

**MASENO UNIVERSITY
S.G. S. LIBRARY**

**COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES ON NATURAL RESOURCES IN UGANDA: A CASE
OF SOUTH BUSOGA FOREST RESERVE**

BY

OTIENO ALPHONSE CHARLES

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE**

SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT AND EARTH SCIENCES

MASENO UNIVERSITY

©2012

Environmental policies on natural resources are as old as the history of man-kind, thus it is common to find an array of policies in the environmental docket in most countries. Despite the myriad of policies made and promulgated by most counties, de-legitimation of the policies on natural resources exists manifested in non-compliance with any of them and their ineffective enforcement in developing countries with a bearing on the new competitive political dispensation amongst these countries, Uganda inclusively. The natural resources have been dished out as handouts hence their petering out, hither to government forest reserves inclusively. This study was out to:-investigate the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy (UFP) 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve (SBCFR); explain the role of politicians with enforcement of the UFP 2001 in SBCFR; and establish the community attitude and willingness of the community living adjacent to SBCFR to comply with the UFP 2001. This was a case study using cross-sectional survey describing existing phenomena with respect to the following variables, compliance, enforcement and political interference with the first two variables. It adopted a QUAL-quant triangulation model given the objectives. The target local community population was 7341 households where 364 households formed the sample size. A total of 344 local community respondents, thus a precision of $\pm 5\%$ at a 95% level of confidence participated from the sampled households and 31 conservationists forming the government regulatory system participated. The instruments used were piloted and using a split-half testing for reliability where a coefficient of 0.83 was attained. Document analysis, observations and interviews were transcribed in the text before analysis and interpretations. The research revealed that there was a moderate correlation between government regulatory system and the local community's compliance with the UFP 2001 at $r = 0.42$. The chi statistic values showed that none of the elements of the government regulatory system was < 9.21 at 0.01 $df = 2$ thus statistically insignificant. It was also found that the elements of government regulatory system were not properly coordinated despite being loosely under NEMA. The SWOT analysis showed that strengths were higher than weakness; where insufficient power and corruption usurped the strengths of NFA in its enforcement. It was also found that local politicians usurped both the powers and authority of NFA in either enforcement of UFP 2001, hence, rendering NFA Officials incompetent. There was a strong relationship at $r = 0.74$ between the politicians' interference and enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR. The local communities were positive towards compliance at Likert Scale rate 360 willing to stop, 305 very much willing to comply with the policy, while 320 some what willing. De-legitimation of forestry policy had a strong bearing on political will to either comply with or enforce it. This has openly led to encroachment of the forest reserves. To avoid de-legitimation of the UFP 2001, there is a need to have a positive political will. The Lead Agencies in the environment docket should be have internal checks and be assertive in management. The policy should be reviewed to include politicians' role. Agro-forestry strategy skewed towards soil fertilization would detach the local community from the forest reserve.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Forest management is as old as the ancestry of the current communities in Uganda. Though scientific forest management accrued from colonialism like in any other developing world, the pre-colonial Uganda's forest management was communal and forests were used as open access resource. In utilization privileges were extended, primarily to some forest products (Mugenyi, *et al* 2005; www.worldwildlife.org, 2009). To strive for sustainability, informal policy existed amongst the chieftaincy or kingdoms where, chieftainship had a right of gifting land, forests inclusive, there were a variety of traditional codes and practices also to that effect besides the forests were assets within a cultural setting (Mugenyi *et al.* 2005, www.worldwildlife.org, 2009; Bikaako-Kajura, 2002). This traditional system was halted with the advent of colonisation and consequent independence of Uganda.

Pre-colonial days is remembered with nostalgia given the symbiotic relationship which existed between the local communities with the natural resources in their proximity bound by unwritten policies. Basing on forests, Bikaako-Kajura (2002) added that the local communities derived their supplementary subsistence needs besides being important cultural and spiritual site. NEMA (2008) asserted that the traditional system relied on a network of traditions and customs that regulated the use of natural resources hence, conservation in the then Uganda. The unwritten natural resource policies were effectively complied with in most developing countries thus, sustainable forest resource utilization.

In Bhutan, an Asiatic country the unwritten forest policy was enforced by very legitimate institutions such as forest protector '*risungpa*' which ensured proper distribution of fuel wood and timber for construction besides enforcing the traditional practice of managing natural resources (Penjore & Raptan, 2009). On the contrary, communities in the East African region had council of elders who enforced policies through sanctions and fines and ensured the sustainable use of communal trees and forest resources (Mwangi, 1998). NEMA (2008) also added that other than unwritten rules, informal but systematic taboos, rituals and rulers, sacred

totems and grooves prohibited behaviours that together aimed at ensuring stewardship of various environmental resources. The gap in the traditional forestry was the local communities by the had; less population, superstitions especially the taboos, the rulers were hereditary and the forest resources were socially utilised as opposed to current economic utility. Thus most forest policies which adopted community management have been challenged globally unless specific role of the community are laid as in collaborative forest management (Otieno, 2003).

The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) records show that by 1890 forests and woodlands covered about 10,800,000ha (45%) of Uganda's land area. Currently, it is about 4,900,000 ha (20%) of the total area of the country (NEMA, 1996 and Ministry of Water Lands and Environment (MWLE) 2001 cited by NEMA, 2004). Uganda's forest loss has been estimated at 50,000 ha per year (FAO, 2000 cited by Kamugisha-Ruhome, 2007). The Uganda government estimates in the same year put annual loss to range between 70,000-200,000 ha per year, in percentage viewed as 0.10%-3.15% (Kamugisha-Ruhome, 2007). This is a manifestation of a rapid decline in the forest cover which could be attributed to a number of factors such as: politics of the country, population pressure, poverty and break down in law and order during the periods of civil unrest in the country hence de-legitimization of forest policy.

The genesis of protection and consequently conservation of natural resources scientifically can be attributed to the works of John Muir (1838-1914) and Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946). John Muir convinced the United States of America (U.S.A) government to establish Semite National Park in 1890 (McKinney & Schoch, 1998). This therefore meant protecting and preserving the national park with all its biomes, contrary to the current conservationist approach with utilitarian stance of Gifford Pinchot. In East Africa generally and Uganda in particular establishment of reserves managed scientifically has a colonial bearing. They were created in order to conserve the erodible forest areas and allow forests to act as the main regulator of the hydrology of an area (Lind & Morrison, 1974; Vink, 1975). Some writers claimed that besides conservation they were to supply fuel wood for the Uganda railway line in Kenya (Omara-Ojungu, 1992; Mwangi, 1998). In Uganda, Hamilton (1984) traced the creation of forestry services in 1898, with the appointment of the first Director to the Scientific and Forestry Department of Uganda thus, ushering in scientific methods and ignored the then traditional ones of the silent majority surrounding the forest reserves up to date.

In the colonial Uganda, the forests were state controlled and not open access as they were in pre-colonial days. The control was through various agreements between the Protectorate Government under Britain and the native authorities as negotiated at the time for instance, Toro Agreement (1900), Ankole Agreement (1909) and later Bunyoro Agreement (1933) (Olet, 1977; Hamilton, 1984). In 1900 the Forestry Regulations giving effect to these provisions was enacted and, in 1907, they were replaced by the first Forestry Ordinance (Olet, 1977). This laid a firm foundation for creation and development of a permanent forest estate by 1910. Hamilton (1984) and Mupada (1997) claimed that to this effect the first forest reserves in Uganda were gazetted in 1932 facilitated by policies and laws put in place by the colonial government. The boundaries of the forest estates, more or less as they are in present Uganda were established in 1940s. The boundaries barred the silent majority from freely accessing the nature's gift and lawfully placed these gifts in the hands of the government.

Formal management of Uganda's forest started in 1900 with rules and regulations but without a policy. The Forest Department was very small and much of its efforts put into direct exploitation, rather than into long term planning, acquisition and development of national forest estate (Obua, *et al*, 1998). The forest policies in Uganda can be traced from the 1929 Nicholson report which recognized the anthropocentric uses of forests, hence creating the need for delimiting and defining forest boundaries (Mugenyi, *et al*, 2005). Prior to it the colonial government capitalized on exploiting the forests, establishing ornamental trees on some plantations and species trial projects (Olet, 1977).

The 1929 forest policy, the first of its kind was crafted without consultations with the local communities. Many writers summed up that the policy provided for sustainable management of the forests, with an inclination on profitability given the capital invested in the project through afforestation of more land (Forest Department cited by Obua *et al*, 1998; Olet, 1977). Olet 1977 continued to assert that through it; the Forestry Ordinance was reviewed empowering the Governor to declare any area a forest reserve. Work plans for forest reserves were drawn up by colonialist. This projected to the independent Uganda where in 1968, the local government forest reserves were amalgamated with the central government forests. This exploitation by the few at the expense of the obstructed majority laid grounds for non-compliance with the policy.

The apparent overriding objective for the creation of forest reserves was to create a sufficiently forested estate that would cater for the country's forest products and service needs as reflected in the 1929 Forest Policy (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). Permits, fees and licenses were therefore introduced to allow utilization of the resources; apart from firewood and poles for domestic use given that forest boundaries had been identified, evidenced by marks on the ground with numbered posts or some other forms of boundary mark as they are currently. Traditional systems of resource management were to this effect criminalized and a more civilized body of state law was adopted. Worse still armed foresters carefully watched over the reserves (Kantwi, 2001; Hamilton, 1984). This in essence meant that the reserves which were in the communities' ancestral land became separate entities from them. But the colonialist could use them at will, a bone of contention.

The forest reserves in Uganda despite being acquired on agreements as earlier mention lay on controversially acquired land. The process of land acquisition for them was gradual, unsystematic and sometimes crude. In some areas forest reserves and wildlife protected areas were declared in occupied territories, in effect denying the holders of the land their proprietary rights. Cases in point are the Batwa whose home was in the Mgahinga and Bwindi Forests, and the Benet community in Tingeyi county, Kapchorwa District occupied areas arbitrarily declared a wildlife protected area (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005; Jaramogi, 2008). Currently people encroaching gazetted forest reserves claim the land ownership portrayed by 78.7% of the community living adjacent to West Bugwe Forest Reserve (WBFR), Busia District (Tenywa, 2007; Otieno, 2003). With increase in population in Uganda, need for land by the communities in the proximity of the forest reserves has escalated thus challenging enforcement of forest policy in the country especially when triggered by politicians.

Post colonial states, Uganda inclusive, inherited the system of state ownership of all natural resources, continuing the colonial traditions. In this case, the state exploits the resources by allocating projects, which people view as benefiting the bureaucrats for instance the degazettement of large area of Namanve (1000ha) and Wabisi-Wajala in Nakasongola District (8,744ha) for industrial expansion. Besides these peri-urban plantations/forest reserves are under pressure such as Mbale, Soroti, Kabale, Fort Portal, Gulu and Tororo (NEMA, 1998; Loeffler, 2000). These have ended up setting conflicts in forest resources exploitations between state agents and the local communities. The politicians capitalise on this to campaign for very

competitive elective posts following a five tier system in Uganda (Sanginga *et al*, 2004; Banana, *et al*, 2007). The politicians' interventions impede either compliance or enforcement of the forestry policy, leading to illegalities in the forest reserves.

Despite the many policies

The National Forestry Authority (NFA) charged with the responsibility of management of Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) evolved from the then Forest Department (FD) institutionalized in 1898. The transformation of NFA from FD started in 1998. It manages CFRs only and performing other forestry functions with the ministry, under the supervision of the minister in charge (MWLE, June 2003; NFTP, 2003 Act N^o. 52.2b). This skews its activities towards politics, an impediment to both compliance and enforcement. Uganda has 506 CFRs (NFA, 2006). Due to negativity vested on the NFA, contrary to the Legitimacy Theory, by benefiting local communities, the body has taken the Luganda connotation "*nfa*" literary meaning "*am dying*" which is a reflector of a strain relationship.

Why the Wildlife

The case study forest reserve, South Busoga Central Forest Reserve (SBCFR) is isolated from other protected areas, surrounded in the north and east by heavily populated agricultural land, making the reserve susceptible to encroachment whilst in the west it grades into lake shore vegetation. The reserve is not especially biodiverse and only of average conservation value, largely as a result of non-compliance. The integrity of the remaining areas of closed forest within the reserve remains under serious threat (Davenport *et al*, 1996). The situation of the forest reserve displays the following key variables at interplay; compliance, enforcement and politics. Politics in this study is an extraneous variable that could not be held constant thus a balancing extraneous variable.

The situation in SBCFR was a tip of an ice berg in the forestry docket of Uganda. The 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy is handy and a conservation panacea curtailed by political meddling in its compliance and enforcement, a situation that prompted this research. Thus, the researcher was puzzled with the following aspects; what is the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve? How are the politicians meddling on enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve? What is the community living adjacent to South Busoga Central Forest Reserve's attitude and willingness to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001?

South Busoga

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the many policies promulgated by the Ugandan government on environment there is delegitimatization of the policies manifested in non-compliance with and ineffective enforcement of the apparently good policies. South Busoga Central Forest Reserve is the largest and important lakeshore forest reserve, in the periphery of Lake Victoria in the Eastern Region of Uganda. The forest reserve form an epitome of serious degradation of forest reserves in Uganda yet forests have anthropocentric values universally known. Due to these values, environmental protection and conservation in Uganda is entrenched in the Ugandan 1995 Constitution (N^o XIII) which came up with a number of environmental policies where the 2001 Forestry Policy paramount to this research, and laws have been promulgated by government. These include, the National Environment Management Act 1995, the Uganda Wildlife Act, 2000, the Land Act 1998, the Water Act 1997, and, the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003 besides them, the following bodies have been established to enforce the policies and laws enacted, National Environment Management Authority, Uganda Wildlife Authority and National Forestry Authority.

This research generally intended to assess the efficacy of environmental policies on natural resources in Uganda; with critical analysis of the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy on conservation of Central Forest Reserves, SBCFR as a case study area.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to assess the compliance and enforcement of environmental policies on natural resources in South Busoga forest reserve, Uganda.

Specific objectives were:-

- i). To investigate the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve.
- ii). To explain the role of politicians' in the enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve.

iii). To establish the attitude and willingness of the community living adjacent to South Busoga Forest reserve to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.

1.4 Research Questions

This study sought to answer the following questions:

- i). What is the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve?
- ii). How are the politicians meddling on enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve?
- iii). What is the community living adjacent to South Busoga Central Forest Reserve's attitude and willingness to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The Ugandan law empowers NFA to protect 506 Central Forest Reserves, which is about 30% of the forest cover country wide (Kamugisha-Ruhome, 2007). NFA is apparently incompetent to block either the government or politicians in general on their actions to change land-use of these reserves exemplified by the giving away of Butamira and Bugala forest reserves besides the impending Mabira CFR. The study yielded data and information useful for the proper planning and decision-making at NFA putting the extraneous politicians into consideration and institutionalization of a framework for the management of actions for the compliance with and enforcement of the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy.

The results of this study revealed existing perceptions that define the relationship between the local communities living adjacent to forest reserves and NFA officials. This information may therefore help in developing strategies for improving the on relations in the need to comply with and enforcement of the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy. It also revealed the role of politicians in

both compliance with and enforcement of the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy, giving workable recommendations.

The study forms a basis for further research in forest policy analysis. It thus led to the generation of new ideas on better and more effective enforcement of environmental policies in Uganda and elsewhere in the world.

1.6 Scope and limits of the study

This study was conducted between June and November 2010 using a case study design and a cross-sectional survey approach. It specifically, adopted a QUAL-quan model of triangulation. The study was conducted in the following parishes close to South Busoga Forest Reserve; Kityerera, Wandegaya, Bubinge, Bukalenzi, Butabira, Bwondha and Namadhi in Mayuge district. A total of 344 respondents from the households participated out of the expected 369 as per table 3.1. Besides, 76 politicians who were part of the household respondents were accessed and 31 members from the government regulatory system (see Table 3.1 & 3.2). Specifically, the unit of analysis was individual human beings residing in the parishes mentioned, NFA officials, local politicians, the police, the judiciary, foresters and environment officers in Mayuge district, Kyoga Range headquarters, Jinja and both NEMA and NFA headquarters, Kampala. Data were collected using questionnaires, interviews, document analysis techniques and observation. The study specifically sought to; determine the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR; establish the impact of politicians' interference in the enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR; and assess the community living adjacent to SBCFR's willingness to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the literature related to the assessment of the efficacy of environmental policies on natural resources with a critical analysis of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 on conservation of Central Forest Reserves. It particularly focuses on the assessment of the efficacy of the forestry policies in curbing deforestation; assessment of the lead agencies' role in enforcing forest policies; establishment of the impact of politicians' interference in the enforcement of the forestry policies and local communities' willingness to comply with forestry policies. These were considered the main aspects of the study and hence reviewed topically as follows:-

2.2. Government regulatory system and enforcement of environmental policies on natural resources

2.2.0 Introduction

Government regulatory system here was taken to be all elements a government uses to ensure compliance with environmental policies. Aspects reviewed under this included among others environmental policies on natural resources with specific emphasis on forestry policies; the mechanism through which enforcement is effected especially by the lead agencies on environmental conservation such as NEMA, UWA and with much emphasis on NFA, a lead agency on forestry in Uganda. It also included other government agencies such as the police force, the laws and acts governing the management of natural resources with particular emphasis on forest reserves.

2.2.1 Compliance with environmental policies on natural resources by the local communities

Several views have been expressed as to define policies by many environmentalists as follows; O’Riordan (2000) claimed that it is a course of action or principle adopted or proposed by a government. This view apparently did not specifically involve all stakeholders in natural resources management, though O’Riordan (2000) added that policies are often flexible in the light of sudden discovery of unexpected information. A policy is a course of action decided upon by a government or by any organization, group, or individual that usually involves a choice among competing alternatives. It becomes a public policy when shaped by government officials (Cummings & Wise, 2003). Sodaro (2001) summed it up as a governmental approach to dealing with a problem or issue. He added that it comprises: (a) ideas, goals and proposals (b) a decision or set of decisions, or (c) an elaborate program or set of actions. Sodaro’s approach is synonymous to most environmental policies aimed at conserving natural resources world wide.

Ndemere (2007) gave a comprehensive view asserting that policies are generally agreed to and purposeful course of action that has important consequences for a large number of people and for a significant number and magnitude of resources. He concurred with O’Riordan (2000) in claiming that the term is reserved for actions that have far reaching effects. In its broadest sense adopted by this research policy refers to programmes, strategies, plans and their implementation resulting from public or collective decision making (Thomson, 2000 cited by Means & Josayma, 2000). In developing countries compliance with environmental policies is a reflector of pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial experiences as seen in the following aspects :-

Many writers agree that forest management in pre-colonial Uganda was communal and forests were used as an open access resource. People utilized them for wood and non-wood forest products. They were a cultural asset within a Kingdom, thus communally managed in the contest of the existing political and cultural institutions at the time (Bikaako-Kajura, 2002; Kamugisha-Ruhome, 2007 and NEMA, 2008). Besides that some elders, through divinations also provided guidance on natural resource utilization and control. Above all to show the intricate relationship, some cultures viz. Banyoro, Baganda, Acholi, Akarimajong planted trees to mark the birth of a child (NEMA, 2008). This ascertained compliance with unwritten rules which were apparently legitimate compared to the current forest policy. The born child could perceive the tree as an age mate needing protection.

In some parts of East Africa, parts of forested areas were held sacred grooves; in which traditional religious ceremonies were conducted by elders. In these places, ceremonies such as sacrifices for bountiful harvests, rain, thanks giving and rites of passages such as circumcision, burial sites for elders were carried out (Castro, 1990 cited by Mwangi, 1998). NEMA (2008) added that certain elders through divinations controlled both access and utilization of the forest resources in these areas. Mwangi, (1998) continued to claim that consumptive activities such as firewood collection and grazing were excluded from such sites. The penalty for illegalities was fines, shunned, considered as a sacrilege and treated as anti-social act, hence, an abomination. Droughts, epidemics and other calamities manifested illegalities in the sacred grooves. In Bhutan, the local community was not to fell trees in the mountains lest they provide the displeasure of local gods and deities, who would then unleash a torrent of rain and hailstorms that destroyed all crops (Penjore & Raptan, 2009). Thus, by way of a variety of traditional codes and practices, communities which depended on renewable resources strived for sustainable utilization (Bikaako–Kajura, 2002). All these were visibly distorted by the advent of colonialism which invented selective conservation of the forest resources at the expense of the local communities.

Traditional natural resource management also had its own predicaments especially outside the sacred grooves, which were relatively small areas, ranging in size of one tenth of an acre to three acres (Castro, 1990 cited by Mwangi, 1998). These included among others shifting cultivation practices and the grazing practices of pastoral communities. According to NEMA (2008), new interests, pressures and technologies however, now supersede the capacity of traditional governance systems to maintain the ecological balance. This is the genesis of the current policies especially the forest policies in developing countries. The current policy with the background of the strength and weaknesses of the traditional and colonial policy brings the local communities in management through aspects as collaborative forest management.

Uganda was a protectorate of Britain and therefore shared with Kenya and later on Tanganyika colonial regulations on natural resources. Forestry in Uganda started in 1899 with the creation of the Botanical and Agricultural Department. This department transformed into the Scientific and Forestry Department, the Botanical and Scientific Department, and the Botanical Forestry and Scientific Department. Initially also included in its responsibilities were agricultural and

veterinary matters, but in 1910, these were deleted to form separate departments. In 1917, the botanical and scientific sections were handed over to Agricultural Department and Forestry became the responsibility of the Forestry Department (Olet, 1977; Hamilton, 1984).

The establishment of forest department in Uganda was in line with the East African Forestry Regulations published in 1892 which transferred management mandate to the Forest Department. The regulations were to curtail forest destruction by shifting cultivators and pastoral communities (Mwangi, 1998; Mbaria, 2001). A number of authors also claimed that the rules provided for the gazettement or de-gazettement of forests; outlined forest offences and their penalties, introduced the compounding of offences; authorized the issue of licenses for permitted activities (Mwangi 1998; Hamilton, 1984; Otieno, 2003; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010; Kantwi, 2001). These therefore pushed the local communities out of them and outlawed their customary laws. The local communities were to comply with rule they did not participate in their making. Non-compliance could have started from this point making the government regulatory system challenged in conservation of the forest reserves.

In Uganda forest policies owe their origins from the 1929 Nicholson report which recognized the vital role that forests and trees play in the environment and created the need for delimiting and defining forest boundaries (Obua *et al*, 1998). According to Olet (1977) the cardinal aspects of this policy were:-

*"To retain under forest or to afforest all areas of land, the retention of which under forest is considered necessary on climatic or other indirect grounds,
To meet, with due regard to vested rights, such of the demands of the population of Uganda as cannot be met by individual or local administrative efforts,
To advise individuals and local native administration, in all matters pertaining to arboriculture or forestry
In so far as is consistent with the three preceding objectives, to manage the state forests of Uganda so that they will give the best financial returns on capital invested."*

(Source: Olet, (1977). *The overall contribution of forestry and forestry industries to the economic development of Uganda*. pp 4)

Subsequent policies such as 1948, 1970, 1988 and currently 2001 oscillated between environmental benefits and production of goods for economic benefit (Resource Management Activities, 1998). Olet (1977) added that between 1930 and 1949 many areas were reserved,

Working Plans for forest reserves were drawn up and in 1968, and the Local Government Forest Reserves were amalgamated with the Central Government Forests. In these apparently no consultations were made to the local communities. The rigid forest management strategies were imposed by the colonial government which rubbished the traditional African forest conservation strategies (Banana *et al*, 2007). This seemingly, was the origin of non-compliance leading to enforcement of forest polices on communities who prior had a mutual relationship with the biosphere in their proximity.

The 1929 Forest Policy and consequent ordinances were not Ugandan in nature. The country run on Royal Instructions of 1921 after it got its first Legislative Council in 1920 where Black Ugandans were excluded in representation until 1945 (Kanyehimba, 2002 quoted by Tumushabe & Bainomugisha, 2004). According to them, throughout the colonial period, there was less legislative activity in all aspects. Most laws were received verbatim from the English Statutes. The various sectoral laws covering environment often referred to as ordinances were a direct replica of the English Law covering similar sectors. These denied the natives their apparent right to participate in the policy making yet were to comply with very punitive enforcement strategies.

Uganda inherited the system of state ownership of all natural resources, continuing the colonial tradition. In this case, the state uses the resources by allocating projects, which people viewed as benefiting the state especially people in government (Loefler, 2000). Prior to 1995, Uganda went through a series of historical episodes that have been characterized by different forms of legislative representation or non-representation at all (Tumushabe & Bainomugisha, 2004). This, therefore, meant that there was no proper legislation on environmental issues apart from ruling by decrees, which disregarded the opinion of the future complaints. This has ended up in de-legitimization of the policies, hence, conflicts between the state agencies and the community living adjacent the resources manifested in the events at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The Uganda Forestry Policy 2001's roots can be traced from the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) launched in August, 1991 and started working in November, 1991 (Aryamanya-Mugisha, 1993). This body was to be time bound; actions oriented and use participatory process in providing a broad framework for integrating environment issues into the overall national socio-economic development plan. It was to be multi-sectoral in all organs of the society, both

public and private. Through NEAP the formulation of the National Environment Management Policy (NEMP) came into force in 1994 (Akello, 2007 b).

NEMP provided a framework under which several sectoral policies were developed viz. the 1995 Water Policy, the 1996 National Wetlands Management Policy, the 1996 Wildlife Policy, the 2000 Fisheries Policy, the 2001 Forestry Policy and several district environment management policies from 2000 till date (Akello, 2007(b). NEMA (2001) added that the policy provides a broad framework for harmonization of sectoral and cross-sectoral policy objectives. Thus, the policy had a comprehensive environmental legal and institutional framework designed. This harmonization was not manifested on the ground as per this research for these sectoral bodies were apparently less concerned with happenings at SBCFR, Mayuge.

NEMP facilitated the making of policies which for the first time in the history of Uganda, explicitly addressed issues such as biodiversity conservation, community participation in resource management and benefit sharing, the roles of civil society and the private sector (NEMA, 2001). Thus the 1988 forestry policy was discarded for it contained limited guidance on principles, strategies for implementations, forestry outside the gazetted reserves and the balance between production and conservation. It was also claimed to be silent on inclusivity especially on the role of government, the private sector and rural communities in forestry, besides the multi-sectoral and institutional linkages. This prompted the making of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 (Republic of Uganda, 2003). The Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 advocates for a greater role for the private sector in forest estate development particularly the establishment of privately owned industrial forest plantations (NEMA, 2001). In SBCFR privatization was evident but without Collaborative Forest Management leading to conflict of interest between lead agencies and the local communities engulfing the forest reserve.

The Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 adopted the all inclusive nature of the process whereby the following were consulted; the central and local government, religions, traditions, research, training international, national and local non-government organizations (The Republic of Uganda, 2001). Contradictorily, this approach fails to explain what drives issues from one stage to the next, overlooks the fact that stages are not always sequential and is too rigid and top down in its view of non-governmental actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993 cited by O'Riordan, 2000). This research found out that the said representative did not have a trickling down effect to the local communities living adjacent SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The Uganda Forestry 2001 emphasized the following in connection to the management of Central Forest Reserves in the country; the permanent forest estate under the government; profitable and productive forestry plantation business; Collaborative Forest Management and water shed protection forests. It also indirectly impacts on Central Forest Reserves through; the development and sustainable management of natural forests on private land; and encouragement of tree-growing on farms (Republic of Uganda, 2002; Republic of Uganda, 2001; Republic of Uganda, 2003). A legal framework was attained by enacting the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003 to replace the Forest Act 1964 (Republic of Uganda, 2001; The Republic of Uganda, 2003). The Act reviewed, the National Environment Statute (1995), the Wildlife Statute (1996), the Water Statute (1995), the Local Government Act (1997), Land Act (1998) and others in order to harmonize them (Republic of Uganda, 2001). The policy emphasized a common management authority for the sectoral institutions concerned with the biodiversity conservation. Thus National Forestry Authority had to develop close links with NEMA, UWA, relevant line ministries, NGOs/CBOs and the private sector (Republic of Uganda, 2001). This was ideal but in reality especially in the district forestry services there was a growing envy skewed towards NFA believed to be better financed, hence, left to battle its own deforestation challenges alone.

Zaelke, *et al* (2005) in quoting an eminent jurist Lon Fuller's description of eight elements of rule of law or policy gave access to compliances and enforcement in that:-

" Law be general in its application, that it be public, that it operates prospectively, that it has reasonable clarity, that it be internally consistent, that it can be practicable to comply with, that is, that there be a genuine congruence between the ought of law and the can, that it be relatively stable; and that there exist a congruence between the world of law and its enforcement. "

The given eight elements are ideal and would lead to general conservation of the environment if taken to the letter. But it is apparent that communities living adjacent, the natural resources are adamant, negligent, or ignorant of law manifested in deforestation and over exploitation of the forest resources in Uganda, exemplified by forest disappearing at an alarming rate (NEMA, 2001/2; Tenywa, 2007; NFA Dec, 2006). This calls for effective enforcement a gap this research based on to be carried out and indeed not filled at SBCFR, Mayuge district manifested by illegality at stone throw from NFA headquarters within the forest reserve.

In the Forestry Policy 2001, Uganda government commits herself in the conservation of the country's rich forest biodiversity, to meet the needs and aspiration of the present generation sustainably. She also recognized that local communities must enjoy adequate benefits from these protected areas and to achieve this, they must have a meaningful participation in the management

(Republic of Uganda, 2001). Since its inception the local communities have not improved instead maintained poverty a major factor pushing them to these protected areas hence encroachment (Natusiimira, 2007). Worse still the government of Uganda has not fully exploited the several categories of policy instruments that are used to implement the natural resource policies, hence encroachments and indiscriminate exploitation of the forest reserves in Uganda. According to Ndemere (2007) these categories include among others; regulatory/control tools, such as laws and bye-laws (the stick), economic/market/ incentives tools (the carrot); communication/moral persuasion tools (the sermon) and contracts/agreements. In case any of these tools have been used, then not fully. This research established that laws and bye-laws were used but no incentives given, hence a disincentive to the local communities.

Environmental policy failures can result from poor design reflected in a lack of key elements, misplaced authority structures and inappropriate financing. Thus new policies are adopted for political purposes, but can run counter to informal policies, attitudes or procedures that support the status quo. Policies can also be unsuccessful because they are never actively implemented due to an absence of political will or lack of operational plans (<http://www/E:/PARTS II>, 2007). Contrary, Uganda's Forestry Policy has a vision, strategies and checklist for the impact (Republic of Uganda, 2001). Ironically, it has apparently failed in SBCFR which is a tip of the ice berg. From the policy, it is clear that very few people if any directly affected especially, the local communities attended workshops to make the policy. This is manifested by all over 450 families settled in the forest reserves, claiming ancestral inheritance like in any other reserve in the country (<http://www/E/Uganda Tours>, 2007; Otieno, 2003). Thus was a predicament to the enforcement of the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

EPA (1992) asserted that environmental policy enforcement by the government involves; inspections, negotiations with individuals or facility managers, legal actions, compliance promotion and non-governmental groups. An effective enforcement programme involves several components, such as, creating requirements that are enforceable, knowing who is subject to the requirements and setting program priorities, promoting compliance in the regulated community; monitoring compliance; responding to violations, classifying roles and responsibilities; and evaluating the success of the programme and holding programme personnel accountable for its success (EPA, 1992; Glaser, 1995). NEMA (2004/05) reports that in Uganda enforcement is still problematic attributed to limited human resources, low capacity of Lead Agencies and local

governments for enforcement. Glaser (1995) thus claimed that the governments must demonstrate that it has the will to enforce policies that it passes. An effective compliance and enforcement scheme applied evenly and consistently can have a profound impact on improving the environment. The gap envisaged on these was the political will to cause enforcement of the forestry policy so as to attain compliance. This reserve needs inclusion of the politicians within the policies so as effectively enforce the policies.

The gigantic nature of concerned sectors directly and indirectly involved in the forestry sector compels co-ordination. On this, the policy requires representation from central government ministries involved in the forest sector, local governments, the private sector and civil society. This was expected to ensure a coordinated and balanced sectoral approach (Republic of Uganda, 2001). According to the Uganda's 1995 constitution, the state is obligated to adopt an integrated and coordinated approach in the protection of the country's natural resources (The 1995 Constitution, cited by NEMA, 1998). This therefore discourages the traditional style and sectoral nature of environmental policies at all cost (NEMA, 1998). In line with this Uganda, has an eleven flexible cabinet ministers committee chaired by the Prime Minister, to provide policy guidelines, formulate and co-ordinate environmental issues in the country for NEMA and liaise with the cabinet on issues affecting the environment such as, compliance with and enforcement of policies (NEMA, 1999; NEMA, 2004/05). The Ugandan President's Executive Order 2006 puts the work of the committee in jeopardy for the local communities exploited this to occupy the reserve with impunity (refer to appendices; III, IV, V, VI & VII).

The current forestry policy of Uganda is in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995. According to the Republic of Uganda 2001, the policy is also in line with the national objectives and directive principles guiding sustainable development as in article XIII (Protection of Natural Resources) regarding, "the protection of important natural resources on behalf of the people of Uganda". According to Article 237(2) (b) of the constitution there is the public trust doctrine which puts the forest reserves and sensitive natural resources on the government or local governments' trust and protection for the common good of all citizens of Uganda. Besides the given, the constitution also enshrines a constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment in its Article 39 (Akello, 2007(a)). The same constitution vests all land in the citizens of Uganda. It also provides for the protection of the family, provision for the marginalised and vulnerable

communities or groups to reduce the imbalances which exist against them (Kagwa, 2006). The policy therefore basing on the given aspects has the following overall goal.

"An integrated forest sector that achieves sustainable increases in the economic, social and environmental benefits from forests and trees by all the people of Uganda, especially the poor and vulnerable."

(Source: Republic of Uganda, (2003). *Forests and Trees-Our Future. Briefing notes on the Uganda Forestry Policy*. Front page).

This clearly shows a gap where the documents are never read in either unison or full. Each stakeholder truncated them to suit their needs. For instance, the government's efforts to change land use in Mabira Central Forest Reserve and Bugala Island in Kalangala District; and civil society using Article 50 of the 1995 Constitution to enforce public interest litigation (Akello, 2007(b)). Besides, evictions of the landless and helpless groups abruptly without alternative livelihood were inconsistent with constitutionalism (Wataswa, 2009). All these were at inter play at SBCFR, Mayuge District, where the locals claimed and occupy half of the forest reserve.

2.2.2 The National Forestry Authority and enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001

Forestry in Uganda like elsewhere falls under the biosphere aspect of environment, a justification of its being under NEMA. Principally, NEMA is the main government lead agency for the management of environment. It is mandated to coordinate, monitor and supervise all activities in the field of the environment (Akello, 2007(a); NEMA, 2008). NFA is a sectoral lead agency charged with the management of central forest reserves in Uganda. Thus, directly enforce the forest policy and liaise with NEMA in the protection of Uganda's forest resources (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). In SBCFR, the body was viewed as anti-development of the area and locally referred to as "*nfa*" a local translation of "*am dying*". Thus, the body had very strained relations with encroachers of the forest reserve. The researcher was therefore out to investigate the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the forestry policy 2001.

In Uganda like other once colonized countries, on attainment of independence all natural resources became property of the government. The Forest Act of 1964 retained the colonial administration approach of the forestry management. Under the 1967 constitution, forest resources were centralized and management vested in the Forest Department (FD) (Olet, 1977). The NFTP (2003) replaces the FD with an autonomous body the National Forestry Authority

(NFA). According to the NFA (2005), the organization manages forestry department activities in 506 Central Forest Reserves (CFR) in the country. It does this in partnership with the private sector such as companies, firms, non-governmental organisations; community based organizations, and individuals, the central government and Local Government (LGs) in accordance with the NFTP (2003). Thus, legally NFA is a corporate body with an official seal and may for the discharge of its functions among others in reference to this research sue or be sued (Act N^o. 52.2b of NFTP, 2003). It is under the general supervision of a minister as per the Act (NFTP, 2003).

The government of Uganda commits itself in Uganda Forestry Policy (UFP) 2001 to "...actively protect, maintain and sustainably manage the current Permanent Forest Estate" the purpose of this estate is conservation of biodiversity, protection of environmental services and sustainable production of domestic and commercial forest produce (UFP Statement N^o.1). It also commits itself to "...promote the conservation and wise use of representative examples of all ecosystems and species in the country (UFP Policy statement N^o.7). NFA does all these on behalf of the government. The body has established a law enforcement unit, charged with eviction of encroachers in the reserves. Besides it embarked on a three-phase strategy; opening the boundaries, sensitizing the people on the importance of forestry and evicting the encroachers (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). This strategy has then been changed to be summed up as sustainable forest management with an urge to improve on the forests and collaborative forest management within the periods of July 2006-June 2016 (NFA, 2006). Evictions have been a challenge to the body and thus a test to the legitimacy of the policy and enforcers as experienced at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

NFA's vision is to "contribute to a sufficiently forested, ecologically stable and economically prosperous Uganda." It has a mission which is to "manage the Central Forest Reserves on a sustainable basis and to supply high quality forestry-related products and services to government, local communities and the private sector." The objectives are piece meal replica of the mission. The authority cherishes the following values; integrity, excellency, and transparency (NFA, 2005). The vision apparently is realistic, credible and attractive thus in concomitant with Stacey (2000). It is thus realistic and attractive to have a sufficiently forested and therefore ecologically stable Uganda, but the ground was not fertile for that due to political interference and encroachment by community living adjacent to the forested areas, mainly attributed to poverty

and population pressure. The credibility of the vision was also in doubt despite the attractive values supposed to be cherished, given the fact that the then FD they inherited the management mantle from were corrupt, ill-equipped to encounter encroachment, bad supervisors, and with bad reputation (Hamilton, 1984). Worse still enforcing an all inclusive forestry policy of 2001 with objectives, selectively for CFR was also a challenge as established at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

NFA has apparently adopted Peter Drucker's management by objectives (MBO) coined in the 1950s. This uses a five steps model in management. The first step involves identification of key results areas in the organization and the determination of measures of performance exemplified by the vision and mission of the organization (Okumbe, 1998). The objectives are stated and agreed upon at this stage. The second stage, the workers and the organization are developed for effective application of MBO. Contradictorily, this stage was pre-existent before the workers were employed by the organization. This was done by the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003 before NFA was formed (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). This then required orientation, seminars and workshops for employees to propel the organizational goals. Besides, sensitization of the local community with whom they work was paramount but very much lacking on the ground. This therefore meant conflict of interest as at SBCFR in Mayuge District manifested on the meek position of the local communities influenced by the local politicians.

Okumbe (1998) had it that in the third stage individual objectives are set and action plans determined. The individual objectives are determined by both the superior and his/her subordinates. Periodic appraisals make the fourth stage, which is diagnostic and takes place about every three months. The final appraisal is done once every year in the fifth stage and provides an overall diagnosis and evaluation. NFA according to the research carried out does one appraisal which to them was overall. According to the National Forestry Plan on which NFA's objectives oscillated, results oriented management (ROM) process was ideal given the fact that the objectives were to be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound (SMART). The Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment is to ensure effective performance management and budgeting by setting annual targets for each of the expected outcomes (Republic of Uganda, 2002). SBCFR has been settled and permanently turned into farm land. This therefore, thwarted the objectives of the organization.

Bowman and Asch (1992) acknowledged that if MBO is carried out skillfully and with commitment in an atmosphere of trust between management and subordinates, it can be a powerful change mechanism. Unfortunately NFA was handicapped by the following factors curtailing its success; in the management of CFRs in Uganda; the environment, the technology it employed, the history of the organization and the expectations of the employees (Stacey, 2000). According to Buyinza (2010), the institutional framework and thinking of managers reflect the past and apparently irrelevant for effective change. They are still viewed as corrupt, few in number and partially engage in illegal activities as at SBCFR, Mayuge District.

The cardinal role of NFA is enforcement of forestry policy. In other countries lead agencies of its equivalent carry out activities such as; inspection to verify compliance, investigation of violations; measures to compel compliance without resorting to formal court action such as, directives by the Minister or enforcement officers ticketing and environmental protection compliance orders by enforcement officers; and measure to compel compliance through court action such as injunctions, prosecution, court orders upon conviction and civil suit for recovery of costs (Canada, 2001). Missing on the Canadian approach to enforcement is a grace period within which the illegal activities must be discontinued, in order to avoid the stated sanction being imposed. After the grace period a coercive penalty can be administered (Kok, 2005). This by the East African standards was a period of notice to evictions. Sometimes they were done hastily as in the case of Maasai Mau evictions done in five hours time yet no alternative accommodation was given to the evictees (Amnesty International, 2007). This research revealed the same for SBCFR in Mayuge District where households claimed that no eviction notices were given.

NFA established in 2003 and become operational in early 2004. The body inherited an extremely bad situation but in less than six months of its services reversed the situation into what was internationally acclaimed as the "*Uganda Miracle*" (Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). In early 2006 according to Kamugisha–Ruhombe (2007) it turned to the status of the then FD, especially corruption where ranks of NFA senior management were implicated. Hamilton (1984) claimed that corruption manifested itself in the following ways; personal acquisition, unauthorized sale, or renting of forest estate; illegal pit sawing, collection of bribes to over look illegality and misuse of departmental vehicles. Mupada (1997) admitted that the vice was synonymous with

the then FD. This challenges the values cherished by NFA viz. excellence, integrity and transparency. The same was evident in SBCFR; Mayuge District.

In Costa Rica, the organic environmental law created two new important institutions, viz. the Environmental Attorney and the Administrative Environmental Tribunal where the Environmental Attorney is responsible for prosecuting any violation of environmental law to the Attorney General's Environmental office besides participating in the national environmental programmes (Kok, 2005). In Uganda, there is a team responsible for monitoring in the Directorate of Environmental Monitoring and Compliance, referred to as the Environmental Regulation and Enforcement Team (ERET), which meets bi-monthly. It is responsible for ensuring well-co-ordinated and integrated development and implementation of environmental impact assessment and audit monitoring in the country (NEMA, 2004/5). Kagwa (2006) in his presentation had it that the police as an institution in Uganda is mandated to maintain law and order and in particular the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the principle agency responsible for investigating all criminal cases in the country including those of environmental nature, has a cardinal role to play in containing environmental crimes. This has less if any to show on the ground in Uganda. Ironically, a police station has been established in SBCFR to legitimize the settlement in the forest reserve other than evicting the encroachers at Nakalyango trading centre.

Michalak and Bularga (2002) claimed that institutional barriers constrain greater use of either enforcement powers or non-compliance responses such as weak position of enforcement agencies within the governmental structure and vis-à-vis industry and insufficient levels of penalties. NEMA (2004/5) reported that in Uganda enforcement was still problematic attributed to limited human resources, low capacity of lead agencies and local governments for enforcement. Glaser (1995) thus claimed that the government must demonstrate that it has the will to enforce the laws that it passes. An effective compliance and enforcement scheme applied evenly and consistently can have a profound impact on improving the environment. From SBCFR it was clear that the Ugandan government was unwilling to enforce the policy given the politicians' condoning encroachment hence de-legitimization of the policy.

Like most sectors of the government, forestry department is ill-financed. The sector takes 1.5% of the government's budget allocation, shared with other sectors in the environment docket (NEMA, 2008). This has been manifested in few staff many of whom according to Poffenberger

(1996) were office bound, heavily burdened with administrative duties. This therefore hampers with field time responsible for supervision and monitoring activities of local communities. D'Silva and Appanah (1993) also added that this limits if any, research, thus lack of reliable data and inadequate knowledge of forest growth and part time encroachments. Besides there was lack of equipments to effectively supervise SBCFR with only two motor-cycles at the station. Besides, fueling the two motor-cycles meant long protocol for authorization hence not flexible for emergency supervisions.

The NFTP 2003 reiterates the constitutional provision that all forests vest in the government which holds them in trust for the people of Uganda (Sec; 5, The Republic of Uganda, 2003). Section 54 of the same Act, has it that the government delegated its managerial powers over forest reserves to the NFA. Section 14 and 32 prohibits unauthorized conduct in a forest reserve which includes encroachment. The offence is punishable as per the same sections. This gives NFA powers to evict encroachers from all CFRs in Uganda (Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). With the background of diminishing forest cover the National Forest Plan (2002) mandated both NFA and UWA to ensure security of the permanent forest estates (PFE) boundaries by:

“Identifying boundaries that are not clear or that are disputed; surveying and agreeing on boundaries, ensuring legal instruments for boundary changes, rationalising boundaries if necessary and resolving disputes, making boundaries appropriately with concrete chains, earth mounds, directional trenches or tree planting and enforcing the law with regular patrols and continuous monitoring.”

(Source: Republic of Uganda (2002). *The National Forest Plan*, pp 38)

This research revealed that NFA, has only authority but power was vested on politicians and other sectors of government, which kept changing stands on conservation of forest reserves. Besides that, there was insufficient supervision if any, leave alone monitoring of the SBCFR with very unclear boundaries.

2.3 Political interference with the enforcement of Forestry Policies

Hornby (2000) defined a politician as “a person who is good at using different situations in an organization to try to get power or advantage for him/her.” He therefore continues to assert that politics “is the activities involved in getting and using power in public life, and being able to influence decisions that affect a country or society.” In quoting the 19th Century British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, Cummings and Wise (2003) viewed politics as the possession and distribution of power. They went further through the example of V.O Key to equate politics with

the process and practice of ruling and the workings of governments generally and concluded that politics is the pursuit and exercise of power. Where power, is the possession of control over others. Sodaro (2001) added that power centres on dominion and influence.

Sodaro (2001) further viewed politics as “the process by which communities pursue collective goals and deal with their conflicts authoritatively by means of government.” Jordan and O’Riordan (2000) claimed that it arises because communities have to find a way to take joint decisions. Thus it can involve balance and compromise, but in practice it is often extremely divisive creating winners and losers. Politics does pervade every aspect of life, hence politicization of everything. Through it, people articulate their preferences and also adopt them at the same time. This leaves the protected areas in a very precarious situation as envisaged by the situation of SBCFR, where the conflict between NFA and the local communities engulfing the reserve had become a driving force of politics.

Central in these definitions of politics is the term power which is viewed by Jordan and O’Riordan (2000) as the ability to achieve a desired outcome. They claimed that politics often takes place through the action of certain interests achieved at the expense of other interests, thus justifying why politics is often conducted by pressure groups, or lobbies or coalitions, creating a strategy for getting their way. In quoting Blondel (1991) they defined politics as “the activity by which decisions are arrived at and implemented in and for a community. Jordan and O’Riordan (2000) continued to claim that the main interest of political scientists is not only in how decisions are made but also in who has the powers to make them or to avoid them. They seek to know who has power, how it is used and on what basis it is exercised. This makes politics very competitive hence, tilted towards endless promises which include degazettement of forest reserves as established by this research at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Jordan and O’Riordan (2000) characterizes five important attributes of politics as follows; politics; is an activity about decision making, involves power, occurs within communities and social networks, and is everywhere. Dietz and Hoogervorst (2002) further explained that a politician is depicted as omniscient, perfectly knowing how transactions prevent welfare, increase and knowing how this can be corrected or prevented. Besides, s/he would be benevolent because while interviewing, s/he only has eyes for the common good, at the same time ignoring his/her private interest which might be conflicting with the public interest. In the event of conflict the environment suffers. Cases in point are politicians from the Rift Valley Province of

Kenya opposing a planned eviction of squatters from the Mau forests (<http://www.nation.co.ke>, 2009). Astute politicians are not only participants in the process of setting social objectives; they have crucial positions in the community. They have tripartite task, viz.

*" To assess which preferences citizens have for environmental utilization
To set the relative weights of needs competing for the only limited available
environmental goods; and
To translate the high priority preferences in to concrete social objectives for
environmental utilization."*

(Source: Dietz, F. & Hoogervorst, N. (June, 2002). *Goals for Environmental Policies: Analysing the Role of Politicians and Economists*).

The enactment of the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute of 1987 established a five-tiered system of elected Local Councils (L.Cs) (Banana *et al* , 2007). According to them the nested layer structure and mechanisms of local governance was build on and mimic the administrative hierarchy of the then and present Buganda Kingdom. Sanginga, *et al* (2004) explained the system as follows, the L.C 1–*Butongole* (village of about 50–100 households) comprising all adults residing in a particular village who elect nine member village local council executive committee. Beyond the L.C.1, in ascending geographical size there are parishes headed by elected L.C.II–*Muluka* chairperson that is composed of 3–10 villages. L.C.II's composition depends on the number of villages elected from the village, has at least 4 women.

L.C.III–*Gombolola*, sub-county composes of 2–10 parishes. It has members elected depending on the number of parishes, 1/3 women; 2 youth, 2 persons with disabilities and elected councilors from parishes. The L.C.IV–*Saza*–County comprise 3–5 sub-counties, thus has 5 chairpersons or vice chairpersons from each sub-county. L.C V *Buganda Lukiiko*-district composed of 3-5 counties and has the following members 36; 12 women councilors, 2 youths, 2 people with disabilities and 19 elected councilors. The district L.C.V is the highest level of local government and links with central government. Banana *et al* (2007) added that this layer provide a viable platform for crafting by-laws and enforcing forest rules at the various levels of local governance. Since the local councilors are forest users they are accountable to other forest user groups through elections.

Saberwal (2000) has it that politicians do respond to voter demands for lifting of restrictions on access to forest resources so as to gain sufficient importance in a given constituency. They do this due to; personal benefits by politicians through allowing preferential access to natural

resources especially forests by fulfilling electoral promises. Sanginga *et al* (2004) further claimed that the provision of local government elections guarantee widespread representation at the various councils and include quotas by gender, people with disabilities and youths. For instance, at least one third of the council members must be women, an affirmative action to empower women and promote gender equity. In Philippines and Malaysia, politicians often hold large logging concessions and provide contracts in return for political support and other favours (Pearl, 1996). Given all these experiences, politicians from regions adjacent natural resources actively and by proxy participate in their exploitation. SBCFR testifies this fact vehemently.

Uganda like many African countries adopted democracy as a system of government. The etymology of the concept of democracy is traced from two Greek roots, *demos*, “the populace” and *kratia*, “rule” – taken together, “rule by the people” (Cummings & Wise, 2003). According to Schmidt *et al* (2005) democracy hinges on majoritarianism theory where the government ought to do what the majority of the people want. Politicians being mandated representatives, take decisions independently without perpetual intermediate consultations with their constituencies (Dietz & Hoogervorst, 2009). According to Anderson *et al* (2005), politicians actively support forest governance when they see a positive political mileage in the support. Schmidt *et al* (2005) hold the same notion in the elite theory where a society is ruled by a small number of people who exercise power to further their self interest. It was this view which distalised NFA at SBCFR, hence de-legitimization of the policy and consequent deforestation.

Most countries have adopted the American system of election where the winner takes it all. This makes a candidate to make strategies on capturing all votes of their party's supporters, to convince a majority of the independent voters and gain a few votes from supporters of the other party (Schmidt *et al*, 2005). In a bid to coalesce voters around a candidate in developing countries, the populous local communities around forest reserves are promised land in the forest estate. A testimony to this was the Executive Order by Ugandans' President Yoweri Museveni in 2006 which has never been evoked. Besides, the President of Uganda Iddi Amin's call for double production after the departure of Asians had earlier introduced the local communities engulfing the protected areas, to utilize the protected areas (Nsangi, 2006; Hamilton, 1984).

Uganda, like most countries in parliamentary elections, candidates only need to canvass most votes to be elected hence competitive. This thus becomes a major factor behind the political insecurity of elected politicians (Kavanamur, 2001). Given the fact that politicians are not sure of

next elections, promises and behaviour while in office contradicts sustainability of environment. Nsita (2006) reported that after demarcations and evictions, the NFA embarked on planting the formerly encroached land with indigenous species of trees. These were thwarted by the general election campaigns where, many local politicians promised the land desperate and unsuspecting people to change the boundary and de-gazette the forest reserves. Besides, they claimed the NFA harassed the local people conducting illegal evictions and other related false allegations. This was a driving force for the local communities to illegally utilize the forest estate with impunity in SBCFR.

Currently, political interference with the management of the forestry sector is high in Uganda. It is assumed that official statements from government indicate a shift in its position on the sanctity of protected areas especially the CFRs (Kamugisha–Ruhome, 2007). This apparently oozed from National Resistance Movement's (NRM) the ruling party in Uganda manifesto chapter 2 N^o 91 "Review the policy on forest reserves to ensure equitable usage of forestry resources" and partly pacified by N^o 92 "Pursue policies to ensure a clean and safe environment." In the same year the Presidential Executive Order 2006 stopping evictions was dispatched (NRM Manifesto, 2006; Nsangi, 2006). Kamugisha–Ruhome (2007) further stated that, these aspects have posed a slow effect but discernible disintegration of the alliance of the law enforcement agencies, which NFA painstakingly stitched together in its first two years of establishment. Nsangi (2006) added that with this, lawlessness has cropped up in forest reserves evident at SBCFR in Mayuge District. The forestry policy is clear on how the community can be used enhance conservation in the forest reserves. Therefore the local communities as per this research are to be partners in the management of SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Politicians play an increasingly critical role in environmental governance in general through; deciding the passing of the Acts, policies, how environmental regulations are enforced, protection of vulnerable ecosystems and assistance offered to manage resources in the proximity of local users (Anderson *et al*, 2005). Surprisingly, environmental issues rarely in Uganda receive a political airing especially not in pre-election periods, simply because no politician can subsume analysis and solutions into simple, tabloid dimensions (Jordan & O' Riordan, 2000). In Uganda for long there has been confusing government policies coupled with irresponsible political statements seeking cheap popularity. Thus over 80% of encroachments in Uganda's forest reserves have the backing of politicians who usually trade forest reserve land for votes

(Jao & Kiyingi, 2005). These apparently irresponsible statements arise from gaps not addressed in either Acts or Policies hence deter enforcement of forest policy as seen in SBCFR, Mayuge district. This consequently then calls for the politicians to be included in the enforcement of the forestry policy as recommended in this research.

In Uganda due to poverty, ignorance, proximity and population pressure, the local communities, have chosen to listen to political pronouncements both local and national. They thus disregard professionals in forestry with a perception that they are detractors (Natusiimira, 2007). In this case, professionals are seen as anti-development and anti-people besides being ill-advisers. Anderson *et al* (2005) have it that politicians in general are worry about staying in power. To this effect according to Dietz and Hoogervorst, (2009) a politician can choose to follow his/her own convictions and beliefs despite his/her knowing that it would convince a sufficient amount of voters. A testimony to this in Uganda is when encroachers' population, which was 180,000 in 2004/05, increased by 23% following a presidential directive to halt evictions of encroachers from gazetted reserves in 2006 (Alweny, 2007; Nsangi, 2006). This de-legitimizes policies enacted by them hence boomeranging enforcement of forest policies.

Anderson *et al* (2005) in a research carried out in Bolivia and Guatemala established that conventional impediments to successful policy implementation are lack of training and administrative capacity, thus impairing compliance with natural resource protection responsibilities. Besides that Ndemere (2007) added that it is imperative that natural resource managers be concerned about both resources and people. To him, natural resources policy objectives must be closely related to the general objectives, attitudes and values of society itself. The number of NFA officials despite their qualifications, cannot counteract what politicians do exploit, for instance, the relationship between the environment and society being two-way. The way the regulated communities think about and respond to "objective" environmental resources is itself deeply political. Due to failure to explicitly draw attention of the regulated communities, there are often unending struggles between the communities and government agencies whose perceptions of the management of resources are competing over appropriation of benefits (Jordan & O'Rordan, 2000; Ndemere, 2007).

In order to harmonise enforcement of environmental policies and Acts in Uganda there is an Inter-Ministerial Policy Committee (IPC) composed of eleven cabinet ministers as a supreme organ of NEMA. This is chaired by the Prime Minister. The IPC provides policy guidance and

co-ordinates environmental issues in various sectors and liaises with cabinet on issues affecting the environment generally. Besides this, NEMA has a Board of Trustees which oversees the implementation and successful operation of policy and function of NEMA (NEMA, 2004). At district level through decentralization policy, there is a provision in the Uganda's Local Government Act 1997 which involves devolution of powers from the central government to the district and other lower councils. The district environmental committees established through NEMA guidelines, in consultations with the district local councils are expected to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated in the district plans and projects, formulate by-laws, promote dissemination of environmental information and prepare the district state of environment reports annually (NEMA, 1998). Through the NFTP, 2003 N^o. 16.1 it is within their prerogative to seek for reclassification of any forest reserve within their political jurisdiction (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). This therefore puts politicians at a central point in enforcement of policies and by laws they pass contrary to what is on the ground. Hence, a strong need for political will to legitimize the forestry policy as exemplified by illegalities practiced in SBCFR with impunity.

In Uganda, the government is entrusted with the management of natural resources for the general benefit of the people (The Republic of Uganda, 1995 Article 273). The Constitution of Uganda continues to assert that, in management, the parliament authority by law is expected to provide measures intended to protect and preserve the environment from abuses, pollution and degradation, and to promote environmental awareness (The Republic of Uganda, 1995). The role of parliament and by extrapolation government protection of natural resources reserves is under the law of trusts, where a trustee holds the legal title to the property (Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). Abuse of the legal title to the property in natural resources reserves is experienced among others by encroachment. Encroachment manifests as earlier mentioned in the forest reserves. It is contrary to section 32 (1) of NFTP (2003) which lists them as activities prohibited in the forest reserves, unless permitted in accordance with the forest management plan. Through both the local and national politicians the local communities living adjacent SBCFR and others from outside the parishes in the reserve's neighbourhood had legalized encroachment.

In Uganda according to Nsita (2006) in the country's 2006 general elections campaigns, politicians' promises accompanied by allegations that NFA officials harass local people; conduct illegal evictions and other false allegations were a disservice to the integrity of the CFRs. This

does not always depict the time lags between political pronouncements and apparent results, for by the time the mess is discovered, the politicians would have left the offices (Dietz & Hoogervorst, 2009). The electioneering period in most developing countries, put the trust the government has on forest policy at stake, thus de-legitimizing it as seen in Uganda generally and in SBFCR, Mayuge district in particular.

Encroachment in Uganda has its genesis from the then president of Uganda Iddi Amin who officialised encroachment in the country by then (Hamilton, 1984). Characteristically, the regulated communities are always meekly skewed towards political allegiance and personalities. Uganda's current president, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, has also done the something similar by directing the NFA to stop all evictions from the forest reserves. Thus, many people have made their ways back to the CFRs (Tenywa, 2007). There was evidence that main politicians didn't comply with privatization demands of CFRs in Uganda, where specific trees were to be planted; instead they planted commercial and food crops in the forest reserves (Lumu, 2007). It had also been observed that politicians dubbed "Private developers" and other politically backed encroachers were destructive to the reserves. The painstaking issue then was the legitimacy of the policies, acts, and the constitution passed by these apparently elusive politicians.

Tumushabe and Bainomugisha (2004) in citing Rosenthal's writings identified at least four ways in which faithful representation can be demonstrated as; "being one of them; providing service to them; acquiring services for them, and expressing their policy views and interests." Thus in developing countries representation is expressed in form of "being one of them". Voters feel contented when they physically associate with their representative through talking and communicating their problems as a form of therapy even if the problems are not solved. A testimony to this was when over 100,000 residents of Mayuge District petitioned the MPs on the natural resource committee on evictions by NFA from Kityerera and Malongo sub-county forest reserve (<http://E:\NFA News>, 2007). Dietz and Hoogervorst (2009) added that voter will replace representatives who cannot realize the wanted and promised set of social goals. The same was proposed in the new Kenyan constitution that the electorate had a right to recall their representative under article 104; 1 despite a check on article 104; 2 (Republic of Kenya, 2010). Contradictorily, environmental issues' life time exceed the time lag between political decisions and apparent results. Thus by the time citizens discover environmental mess, the responsible politicians would have left offices.

In Uganda, apparently, since the creation of the first legislature in 1920 up to 1985, there were no clear cases that demonstrate how legislators have championed the environmental interests of their constituencies. Environmental issues, forests inclusive were largely political through decrees, personal and other considerations rather than from constituencies' demands (Tumushabe & Bainomugisha, 2004). Mugenyi *et al* (2005) had it that 1981–86 the government encouraged settlements in the reserves, which had become good sites for guerilla warfare. Thus, much of SBCFR was cleared for settlement. The forest department failed to evict the encroachers between 2000–2001 due to lack of resources and politicization of the forest reserves. NFA tried in the first two years after its inception and has currently followed the suit of the then FD despite effective legislation on environment since 1986 (Kamugisha-Ruhome, 2007). This therefore meant the demise of SBCFR, Mayuge district as revealed by this research in chapter four.

2.4 The local communities living adjacent forest reserves' attitude and willingness to comply with environmental policies

A community can be viewed as any interacting collectivity of individuals, from the tiniest village to the world as a whole (Sodaro, 2001). According to the NFTP A N^o. 3 Local Community refers to;

"Households and persons living in a defined geographical area, in close proximity to a forest, and identified by common history, common culture or common residence, and may include all the residents of a village which shares a boundary with a forest."

(Source: The Republic of Uganda (2003). *The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act* pp 10)

This research capitalized on household or persons living in villages which share a boundary with SBCFR, in Mayuge District. These were heterogeneous in nature given the migrations currently in the country, hence had no homogeneity in language, history and the like. Though majority share many commonalities especially being from the Basoga community.

2.4.1 Causes of non-compliance with environmental policies on natural resource

The U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1992) defined compliance as the full implementation of environmental requirement. It occurs when requirements are met and desired changes are achieved. According to the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE, 2008) it is the behaviour response to regulatory requirements or conformity with the law. Without it, policies will not achieve the desired results of improved

environmental quality. Achieving it usually involves enforcement efforts to encourage and compel the behavioural changes needed to achieve compliance (<http://www.inece.org/> enforcement principles, 2007). UNEP (2006) added that it is conformity with obligations, imposed by a state, its competent authorities and agencies on the regulated community, whether directly or through conditions and requirements, permits, licenses and authorisations. Thus without behavioural changes or conformity with either the law or policy non-compliance manifests, hence enforcement of policies to defiant persons.

Akello (2007(b)) had it that Uganda's sectoral policies on environment include among others; the Wetland Policy 1994, Wildlife Policy 1996, Fisheries Policy 2000; Forestry Policy 2001, and the National Energy Policy 2000. Sectoral legislations include; Uganda Wildlife Act Cap 200, the Land Act Cap 227, the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003 including subsidiary legislation under respective Acts. Broughton (2002) claimed that in the regulatory context compliance is a complex, flexible, dynamic and interactive process that can include various states of affairs, from on going efforts to achieve and maintain regulatory requirements, to phased-in progress towards compliance in the future and even to justifiable temporary non-compliance. The Dutch Government (2004) in the Table of Eleven has it that non-compliance decrease the chance of realizing the policy objective. Moreover, legislation is also meant to be complied with; compliance maintains the legal nature of society, and non-compliance affects that nature.

The NFTP 2003 N^o 14 forbids the following in the CFRs in Uganda: cutting, disturbing, damaging, burning or destroying any forest produce or removing or receiving any forest produce except with authorisation (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). This, therefore, makes the following activities carried in most CFRs illegal, charcoal burning, farming and settlement, pit sawing, grass burning, hunting and firewood collection (Otieno, 2003). Contradictorily NFTP 2003 N^o 33; 1 allows using dry wood or bamboo in reasonable quantities for domestic purposes; while 33; 2 completely forbids as in N^o.14 in a strict nature or a site of special scientific interest. Thus whoever was found in the CFRs carrying out the given aspects was encroaching the reserve as seen in SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Encroachment a testimony of non-compliance manifests itself as follows among others in most CFRs, South Busoga inclusively; settlements, cultivation; grazing and infrastructural development (Watasa, 2009). NFA (2010) in assessing the current situation of encroachment in

CFRs viewed encroachment as the entry of people with their activities in CFRs without permission, in contravention of Section 32 of the NFTP of 2003. They claimed that the entry can be deliberate or unknowingly for the earlier mentioned purposes. According to them at least 300 out of the 506 CFRs have encroachers, who have the following within the forest estate: cultivated land, livestock, permanent and semi-permanent houses; schools, churches, mosques, cattle dips, health centre, kraals, markets and illegal land titles. Encroachment can be attributed to either or some of the following pull and push factors.

Poverty is a driving force to utilization of the forest resources hence, non compliance. NFP (2002) claimed that 35% of the people in Uganda who live below the poverty line are in rural areas, and marginalized as unemployed youth, women and elderly; who are unable to buy or grow fuel wood, landless, unproductive assets and thus depend heavily on access to forest resources for their survival (Republic of Uganda, 2002). NEMA (2000/2001) referring to UNEP (1999) reported that poverty has been and remains a major cause and consequence of environmental degradation and resource depletion. These people thus not only cut down trees for farmland but also for charcoal, fuel wood, and timber. Most of the households (91.6%) in WBFR claimed that poverty was a driving force to encroachment of the reserve hence, illegal activities extrapolated as non-compliance (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). Contradictorily, many authors admit that poverty also exist in the developed countries but are compliant to natural resource policies unlike Uganda and other developing countries (Schmidt *et al* 2005; Sodaro, 2001; Cummings & Wise, 2003 and McKinney & Schoch, 1998).

In the tropical countries, population pressures especially of local communities push them to these areas (Whitmore & Sayer, 1994; Valentine, 1991; De Blij, 1988). Simon (1981) stressed that man is a material using animal manifested in his food needs to keep him alive to objects he fabricates. Observably most forest reserves are located in remote areas, with poor communities in their periphery (Opala, 2000; De Blij, 1988). De Blij (1988) continued to assert that the poor hungry people of tropical, developing countries increase rapidly in number, thus negating sustainable utilization of resources at their proximity. Uganda's population growth rate is one of the highest in the world at a rate of 3.2 per cent. Thus, given the six times increase, that is from 4.8 million in 1948 to 30 million in 2008, in the number of people trying to survive on the fewer natural resources than there were 60 years ago (MFPED, 2008 cited by NEMA, 2008). In a contradiction China, the most populous country in the world changed its forested land area from

8% in 1949 to 12% in 1984. Thus, China's case despite the constant population increase depicts other factors much more significant in explaining non-compliance with forest policies (<http://www/E:\ Unsylva, 2007>).

In close association with both population pressure and poverty was the need for land by the communities living adjacent the CFRs (Otieno, 2003). Pickering and Owen (1994) claimed that the rich biological heritage was in real danger of mass extinction attributed to clearance by the land hungry population in Madagascar. The local communities engulfing the CFRs have exhausted soil fertility on their land, hence infertile. This has left CFRs to be the only fertile areas, attractive for subsistence farming. Thus, encroachers are forced to open new land annually by clearing more in the CFRs (NFA, 2010; Nsangi, 2006). Worse still in SBCFR, Kenyans have settled in the forest reserve villages of Walujjo, Nairobi and Musoma to cultivate, produce timber and charcoal (Siminyu, 2009). Davenport *et al* (1996) reported that to both north and east of SBCFR was inhabited by heavily populated agricultural land. Besides Kenyans, this research revealed many encroachers from outside the two sub-counties of Malongo and Kityerera active in illegal activities within the forest estate. Thus with population increase country wide and decrease in soil productivity, Nsangi (2006) claimed that people have become nomads, where some nomads end up in CFRs as they have done at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The relationship between income and environmental pressure is intricate. It is perceived that poverty can contribute to unsustainable levels of resource use as a means of meeting short term subsistence needs. In this case poverty connotes inability to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, education and health (Republic of Uganda, 2002). In his study of Deforestation in WBFR, Otieno (2003) established that charcoal burning was the most destructive and progressively followed by fuel wood collection, which had gone out of "reasonable quantities" permitted by Forest Act 1964 31:1 (Forest Act, 1964 cited by Otieno, 2003). It has been estimated that about half the world's poor live in environments that are highly degraded. This has led many observers to postulate a causal link between poverty and environmental degradation (Eckholon, 1976 cited in <http://www/E./Population and Environment, 2007>). Contradictorily, Raven concedes that the rich or industrialized countries consume 80-90% or more of virtually all commodities (cited in <http://www/E/ Unsylva, 2007>). Despite the contradiction, poverty alleviation has been made part of the environmental agenda so as to make environmental policy succeed as seen in the National Forestry Plan (2000) in Uganda, yet as per this research nothing

was on ground to deter the local communities engulfing SBCFR in encroaching the forest reserve with a burner of poverty alleviation.

The forest estates as they stand currently in Uganda were established arbitrarily. Mugenyi *et al* (2005) reported that the process was gradual, unsystematic and sometimes crude. It has been also noted that the following did take place in the process; Uganda Memorandum of Agreement (Forest) 1907, and the Forest Ordinance 1913 following; the Toro Agreement 1900; Ankole Agreement 1909 and later Bunyoro Agreement 1933 making the forest come under government control (Hamilton, 1984). Mupada (1997) added that the first forest reserves in Uganda were gazetted in 1932, facilitated by policies and laws put in place by the colonial government. Many authors asserted that forest boundaries in Uganda as they stand today were established in 1940s, evidenced by marks on the ground with numbered posts or some other forms of boundary marks (Hamilton, 1984; Mupada, 1997). Some of these were declared in occupied territories, in effect denying the holders of the land their proprietary rights such as the Batwa of the Mgahinga and Bwindi Forests, the Benet of Kapkwai part of Mt. Elgon National Park and the Ogiek of the Maasai/Mau Forest (Kenya Land Alliance, 2005; Jaramogi, 2008). All these cause conflicts and hence breeding grounds for non-compliance should chance allow as it has for the Ugandan case; for the current and previous governments retained the colonial administration approach of forestry management (The Forest Act, 1964 cited by Otieno, 2003).

Following the arbitrary establishment of CFRs; there was a claim that the land belonged to those NFA called encroachers (Tenywa, 2007). This claim was also nursed by 78.7% of the households living adjacent WBFR, Busia District (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). Generally local communities engulfing forest reserves claim ancestry from the reserves. They claim their consent was not sought, if it were there were quasi-legal agreements made by chiefs or kings as discussed earlier. Seemingly, there was no attempt made to relocate or compensate those evicted from the gazetted reserved land (Karim, 2001). Attesting to this were grinding stones, sighted in WBFR, Busia a testimony of earlier settlement in the area (Otieno, 2003). There was a notion that SBCFR was depopulated after the sleeping sickness epidemic of 1901–09 (Webster *et al*, 2003). Given this background encroachers in SBCFR organized themselves better and mobilized political support hardening their stance on evictions by NFA (Tenywa, 2007). They deliberately grazed, set fires to the planted trees and even directly uprooted tree seedlings in the reserves (Temmerman, 2007). This directly translated into non-compliance with the forest policy.

Many authors attribute encroachment of the CFRs to breakdown in law and order during the 1970–80s; where government of Uganda encouraged the growing of agricultural crops in CFRs in a bid to revamp the agricultural output (Hamilton 1984; Mupada 1997; Bikaako–Kajura, 2002; Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). Mugenyi *et al* (2005) added that within the years 1981–1986 settlements on CFRs were encouraged to flash out guerilla war fare SBCFR suffered this consequence. Kamugisha–Ruhombe (2007) also added that pit sawing for illegal logging made its first appearance in CFRs during these periods; a challenge that has become recurrent to successive governments. This has been a serious form of non-compliance with the forestry policy in SBCFR particularly, as per this research and Uganda in general.

General corruption amongst the government officials, the foresters inclusively, has led to non-compliance with the forestry policy. In context corruption here refers to misuse of entrusted powers for private gain (Marmon, 2009). In Uganda like many other developing countries foresters / officers are on comparatively humble salaries and must control products with high commercial value (Contreras–Hermosilla, 2001). NFA inherited corruption prone FD and continued with the same (Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). Otieno (2003) established that the then FD was both directly and by proxy involved in illegal human activities in WBFR, Busia district, a testimony of corruption. The same research also established that forest patrolmen's pay by then was UShs. 30,000/= (USD. 17.6) per month and not promptly paid increasing the propensity to corruption to disregard illegalities in the CFRs. Kamugisha–Rahombe (2007) continued to claim that corruption cuts across all levels of society including politicians, investors and local people besides the other mentioned organs of the government. This coupled with other factors has led to encroachment in the forest reserves hence non-compliance (appendix VIII testifies this institutionally in Uganda.).

There have been shifting government positions in most countries which inherited forest management from the then colonial powers. Contreras–Hermosilla (2001) claimed that these governments view forest reserves as obstacles to development thus land use change is equivalent to improving the quality of land. This devalues natural resources, forests inclusively. A case in point for this is the Ugandan government failure to concede to a High Court ruling on the illegality of the allocation of Butamira CFR (Kamugisha–Rahombe, 2007). The same case was envisaged in the loss of 1000 hectare to industrialization at Namanve forest reserve near Kampala. Mbaria ((2001) reported of planned excision of 167,000 acres of forest land in Kenya

to settle poor landless. Besides, there was legal Non-Residential Cultivation in Bahati and Emburu forests in Nakuru District (Gachanja, 2000). Kaiza (2001) reported on industrial location of Kenya's Bidco Oil Refineries to clear five forests on Bugala Island, despite the public outcry. This makes the incentives for improving the policy framework and complying with the law lacking, hence non-compliance. Thus, other unaffected reserves are automatically affected by land hungry local community on their periphery.

Glaser (1995) has it that the community should be made to feel a part of the enforcement system and that their complaints should be taken seriously. In Uganda, the Forestry Policy 2001 puts strong emphasis on public involvement especially those living adjacent to a forest reserve and benefit from sustainable forest management, including the application of CFM (Republic of Uganda, 2003). Where CFM will define the rights, roles and responsibilities of partners on the basis for sharing benefit from improved management. There will be a specific focus on wide stakeholders' participation, collective responsibility and equity and; on improving the livelihoods of forests dependent communities (Republic of Uganda, 2001). These have not been successful as established by this research yet the local community was much willing to take up CFM at the neighbourhood of SBCFR, Mayuge district.

2.4.2 The local communities living adjacent to forest reserves and evictions by the government lead agencies

The issue of encroachment in Uganda dates back in the colonial times especially in 1951, where people attempted to go back to Mabira Forest after eradication of "*mbwa*" flies (*simalium damnosum*) making life attractive in the reserves. These could be envisaged in South Ankole (over 100 people); East and West Mengo (245 people); Kadam Central Forest Reserve (400 people) and several others (Webster *et al*, 2003). Despite all these, Mugenyi *et al* (2005) claimed that these illegalities were not serious problems before the 1960s. In the post independence Uganda it started during the politically turbulent 1970s and continued up to early 1990s (Kamugisha-Rahombe, 2007; NEMA, 2001). Mupada (1997) added that the 1970 Forest Policy stressed timber production, harvesting and utilization and under played the conservation requirements and the need for participation of local authorities. Thus, given the anarchy that existed in the country by then, encroachment was opened with some impunity.

In a bid to stamp out encroachment in the forest reserves the government crafted the 1988 forest policy. This policy stressed on forest conservation, research, agro-forestry and extension services (NEMA, 2001). Besides that, NEMA (2001) also reported that in 1991, the government consequently evicted all encroachers from gazetted forests and cancelled all land titles issued for lands within the forest estates between 1971 and 1986. Most forest reserves were resurveyed, boundaries re-opened and demarcated (NEMA, 1998; NEMA, 2001). Nsita (2006) claimed that after demarcations and evictions the NFA embarked on planting the formerly encroached land with indigenous species of trees. This echoed the planting of “*musizi*” tree species (*maesopsi eminii*) on hitherto encroached cleared forest land of about 500 acres in West Mengo forests (Webster *et al*, 2003). Many authors agreed that competitive 2006 presidential elections thwarted this noble course and drew the country to the 1970s – 1985 conditions (Nsangi, 2006; Nsita, 2006; Tenywa, 2007; Temmerman, 2007; Natusiimira, 2007; Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). The February 2006 Executive Order halting evictions led to spontaneous increase of the number of encroachers from 170,000 to over 300,000 (Watasa, 2009).

The presidential ban on evictions like any other has been misinterpreted by the encroachers to mean permanent settlement into the CFRs (Siminyu, 2009; Watasa, 2009; NEMA, 2001; Hamilton, 1984). Siminyu (2009) claimed that the encroachers assaulted, abused, bit up and even killed some NFA officials with impunity. They have gone further to destroy equipments such as vehicles, indiscriminately cut down trees and burnt forest reserve (Natusiimira, 2007). The following also rose up; houses built from 34,800 to 42,476; livestock from 133,903 to 163,362 while areas under cultivation increased from 56,200 ha to 68,609 ha within a year (Temmerman, 2007). Temmerman (2007) also added that the encroachers discouraged commercial timber plantations in SBCFR by deliberately grazing, setting fires to the planted areas and even directly uprooting tree seedlings in the reserve. In case of attempting normalcy by NFA, they petition the President and the Speaker about “harassment” by NFA using the Executive Order as an annex (refer to appendices IV & VII).

Evictions normally start with notices of intent to evict. The notices have deadlines on which occupation seizes to take effect after an inspection, by means of an official report or on official letter. Notices or warning are always in writing (Kok, 2005). This can eventually be communicated through the media, local council meetings and gatherings such as churches, mosques and ceremonies. The Maasai–Mau evictees heard it through rumours which could not constitute notice (Amnesty International *et al*, 2007). Kamugisha–Ruhombe (2007) reported that

NFA undertook evictions in early 2005 throughout all CFRs in the country. Some settlers left voluntarily upon advice and sensitization by the NFA, a big number was forcefully evicted and their homes destroyed. This ostensibly could have militated the Executive Order of 2006 which has not been withdrawn till now (Watasa, 2009). Contrary to Executive Order 2006, the Ministry of Water and Environment came up with a December 2009 evacuation by 1st March 2010 and to that effect Namwasa and Luwunga Central Forest Reserves in Mubende and Kiboga Districts were freed of encroachers (Watasa, 2010).

Mugenyi *et al* (2005) reported that at SBCFR eviction process meet hostility with accusation skewed towards NFA officials. Registration of encroachers was viewed with suspicion and crude methods of evictions were used such as; beating people, burning houses and cutting down crops among other evils. In Maasai–Mau policemen were used during the eviction exercise who gave residents only four hours to vacate from the time of their arrival. They burnt every house, the local school and crops at night. No alternative accommodation was given to the evictees (Amnesty International *et al*, 2007). The Uganda Police is sometimes difficult to summon due to limited knowledge on environmental issues and lack of man power (Lwasa *et al*, 2009). Worse still two national integrity surveys conducted in 1998 and 2000 revealed that the Uganda Police was the most corrupt institution in Uganda (Kazoora *et al*, 2005). The institution's usage lacks credibility amongst most Ugandans, encroachers inclusively. Besides, all these guidelines on evictions have not been established or exposed to the public as demanded by the National Forest Plan 2002 (The Republic of Uganda, 2002). Thus, a challenge to evictions in the CFRs giving encroachers a notch to exploit as NFA takes its time.

Uganda subscribes to a number of international instruments requiring her to manage the natural resources in a sustainable manner. These include among others; the Convention to Combat Desertification 1994; International Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; Bonn Convention on Migratory Species 1979; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 1973; Convention on Protection of World Cultural and National Heritage 1972; Ramsar Convention and the next (NEMA, 2004/5). These treaties are initiated by or fall under aegis of the United Nations (UN), but the UN has only limited power of enforcement. Globally, it is uncommon for nations to go to war over environmental protection despite going to war over the control of scarce natural resources (McKinney & Schoch, 1998). This could be exemplified by the proposal to de-gazette Mabira forest reserve and several others in Uganda besides the current situation in

SBCFR, without international pressure on Uganda (Kaiza, 2001; Tenywa, 2007; Nsangi, 2006; Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007).

Uganda also signed the following committing her to guarantee property rights, especially for poor and vulnerable peoples. These international instruments proscribe arbitrarily deprivation of people's right to property including land. According to the United Nations general assembly resolution N^o. 217 A (iii) of 10th December, 1948, every one has a right to property as an individual as well as in association with others and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property (The Universal Declaration on Human Rights cited by Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). Thus evictions in Uganda like the ones at Mau forest complex violated the rights to adequate housing by torching the evictees' houses. This right is set out in Article 11(i) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, determining that the right to housing is part of the African Charter (Amnesty International *et al*, 2007). According Mugenyi *et al* (2005) Uganda ratified this in 1987 but not strictly followed as seen in SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights also provides for the right to property and further provides that people that have been dispossessed of their property rights have a right to full recovery of their property according to Article 21 (African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights cited by NEMA, 2008). According to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment N^o 7:

“Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violations of other human rights. Where those affected are unable to provide for themselves, the State Party must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.”

(Source: Amnesty *et al* (2007). *No where to go. Forced eviction in Mau Forest, Kenya*. pp 13)

Thus, despite a need for protection of water catchment area, the government needed to ensure security of tenure with regard to the settlement of its people (Amnesty *et al*, 2007). These ostensibly constitute reasons why politicians stop eviction as envisaged by the Executive Order and the 2006 N.R.M manifesto (Watasa, 2009; Tenywa, 2007; Nsangi, 2006).

The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Convention 1989 N^o 169 provides for recognition of ownership rights of land and resources that indigenous and other tribal people occupy. The convention makes it a responsibility of governments to develop coordinated and systematic

actions to protect property rights of tribal peoples and to respect their integrity (NEMA, 2008; Amnesty International *et al*, 2007). Thus, the Human Rights Committee recommends that:-

"The State Party should develop transparent policies and procedures for dealing with evictions and ensure that evictions from settlements do not occur unless those affected have been consulted and appropriate resettlement arrangements have been made."

(Source: Amnesty International *et al* (2007). *No where to go. Forced evictions in Mau Forests, Kenya*. pp. 14)

According to Mugenyi *et al* (2005) evictions of tribal groups or vulnerable communities from forestry resources they have occupied for long periods of time without alternative source of livelihood, does not only violate the provisions of the convention but also a negation of the primary responsibility of government as provided for under the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989. Thus a need to read both the Human Rights Committee recommendations and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 without truncation before evictions are carried out as was done in the Ugandan CFRs, SBCFR, and Mayuge district inclusively.

The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda has it that land belongs to the citizens of Uganda. But the Natural Resources are held by the government in trust for the people of Uganda (Article 237, Republic of Uganda, 1995). Thus the government as a trustee is mandated to protect CFRs from all forms of degradation and encroachment. Under the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, the constitution calls for sustainable utilization of forest resources, among other natural resources for the present and posterity (NEMA, 2005). Objective XIII of the National Objectives and Directive principles of State Policy and article 237 (2) (b) of the constitution pronounce the public trust doctrine (Republic of Uganda, 1995 cited by Akello, 2007(a)). It is thus a legal and moral duty of government as a trustee of CFRs to protect these reserves from all forms of destruction including encroachment (Watasu, 2009). It is imperative then that following the acts of government's proposals to de-gazette forest reserves such as Mabira and Bugala Island in Kalangala District, in the near future a public interest action may be filled in the courts to define the trust doctrine and the role of the state as public trustee (Akello, 2007(a); Kiyingi, 2005). This justifies de-legitimization of all environmental policies, laws and regulations in the country.

Akello (2007(b)) admitted that there was a problem of the poor compliance culture among Ugandans. She attributed this to general lack of respect for established environment authorities/institutions and laws coupled with political interference undermining compliance as a

mechanism for environmental regulations. As per the CFRs, it was quite common for a person or group of persons to appropriate, current or damage or in any way alienate any part of a reserve in contravention of the management plan of that particular reserve (Kamugisha–Ruhombe, 2007). The local communities living adjacent these reserves have therefore adopted the following in Uganda:-

Through mob justice, the local communities living adjacent the CFRs, having been instigated by politicians are hostile and cause bodily harm on NFA officials, as exemplified in SBCFR, and 13 other CFRs in Kibale, Kiboga, Mukono and Luwero Districts (Nsita, 2006). Given the elections times exploited by both aspirants and electorates; the local community fully exploit the status quo to entrench themselves in the forest reserves. Nsangi (2006) claimed that the encroachers pick courage to other than causing bodily harm; assault, abuse and even kill the foresters. Natusiimira (2007) reported that they view foresters as anti-development compared to politicians. They are now a big force to reckon with given their numerical strength of over 10,000 people in SBCFR alone and 300,000 people country wide (Watasu, 2009).

2.4.3 The local community living adjacent to forest reserves and compliance with the forestry policy in Uganda

Many modern environmental enforcement programmes incorporate an element of self reporting. In this case a firm has to decide not just what to do, but also what to report that it is doing (Heyes, 2010). NFA amidst its problems as earlier mentioned skewed towards de-legitimization had adopted registration of encroachers; categorizing them as follows:

- “-The land less form those with alternative land.*
- Commercial interest from subsistence interest.*
- Natives from migrants.*
- Types of activities being carried out in the reserve and so on.”*

(Source: NFA (2010). *The current situation of encroachment in CFRs and the way forward.* pp. 7)

This approach has succeeded in many CFRs within Moyo, Arua, Mubende, Mafuga and Soroti zones. However it has been interfered with by the local politicians instructing the local communities not to register especially in Lango, Mubende, Kiboga, Bundibugyo, Masindi, Mpigi and SBCFR, Mayuge district (NFA, 2010).

On reporting it was found that the local communities living adjacent CFRs prefer reporting to NFA officials other than the police. For other than being corrupt, the police are not well conversant with forestry law (Kazoora *et al*, 2005). Kagwa (2006) claimed that maintenance of law and order including environmental crimes lie on the docket of criminal investigation department (CID) of the police. Besides keeping law and order, the police fraternity is duty bound to both prevent and detect crimes which should also include environmental crimes. Thus, despite the blame forest crimes are within their jurisdiction; so should be fully mainstreamed into the policies, plans and programmes of the Uganda Police Force. Lwasa *et al* (2009) reported that an environmental desk within the CID was established in 2005 as a specialized unit under the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. This like any other government bodies lacks both financial and human resources to facilitate its work. It has therefore curtailed progress in curbing forestry crimes by the police besides long and tedious process of making reports to them.

Self-reporting taken as a substitute for government monitoring efforts may reduce enforcement costs without compromising deterrence. In case enforcement authority discovers illegality when no self-report has been made, the penalty is considerably higher. Failure to report and submitting false reports are criminal offences—punishable by imprisonment (Cohen, 1999). Positively, self-reporting is rewarded with more lenient treatment by prosecutors who might agree not to bring criminal charges or to reduce the severity of the sanction (Bureau of National Affairs, 1993 cited by Cohen, 1999). Telephone hotline has been instituted by NFA for reporting, favoured by many people for its expediency, cost-effectiveness and protection to the reporter. It is mainly used for receiving public complaints. The body maintains the anonymity of reporters of illegality and alerts the police immediately when reports come in (Kazoora *et al*, 2005). Reporting introduces a new type of monitoring especially auditing the reports so as to authenticate and consequently impose a penalty incases of both the truth and falsification (Cohen, 1999).

Man's attitude is manifested in his/her behaviour. Enger and Smith (1995) asserted that the recognition of individual responsibility must then lead to real changes in individual behaviour. Kazoora *et al* (2005) reported that communities' willingness to change from general solidarity in illegality to secretly and individually report the illegalities through direct communication to NFA officials; using telephone hotlines; foregoing hefty incentives provided by practitioners of illegalities for merge unstandardized incentives by NFA as done by Uganda Revenue Authority.

Otieno and Buyinza (2010) also reported that the local community engulfing WBFR, Busia District in Uganda were willing to conserve the forest reserve in conjunction with NFA through Collaborative Forest Management. Contrary according to Enger and Smith (1995) many individuals are interested in clean and healthy environment, but do not want to make major life-style changes to make that happen. This apparent maintenance of life style has been challenged by the given success of collaborative forest management in Mountain Elgon National Park (Buyinza, 2010). Thus, the local communities engulfing SBCFR were merely reluctant to compliance to the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 given their encroachment in the forest reserve.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

From the literature reviewed, the concepts at interplay are three viz. compliance, enforcement and politics for appropriate management of forest resources in Uganda. Their relations are as explained as follows. The cardinal aim of any environmental policy on natural resource is sustainable management of natural resources. This is achieved by the local communities' compliance to the rules and regulations, collaboration in resource management, policing the natural resources, responding to monitoring, supervision and evaluation, and self monitoring and reporting. When effectively done the lead agencies engage in the participatory monitoring of compliance conveyed in the conceptual diagram (Fig. 2.1). But due to poverty, ignorance, population pressure, arbitrary establishment of the reserves and other push factors, the regulated communities eye the resources at their proximity with nostalgia given the open access. The local community in abid to eke a living engage in the following activities to the resources in their neighbourhood; illegal exploitation, farming in the area, settlement, grazing and the next with an open or silent backing of either local or national politicians as shown in the framework. This leads them to non-compliance with policies governing the use of these resources, a call for enforcement as in the conceptual framework.

The government agencies are the sole policy enforcers on forest resources in Uganda and these include, NFA, NEMA, the Uganda Police Force and UWA. They work in line with, the constitution, policies and Acts of parliament. The agencies promote compliance by, monitoring, compliance assessments, voluntary compliance programmes, create public awareness and respond to violations of the policies manifested in illegalities. Thus, in their strategy they punish,

evict, and fine the encroachers as punitive approach such as; evictions, fines and imprisonments. This explains the double edged arrow as in fig. 2.1. But their role is disregarded by the regulated communities especially during the elections when engineered by the politicians, viewing them as detractors and anti-development.

Politicians act as the pivot through which both compliance with and enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 balances. This makes them extraneous in on both sides for they interfere with the two variables as in figure 2.1. The interference can either be positive or negative but for the smooth flow they should not interfere as the diagram portrays. Positively the politicians; make the laws, rules and regulations, policies, acts, constitutions and amendments, oversee the works of the executive arm of government, can effectively mobilize the locals on compliance, and above all legitimize a policy. Negatively they can promote non-compliance, advocate for resettlement and compensation of encroachers, instigate the local communities against the lead agencies and above all perceive encroachers as constituents hence disregard illegalities. Their negative interference calls for a non-interference with either compliance with or enforcement of the policy as in figure 2.1. This is contrary to the Legitimacy Theory as postulated by Tyler 1990 (Ivanora, 2002).

All the given concepts interplay to discomfort forest resource management manifested in deforestation. In this case deforestation is taken to mean devegetation of trees without replacement contrary to sustainable utilization of the forest resources. In Uganda forests are diminishing at a faster rate. Thus, there is a need to comply with the policies as non-compliance affect the forest resources negatively as in fig.2.1.




Fig: 2.1 Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher's (2012).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter shows how the three objectives translated into research questions were measured and attained. It presents a detailed description of the research design, location of the study area, sample population and sampling techniques of the population, data collection instruments, research procedure, data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design

The study was of a case study design focused on a unit of study or a bounded system for this case de-legitimization of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 (UFP, 2001) at SBCFR, Mayuge district. The selected forest reserve epitomized non-compliance and ineffective enforcement of forestry policy nation wide given, the history and culture of the local communities in the neighbourhood of central forest reserves in the country. The findings can therefore give a generalisation of the entire country. The research adopted a QUAL-quant model of triangulation (Gay *et al*, 2009 Bailey, 2007; Amin, 2005; Morse & Richards, 2002; Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987). Given the all-encompassing nature of case studies, the research was conducted through a cross-sectional survey, for it specifically, investigated the relationship between compliance and enforcement of UFP, 2001 in SBCFR. Through the adoption of the cross-sectional survey the data was analysed by procedures of descriptive statistics using frequencies, percentages and measures of central tendencies (Amin, 2005). The measures of central tendencies were basically on the respondents' ages where mean, mode and medium ages were established so as to authenticate results using consent age of 18 (The Republic of Uganda, 1995). The study used questionnaires, interviews, observation and documentary analysis for it was not experimental in nature. The design was handy for it is effective in providing a snapshot of the current behaviours, attitudes, opinions and beliefs in a population (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003; Gay *et al*, 2009).

3.3 Location of the Study Area

The case study forest reserve was gazetted and demarcated in Legal Notice N^o. 110 of 1938. Under Legal Notice N^o.41 of 1948 the title of the forest is South Busoga Central Forest Reserve (Leggat, 1954). It is currently under NFA with a total area of 16382ha. It is absolutely situated on the northern shores of L. Victoria between latitudes 0° 16' 59" N and longitudes 33° 34' 22" E

Davenport *et al*, 1996 and Maps and location, 2004) (Figure. 3.1). It is 51 kilometres South East of Jinja town and 131 kilometres South East of Kampala city.




Fig. 3.1 Map showing location and extent of Deforestation of South Busoga Central Forest Reserve.

Source: National Forestry Authority, Kampala, Uganda

3.3.1 Climate and vegetation of the area of study

The area has a bimodal type of rainfall which begins in March or April with peaks in May-June and October-November. From December to March the area experiences dry spell though occasionally irregular rains fall in the former months (Leggat, 1954; Davenport *et al*, 1996) The natural vegetation conforms to the rainfall intensity thus decreases eastwards and southwards from Kityerera (Leggat, 1954). According to Davenport *et al* (1996) the forest can be broadly classified as medium altitude moist semi-deciduous forest (*Albizia spp*s dominated) and moist *Combretum* savanna this is within an altitudinal range of 1140-1300 metres above sea level. The lake shore vegetation in the reserve is of average conservation value especially the papyrus swamp. Besides these between 1949-1941 *Mvule* (*Chlorophora excelsa*) and other valuable species were planted in 765 acres (Leggat, 1954). Most of this vegetation has been devegetated due to de-legitimization of the forestry policy through encroachments leaving behind tree stamps of the mentioned species.

3.3.2 Geology and soils of the area of study

The main parent rock is a medium to coarse-grained granite, with large felsper crystals in the eastern areas of the reserve. There are also scattered hilly outcrops of metamorphosed, fine-grained sediments (Jones and Scott, 1953 cited by Leggat, 1954). The main valley system runs north to south and the drainage is through this to Lake Victoria in apparently a seepage nature. The nature is due to the flatness of the topography. The sub-soil is overlaid by a variety of soils ranging from a grey-black clay loam to dark brown fine sandy loam. On very gently sloping land near the lake shore, some of the valleys have deep, dark coloured, heavy alluvial soils and there are pale coloured fine sands laid down by a receding lake shore(Leggat,1954). Thus given the higher organic content soils tend to turn darker in colour as experienced in this forest reserve (Brady, 2002). Hence given the population pressure among the households engulfing SBCFR, political interference in enforcement of the forestry policy and exhaustion of soils outside the forest reserve many decided to de-legitimize the policy and encroached the forest reserve for its fertile soils.

3.4 Population and sampling techniques

Mayuge district had 64,005 households as per the 2002 Population and Housing Census (UBOS, 2006). The target population comprised 7341 households in seven parishes adjacent to SBCFR. These were in two sub-counties viz. Kityerera and Malongo sub-counties all in Bunya county, Mayuge district in Uganda. Specifically, these parishes were; Kityerera (1348); Wandegeya (518); Bubinge (464); Bukalenzi (1410), Bukatabira (1636), Bwondha (1128) and Namadhi (837) (UBOS, 2006). The following were also expected on the political front; 70 local council (L.C) I members, 26 L.C.III members; district councilors, district environmental officer, forest officers and members of NFA the Kyoga Zone. This forest reserve is an epitome of the rest in the country.

3.4.1 Sample

The sample size consisted of homesteads, local politicians, the government regulatory system agencies such as; environment and forest officers besides the NFA officials from the area of study, court officials and the police officers. A total of 344 respondents participated out of the expected 364 as per table 3.1. This number especially of the homesteads was chosen in line with Krejcie & Morgan (1970)'s sampling size for research activities determination table (cited by Amin, 2005). The number of responses compared to the sample size was at a 95% level of confidence; within a precision level of ± 5 at significance level of 5%. Thus, authenticated the data collected from the local community (Kothari, 2004). The table below is tabulation from the total population in line with the Krejcie & Morgan (1970) (refer to Appendix X).

Table 3.1 Sample size of the households respondents of the community living adjacent South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge district (n=344)

Parish of origin	numbers
Kityerera	47
Wandegeya	61
Bubinge	20
Bukalenzi	61
Bukatabira	64
Bwondha	50
Namadhi	41
Total	344

3.4.2 Sampling Technique

In this case triangulation of sampling techniques fully surfaced, thus both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were concurrently used (Bailey, 2007; Amin, 2005). The techniques applied were: stratified sampling; snowballing, purposive sampling and convenience sampling techniques.

Stratified sampling technique was used in selecting the parishes adjacent to SBCFR and the households as they appear in the sample frame. In this technique the population was divided into several sub population that were individually more homogeneous than the total population which were unique, political administrative units selected by members of the parishes concerned (Kothari, 2004; Kakooza, 2002). Specifically, a stratified weighted sampling technique was applied basing on the general sample size in which case equal numbers of units were selected from the stratum and averages were taken. The weights were given in proportion to the size of stratum in the whole population as reflected in table 3.1 (Cauvery *et al*, 2003).

Snowball Sampling was used after stratifying the sample size. In this case the research assistants located a few individuals from each strata or parish. The located individuals consequently networked others unknown to either the researcher or research assistants. This continued until the sample size of respondents from the parish was realized. Despite the minimum bias that could have occurred if any using snowball sampling, its advantages such as, the selected respondents allowing a trickling down effect up to the purportedly hostile of the encroachers. Many authors including the researcher agreed that snowball sampling was appropriate for the researcher in that case (Kumar, 1996; Amin, 2005).

Purposive sampling was done to access the politicians, environmental officers, forest and NFA officials attached to SBCFR and other government regulatory agencies. These people were informative and hence had the required characteristics (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). This method was adopted for in it the researcher purposely targeted a group of people believed to be reliable for the study and could provide the best information to achieve the objectives (Kumar, 1996; Kombo & Tromp, 2006). This made it appropriate for the study as in table 3.2 below

Table 3.2 Purposive/ convenience sample size of the respondents

Occupation	numbers
Local politicians	76
Environmental officers/NEMA officials	07
Forest officers/NFA officials	15
Police Officers	02
Public officers	06
Mayuge district magistrate	01
Total	107

Convenience sampling was used to access the individuals who networked the questionnaires and assisted in interview schedules especially in the parishes for the politicians. The researcher visited both NEMA and NFA headquarters in Kampala to access some environmental officers; forest officers and NFA officials. NFA offices at Jinja in charge of the Kyoga Range were also visited by the researcher so as to administratively access the NFA officials at SBCFR. The public officers here mentioned included Resident District Commissioner and officials working in that office. While the police officers were Mayuge District Police Commander and Officer in charge Criminal Investigation Department. Key in this was the respondents ease, availability and accessibility (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Basically, this was applicable in the parishes where the researcher was unknown thus capitalized on volunteers or people who showed interest in the research.

3.5 Research Instruments

The researcher used: questionnaires, interviews, observation, and document analysis as the main tools for collecting data. The researcher was mainly concerned with views, perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behaviors of the respondents. Such information could be best collected using the given tools (Bell, 1999; Cauvery *et al*, 2007; Oso & Onen, 2005).

Questionnaires were the main instrument for it was used in all research questions. It was appropriate for the following data: opinions, attitudes, respondents' level of familiarity with aspect of the objectives and research questions in this research. It elicited information regarding the respondents' bio-data classified as sex, age, marital status, education, occupation etc. These partially aided in explaining differences in behaviors and attitudes towards compliance with and enforcement of forest policy. The sample size was also enormous, the respondents were

presumably hostile given the literature about their activities, and given the time constraints, a questionnaire was a convenient tool for collecting the data. For some information needed could be easily described in writing (Oso & Onen, 2005). Besides research assistants were also used in data collection.

Interviews were used so as to supplement the data and inferences obtained through both observation and questionnaires. This was more so on issues of non-compliance with impunity, politician's role in defying compliance, communities' reactions to enforcement officers, history of non-compliance in the area and the next. Through interview schedule, flexibility was applied so as to elicit the attitudes and behaviours of the locals towards the enforcement officers and their purported leader, Iddi Mwanja (Kumar, 1996; Cauvery *et al*, 2007). All these justified the use of interviews method in this research. Both interviews and observations were done within June and November, 2010.

Observations were used to elicit information on specifically non-compliance depicted by encroachment in the forest reserve such as illegal cultivation, cutting trees manifested in tree stamps and pitsawing, charcoal burning, unreasonable settlement and general encroachment. According to Kumar (1996) these activities are more behavioral than perceptual, hence at times hidden by respondents. Cauvery *et al* (2007) added that this method helps in studying complex situations, whereby it leads to the understanding of the whole and the parts in addition to getting other details of the situation. The researcher was, therefore, convinced that observation was the best approach to collect such important information from the forest reserve, the use of a camera to attest the activities was therefore, paramount as seen in the plates applied in this thesis.

Document analysis: Documents objectively written about the forest reserve available in newspapers, newsletters of NFA, district environmental report, NEMA reports, or bulletins for the forest reserve within the forest reserve or at their headquarters in Jinja and Kampala (see appendix iii, iv, v, vi, vii and ix). Some of these were declassified; so the researcher appropriately used them as paraphrased and consequently referenced (Cauvery *et al*, 2007). The materials gave supplementary information for their main data source is participatory observation or interviewing (Amin, 2005). Thus they were handy for the researcher.

3.6 Data Quality Control

Split-half testing for reliability of the questionnaires was used coming up with validity and reliability coefficients of $r = 0.83$ or 83%. This computed the correlation between scores on the odd numbered items with scores on the even numbered items of the questionnaires. Reliability was thus computed using the product moment correlation between the two scores. By this the researcher got an assessment of the consistency of the questions, an indication of whether they were measuring the same thing as agreed by a number of authors (Kumar, 1999; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003; Vogt, 2007; Gomm, 2008; Gay *et al*, 2009). The coefficient of 83% was on a high rating given that it lay in between 80%-90% considered high, hence the reliability of the instrument (Vogt, 2007). According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) the approach eliminated chances of error due to differing test conditions as could have been in the test-retest approach, was an appropriate choice of the researcher.

Qualitatively the validity was assessed using Guba's 1981 "*Criteria for Assessing the Trustworthiness of Naturalistic Inquiries*" adopted by many authors as follows credibility was attained by the researcher and the assistants doing the following; having prolonged participation at the study site especially the assistants being dwellers in the forest reserve's neighbourhood; did peer debriefing with colleagues and other professionals in the area of study besides establishing structural corroboration or coherence ensured that there was no contradictions. On transferability, a belief that everything was context bound, a detailed descriptive data was collect using questionnaires (refer to the questionnaires and interview questions on appendix I). Dependability, stability of the data was done by establishing an "audit trail" where a colleague in the department audited the written description of each process under taken which included original field notes, and photographs taken from the field. Confirmability, the neutrality or objectivity of the data collected was ascertained by triangulation of the various methods especially interview, questionnaires, observation, and documentary analysis (Vogt, 2007; Gomm, 2008; Gay *et al*, 2009).

The main extraneous variable in this study was political interference, for control purposes, it was built as variable tested against both compliance and enforcement. This was mainly because it could not be eliminated or held constant given politicians' charismatic behaviours in cajoling the local populace especially in the eve of elections in Uganda like elsewhere (Oso & Onen, 2005; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

The pygmalion effect normally attributed to the researcher's exposition of his expectations prior to interview which consequently makes the respondents responses skewed towards the researcher's expectation was controlled by the researcher's confinement to the very, basics, regulations of collecting data using interview method where the researchers had to talk little and listen a lot besides in depth interview by probing further as per the interview schedule (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003; Gay *et al*, 2009).

3.7 Data Analysis

The percentage distribution techniques was used to show the particular frequencies of respondents preferring a particular alternative to give the face value implications on non-compliance and enforcement problems of the forestry policy on deforestation of SBCFR. Besides, these photographs of incidences of non-compliance were also taken, for instance, crop farming, settlements and charcoal burning in SBCFR. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 10 (SPSS) was used given the number of respondents and carrying out cross tabulations which cannot be done either manually or using Excel (Fisher, 2007; Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008).

The study especially in its first objective generally was to investigate the relationship between government regulatory system and the local community around the SBCFR's compliance with the forestry policy. Such a study is adequately handled by correlation analysis so as to establish the degree to which the two variables were related. Thus through cross tabulation using SPSS a correlation coefficient of $r = 0.42$ was established which showed moderate correlation between the two variables (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008). Despite correlation analysis' admitted tendency to reduce complex behaviour into simple components it was appropriate for this kind of research (Kumar, 1999; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003; Oso & Onen, 2005; Vogt, 2007; Gomm, 2008; Gay *et al*, 2009).

This study being case study used scatter plots to visually display the relationship between the government regulatory system and the local communities' compliance with each of them in SBCFR. In so doing, the researcher could see how different organs of the government regulatory system were aligned, where clustering of loyalty and consequent trends that occurred (Gay *et al*, 2009). This was useful, for establishing if relationships between variables are linear was important when reading or calculating a Pearson r , for r is a measure of linear relationship between variables (Vogt, 2007). Thus, a visual display was useful to narrow the analytical focus

and triangulate the researcher's understanding of enforcement and compliance with interlinked environmental policies on natural resources in Uganda with particular reference to SBCFR (Gay *et al.*, 2009).

Chi-square (χ^2) test for goodness-of-fit was used to analyze the frequencies in line with the research questions (Kothari, 2004; Oso & Onen, 2005). According to Kothari (2004), it was an important non-parametric test and as such no rigid assumptions were necessary in respect of the type of population. Only the degrees of freedom for using the tests were prerequisite, for this case the degree of freedom depending on a particular case was determined. It was used to compare the differences between categories frequencies when data was categorical and drawn from a population with a homogenous distribution in which all alternative responses were equally likely. The types of data collected were of the type "one-variable-many-levels" (Oso & Onen, 2005). The data were basically categorical frequencies of the descriptions of; views, opinions, perceptions, feelings and attitudes of the respondents towards enforcement and compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 from the regulated community in SBCFR. Thus, chi-square was ostensibly the most suitable for this research.

The researcher perceived NFA as an organization and therefore like any other to test its competence Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats analysis (SWOT) was a better tool given by many writers (Carto & Peter, 1993; Thompson & Strikeland, 2001; Mintzberg, *et al* 1995; Saunders, 1997 & Stacey, 2000). This analysis provided a good overview of whether the organization's position was fundamentally healthy or unhealthy. It was thus grounded in the basic principle that strategy making efforts must aim at producing a good fit between an organization's resource capability, as reflected by its balance of resource strengths and weakness and its external situation such as opportunities and external threats (Thompson & Strikeland, 2001). Saunders (1997) asserted that the success of this technique is partly dependent on the effectiveness of the surveillance in identifying the key factors that may be relevant. It is also affected by the ability to interpret the information in the light of future trends and implications. Despite, that the model has proved very useful in many circumstances (Mintzberg *et al.*, 1995). Thus appropriate for this research since NFA as an enforcement organization, was the lead agency in forestry issues in Uganda.

Qualitative analysis was done using interviews and observations coded and organised into themes from which generalisations were formulated (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). A quick

impressionist summary was used where key findings were summarized, explanations recorded, interpretations and conclusions were recorded from the respondents. These were inscribed in the report as in chapter four (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). The data collection and analysis on in this aspect were done simultaneously especially on the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR; the impact of politicians' interference in the enforcement of the Uganda Forest Policy 2001 in SBCFR; and the communities' attitude and willingness to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.

Attitude scales were used to measure attitudes, opinions and behaviors of respondents. This was applied mainly to objective three of this study which was '*to establish the community living adjacent to South Busoga Forest Reserves' attitude and willingness to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.*' Thus, Likert and rating scales were used where the respondents were required to self report along a continuum of choices as expressed in the questionnaire in the appendix I. Likert scale was mainly used to the local communities and the politicians' were positive attitudes were measured by Strongly Agreed (SA) =5; Agreed (A) =4; Undecided (U) =3; Disagreed (D) =2; Strongly Disagreed (SD) =1. Thus individual score was determined by adding the point values of all statements (Gay *et al*, 2009). Given the nature of the rating scale that is asking respondents to rate or evaluate a service, policy or opinion according to a carefully graduated scale it was very handy for rating efficacy of NFA officials' supervision as could be seen from the questionnaires addressed to them (Fisher, 2007). Thus, checked on whether NFA officials did supervise the forest reserve on the following ratings; frequently=4; occasionally=3; never=2; rarely=1. This was part of objective one.

3.8 Ethical Consideration

During this study the following ethical considerations were taken into account in the design and sample of research, viz. privacy, deception, and confidentiality. Obtaining a valid sample for interview amongst the local communities entailed identification and partly down playing confidentiality, hence a possibility of dishonesty in responses. The same were possible to NFA officials, environmental officer, forest officers and politicians.

However the respondents were at liberty to freely ignore what they did not wish to respond to besides a little amount of dishonesty on the part of the researcher especially concerning his identity for this lead to honest responses amongst the local community more so in relation to their non-compliance activities. The researcher disguised himself and one of his assistants as journalists having got prior knowledge that the journalist had soft spot in the area.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

The results presented and discussed in this chapter were, in the light of the fact that despite the many policies promulgated by the Ugandan government on environment, there was delegitimatization of the policies manifested in non-compliance with and ineffective enforcement of the apparently good policies. The results were in line with the objectives of the study.

4.2. Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents

The respondents' characteristics are presented as in table 4.1 and thereafter discussed as given.

Table 4.1: Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of households adjacent to SBCFR, Mayuge District (n=344)

House hold characteristic	n	%	Household characteristics	n	%
Gender			Age		
Male	207	60.0	Mean	38.4	
Female	137	40.0	Median	36	
Marital status			Mode	40	
Married	235	68.1	Income level		
Divorced	18	5.2	Above poverty line	144	41.7
Separated	17	4.9	Absolute poverty line	17	4.9
Single	61	17.7	Below international poverty line	42	12.2
Widowed	11	3.2	Hard core poverty	113	32.8
Education level			Within poverty line	14	4.1
No	30	8.7	Dependant		
Elementary	21	6.1	0	52	16.6
Primary	63	18.3	1-5	119	37.9
'O' Level	99	28.7	6-10	92	29.3
Post Secondary	130	41.4	11-15	36	11.5
Occupation			16-20	25	8.0
Peasants	88	25.5	>21	16	5.1
Casual	14	4.1	District of origin		
Idle	21	6.1	Greater Busoga	69	20.0
NGO	14	4.1	Bugiri District	20	5.8
Politicians	76	22.0	Iganga District	51	14.8
self employed	59	17.1	Mayuge District	130	37.7
Government employees	72	20.9	Outside Busoga	52	15.1

The respondents from the households engulfing SBCFR parishes were 60% male while 40% female. This could be attributed to the fact that 84.9% of them were from Busoga region dominated by Basoga culture which is patriarchal in nature. Thus male dominate in management of the households as portrayed in Table 4.1. The 38.4 mean ages of the respondents, mode of 40

and median of 36, authenticated the responses for they were above 18 years, an age of consent in the Ugandan Constitution (The Republic of Uganda, 1995). These were distributed among the parishes close to the forest reserve as follows: Bubinge 20 (5.8%); Bukalenzi 61 (17.7%); Bukatabira 64 (18.6%), Bwondha 50 (14.5%), Kityerera 47 (13.7%); Namadhi 41 (11.9%) and Wandegeya 61 (17.7%). Most of the respondents were within the active working age group, hence their active interaction with the forest reserve at their proximity.

More than two thirds of the respondents were married while 13.4% were once married and were divorced, separated or widowed (Table 4.1). Merely 61 (17.7%) were single. In correspondence to this, 16.6% of the respondents had no dependants; while more than a third of them had at least 1 to 5 dependants. Surprisingly, almost half the respondents had more than 5 dependants. This was in concomitant to the fact the total fertility rate of Eastern Uganda region was 7.4 per woman which superseded the national of 6.9 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2001). Many authors agree that in tropical countries population pressure has a significant correlation with deforestation as seen in SBCFR (Simon, 1981; De Blij, 1988; Whitmore & Sayer, 1994 and Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). In contrast, China the most populous nation globally presented a unique increase in forest cover from 8%-12% between 1949 and 1984 ([http://www/ E:\ Unsylva, 2007](http://www/E:\ Unsylva, 2007)). The Chinese case presented a justification that compliance with forestry policy is possible despite population pressure.

Poverty in a Ugandan context focuses on defining food-related needs, and only indirectly estimates non-food requirements (Nunan *et al*, 2002). Thus, despite the dependence pressure, over one third (41.7%) of the respondents were above internationally quoted US\$ 1 per day. Only 12.2% were below international poverty line but above both Ugandan absolute poverty line (\$ 0.47 per day) and hard core poor (\$ 0.33 per day) (Table 4.1). These results could not unearth the fact that, most forest reserves are located in remote areas with poor local communities in their periphery (De Blij, 1988; Opala, 2000; Otieno, 2003). De Blij (1988) wondered how poor hungry people in developing countries could sustainably exploit environmental resources in their proximity. This directly affected compliance with and enforcement of forestry policy given the fact that man is a resource utilizing animal besides the proximity to SBCFR.

The respondents' education level according to Table 4.1 showed that more than 90% of them acquired basic education that is from elementary to post secondary level. Elementary and primary level which forms less than a quarter of the respondents are basically unskilled and at

most semi skilled, hence have limited choices of work for skilled well paying jobs. They need a lot of sensitization and enforcement so as to comply with stringent policies. At post primary levels who were 70.1%, there is more integration of skill training enabling individuals to make sustainable choices depending on their abilities, interests, sensitization and enforcements. The post primary level included "O" Level, "A" level, Certificate Course, Diploma, Degrees and Post graduate courses. Surprisingly, with an 8.7% of illiterates as per Table 4.1 the respondents outweighed the national survey which had up to 20% of the population 15 years and above having no formal education (UBOS, 2006 cited in NEMA, 2008). NEMA (2008) continued to assert that, literate individuals are better equipped to participate in both personal and community development hence, more likely to play part in environmental decision making and to take advantage of opportunities for environmental justice. Given the circumstances at SBCFR, the literacy opportunity had not been exploited by all stakeholders in the forestry resource utilization portrayed by the dwindling of the resources.

Slightly more than a quarter (25.5%) of the respondents was directly engaged in peasantry farming. More than a fifth (20.9%) of the respondents were government employees, 6.1% were idle; 4.1% casual labours in various activities including farming; while 22% were politicians given the five tier political system. All these as per the interview and observation partly and fully participated in farming in the forest reserve. These further included self employed 17.1% and non-governmental organizations' employees 4.1%. The respondents' participation on farming whether by proxy or directly was a manifestation of the ill definition of property rights over the forest areas in Uganda hence most people treat them as open access commons. The disappearance of ungazetted forests country wide in Uganda attests to this notion and ostensibly extrapolated in CFRs exemplified with deforestation of SBCFR with impunity (NEMA, 1997; Bikaako-Kajura, 2002).

With slightly more than a third (37.7%) of the respondents coming from within Mayuge District where the forest reserve is located; close to two thirds (62.3%) were immigrants from other districts. Mayuge and Bugiri Districts were once sub-districts of Iganga so presumably internal district migrations could have led to emigration to SBCFR of less than a quarter of the respondents to the forest reserve (Table 4.1). A fifth could have come in from the greater Busoga region which by the time of this research included; Kamuli, Kaliro, Jinja, Namutumba and Luuka

Districts. This, therefore, contradicted the notion that proximity is a major factor of illegality in the forest reserves as was found in WBFR in 2003 (Otieno, 2003).

4.3. Government Regulatory System and Compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge District

The government regulatory system entails elements stemming from environmental policies, laws, and acts meant to conserve environment through enforcement mechanism such as the lead agencies. In this case the acts and laws whose compliance was tested were the following; Uganda Wildlife Act, National Environment Act, Uganda Forestry Policy, Uganda National Forestry and Tree Planting Act, The 1995 Constitution of Uganda, and The Local Government Act. The enforcement/ lead agencies were; Uganda Wildlife Authority, National Environment Authority, National Forestry Authority, Uganda Police Force, District Forestry Services, District Local Council, Internal Security Organization and Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces.

4.3.1 Media of sensitization of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 to local communities living adjacent South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge District

There were mainly five medias used to create awareness among the local populace engulfing SBCFR viz. radio, newspapers, television, local council or village meetings, and through the conservationists such as; district forest officials, environmental officers and NFA officials. The house holds adjacent SBCFR's responses on the use of the given media were presented as in Figure 4.1 in the next page.




Figure.4:1: Media of sensitization of Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 around South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge district (n= 344)

From Figure 4.1, it was crystal clear that majority (225 (65.2%) of the household respondents were sensitised by radio about the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001. This was due to the mobility or flexibility of radios and often use of traditional or local languages to overcome the literacy barriers that affect the print media. Much of NFAs' mentions over the radio and television were aired during prime news times, for most people/listeners target news segments. The prime news times in Uganda were at 7.00 am, 1.00 pm, 7.00 pm, and 9.00 pm. Radio programmes are spot announcements that are taped played and repeated at scheduled intervals in addition to the negative publicity by the local politicians in audience participation programmes (Kiyingi, 2006; Zziwa & Waisswa, 2007). However, television solicited the least response 58 (16.8%) apparently due to its being expensive, immobility, inflexibility, and locally viewed as a good of ostentation. Besides the given televisions were more associated with electricity and urbanization given the low signal coverage in the rural areas of Uganda.

More than a third of the respondents (121(35.1%) claimed to have got the Forestry Policy 2001, through forest and environmental officers, referred to as conservationists in Figure 4.1. The apparently low sensitization by the conservationist echoed the sour relationship expressed by many authors (Nsita, 2006; Tenywa, 2007; Temmerman, 2007; Nsangi, 2006; Natusiimira, 2007). Amidst the uncomfortable relationship appreciation the conservationists' sensitization by more than a third of the households was a panacea towards a collaborative forest management a pinnacle of the Forestry Policy (NFA, 2006). This showed a commitment on the side of the conservationists especially sensitizations of the forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

With about the similar response as sensitisation by conservationists the household respondents claiming, to have read about the Forestry Policy 2001 through the newspapers were (120 (34.8%), as per Figure 4.1. Generally, the print media provided one of the most efficient methods of disseminating environmental information for it easily kept record for future references. The information was normally written in either English or the local languages (NEMA, 1998). The local dailies such as New Vision, Bukedde and The Daily Monitor featured issues on evictions, encroachments, concerns about environmental degradation, over harvesting of forest resources, trees planting, timber dealing, timber auction and establishment (Kiyingi, 2006). Despite the given contribution on awareness, this apparently had the following predicaments hence could not compete with radios; circulation and congested content where they could include among others;

politics, leisure, religious issues, advertisements and the next (NEMA, 1998). Above all literacy and ability to purchase them could have curtailed their usage in the remote SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Generally sensitization of the Forestry Policy 2001, had been successful among the households living adjacent SBCFR, Mayuge district depicted by merely (25 (7.3%) being ignorant (Figure, 4.1). The same figure showed that the policy was sensitized through these medias; radio, newspapers, conservation officers, local council meetings and television was positively in line with the United Nations declaration of the Decade of Education for Sustainable 2005-2014 endorsed by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (NEMA, 2004/5). Contradictorily, despite the overwhelming acknowledgement (92.7%) of sensitization of the Forestry Policy 2001 as viewed in Figure 4.1, the degradation of SBCFR negated the expectation of sensitization of the policy. Thus de-legitimization of the policy seemed strong on the push to deforestation of SBCFR, Mayuge district.

4.3.2. The local community views on aspects of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001

The main aspects of the Uganda Forestry 2001 tested in this research were; Collaborative Forest Management; privatisation of the forest reserve; transparency in decision making; equitable sharing of forestry resources; promotional campaigns to grow trees and effectiveness of the policy in the forest reserve. The views of the house holds around SBCFR, Mayuge district on the given aspects are presented as in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4. 2: Community's view on aspects of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 (n=344)

Aspect	Local communities' views		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
Collaborative Forest Management	143(41.6%)	32(09.3%)	161(46.8%)
Privatisation of the forest reserve	193(56.1%)	38(11.0%)	106(30.8%)
Transparency in decision making	99(28.8%)	55(15.9%)	119(34.6%)
Equitable sharing of forest resources	132(38.4%)	49(14.2%)	155(45.1%)
Promotional campaigns to grow trees	214(62.2%)	30(08.7%)	93(27.0%)
Effectiveness of the policy in the forest reserve	167(48.5%)	50(14.5%)	120(34.9%)

From Table 4.2 it was clear that about two thirds of the respondents (62.2%) agreed that promotional campaigns to grow trees both within and outside the forest reserve have been

effectively done. This could be attributed to the establishment of NFA under Section 52(1) of the NFTP, 2003, charged with the management of forestry in the CFRs in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2003). On the side of the lead agents investigated about two thirds of their numbers appreciated the policy's idea of posting NFA officials in the area which have been responsible for the promotional campaigns to grow trees both within and outside the forest reserves. Despite, the lead agencies acknowledgement of NFA postings, they also claimed that the local community was non-compliant to the forestry policy, manifested in their observable active participation in illegalities within SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Associated to tree planting was privatisation of the forest reserve where more than half the respondents (56.1) agreed to in SBCFR. Kakira Sugar Works and Nile Ply Companies started establishing communal timber plantations in SBCFR despite reported challenges (Temmerman, 2007). Planted trees dominated the natural vegetation if any in a transect of the forest reserve. This was also clear of planted forest on private lands in the neighbourhood of SBCFR. This was in concomitant with the Forestry Policy 2001 in the area (Republic of Uganda, 2001).

Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) embraced in other forest reserves such as, Mt. Elgon National Park, WBFR, Budongo Forest Reserve and Mabira Forest Reserve was not in SBCFR as seen by less than half (41.6%) the households' responses in Table 4.2 (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010; Otieno, 2003; Buyinza, 2010). Only 46.3% of the lead agents were satisfied with CFM and its application at SBCFR, thus needing much input to that effect. From the lead agents it was clear that they gave in to the general view of CFM in Uganda. CFM is done by agreement between the NFA and the local communities willing to co-manage a forest reserve in their proximity (NFA, 2003). This had not been done by the time of this research instead there was evidence of privatisation in SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Nearly half the local communities (48.5%) agreed that the Forestry Policy 2001 was effective contrary to the observable non-compliance with it in illegal activities carried in the forest reserve (Table.4.2). Part of the policy the following were evident; NFA officials posted to the area; sensitization of the policy; planting of the trees in and outside SBCFR; privatization of parts of SBCFR and SBCFR boundaries known by the local populace. On the contrary, there was dismal response on transparency in decision making and equitable sharing of forest resources main pillars of CFM a cardinal aspect of the Forestry Policy, 2001 (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010).

4.3.3 National Forestry Authority and the management of SBCFR, Mayuge district

The management of SBCFR, Mayuge district by the NFA officials charged with its management on behalf of the government and the people of Uganda was as in Table 4.3. The responses given in the table were from the lead agencies and by extension the government regulatory system, without the politicians as in Table 3.2 in Chapter Three.

Table 4.3: NFA officials' management of SBCFR, Mayuge District (n= 31)

Activity	Response by the conservationists/ lead agencies			
	Frequently	Occasionally	Never	Rarely
Supervise the forest reserve.....	11 (35.5%)	02 (06.5%)	17 (54.8%)	01 (03.2%)
Review performance against targets and objectives of the organization.....	11 (35.5%)	03 (09.7%)	13 (41.9%)	04 (12.9%)
Evaluate the community's compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.....	05 (16.1%)	01 (03.2%)	21 (67.7%)	04 (12.9%)
Sensitize the local community living adjacent SBCFR on conservation.....	10 (32.3%)	03 (09,7%)	16 (51.6%)	02 (06.5%)
Do advisory services to the local community....	06 (19.4%)	05 (16.1%)	18 (58.1%)	02 (06.5%)
Conflict on conservation with the local Community.....	16 (51.6%)	02 (06.5%)	11 (35.5%)	02 (06.5%)
Conflict on conservation with the local politicians on evictions.....	18 (58.1%)	02 (06.5%)	09 (29.0%)	02 (06.5%)

Table 4.3 shows clearly, that the NFA officials did not evaluate the community's compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 by more than two thirds of their numbers (67.7%). The cardinal aim of NFA as an organization is conservation of forest reserves in Uganda. This can be achieved by ensuring compliance with the policy. Thus, the act of NFA contradicts Bowman and Asch (1992) who claimed that employees are judged purely on quantifiable achievement. So failure to evaluate community's compliance was a predicament on the work schedule of the NFA officials at SBCFR, Mayuge district. This apparently gave room for the local communities living adjacent to the forest reserve to practice illegalities in SBCFR with impunity.

It was also clear that more than half the lead agencies (58.1%) accepted that no advisory services were rendered to the local community (Table 4.3). This was contrary to Policy Statement 10; on education, training and research which emphasizes on; building public awareness of issues in the

forest sector and developing promotional campaigns to encourage tree growing (The Republic of Uganda, 2001). On the same note there was thwarting of sensitization of the local community by (51.6%) lead agencies' responses. This was a challenge to the NFA officials, it could have been attributed ill financing of the forestry docket, hence a set back to compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 as experienced at SBCFR.

More than half (54.8%) of the lead agencies agreed that there was no effective supervision of SBCFR (Table 4.3). Slightly above a third of their number (35.5%) claimed that policing the forest reserve was efficient and frequent. Only 6.5% claimed that it was occasional. Supervision is very cardinal in monitoring and evaluating of the services of NFA and its failure was a challenge to implementing the Forestry Policy 2001 (The Republic of Uganda, 2001; MWLE, 2002). The failure here could be partly attributed to ill-equipment and inadequate financing of the sector like others in Uganda.

Though other issues could deter supervision, such as, negligence given the proximity of Kityerera NFA station about 300 metres away from (Plate 4.1). Charcoal is made by burning wood arranged as in Plate 4.1 slowly in limited oxygen. It is preferred to fuel wood by urbanites for it has twice as much energy per unit weight, burns at a higher temperature than wood, produces less smoke and ash besides being easy to manage. It also takes less space thus easier to sell, transport and store (Muthoka *et al.*, 1998). All these combine to make charcoal burning a lucrative activity to communities living in the proximity of loosely governed forest reserves as it was in SBCFR, Mayuge district.



Plate 4.1: Preparation for charcoal burning in SBCFR close to Kityerera NFA station along Mayuge/Bwondha road

From Plate 4.1 a deduction of the situation would portray the NFA official as negligent or corrupt to down play illegality given the distance where the activity was taking place and their office. It could also be adduced that the NFA officials were also active participants either directly or by proxy as was experienced at WBFR, Busia district (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010).

There was frequent conflict on conservation with the local politicians on evictees as indicated by 58.1% of the lead agencies' responses (Table 4.3). Although 29% claimed that there was no conflict. Further conservation conflicts with the local community, was evidently frequent accepted by 51.6% though, denied by 35.5% (Table 4.3). This therefore could not make the following possible; evaluation of the community's compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001, review performance against targets and objectives of the organization effective for it was denied by almost half the population (41.9%) of the lead agencies' responses and consequently advisory roles to the community failed as in Table 4.3. All these testified failure by NFA at SBCFR in Mayuge district.

Table 4.4. The local communities' awareness and compliance with environmental laws/ Acts governing SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Law/ Act	Yes	No
The 1995 Constitution of Uganda	47 (42.7%)	197 (57.3%)
Forestry Policy 2001	167 (48.5%)	177 (51.5%)
The National Forestry & Tree Planting Act	185 (53.8%)	159 (46.2%)
The National Environment Act	161 (46.8%)	183 (53.2%)
Local Government Act	140 (40.7%)	204 (59.3%)
Land Act	158 (45.9%)	186 (54.1%)
The Traditional Rulers Act	137 (39.8%)	207 (60.2%)
The Leadership Code	127 (36.9%)	217 (63.1%)
The Police Act	126 (36.6%)	218 (63.4%)
The Magistrate Act	118 (34.3%)	226 (65.7%)
Uganda Wildlife Act	139 (40.4%)	205 (59.6%)

Table 4.4 shows that close to two thirds (65.7%) of the local community were ignorant of the Magistrate Act on environment. Over sixty percent of the households as presented in Table 4.4 were ignorant of the following; The Police Act (63.4%), The Leadership Code (63.1%), and The Traditional Rulers Act (60.2%). Besides over half of the respondents as in Table 4.4 were also ignorant of the following on environment at SBCFR, Mayuge district; Uganda Wildlife Act (59.6%), Local Government Act (59.3%), The 1995 Constitution of Uganda (57.3%), Land Act (54.1%), The National Environment Act (53.2%) and Forestry Policy 2001 (51.5%). Positively,

Table 4.4 presents the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act as the only act where more than half (53.8%) of the respondents claimed to be aware of and compliant with at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The data presented in Table 4.4 was analysed using Chi square test for goodness of fit to determine the level of significance of the laws/acts on the local communities living adjacent SBCFR's compliance with them. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.5

Table 4.5: Summary of chi square statistic value of the Local Community's awareness of Laws/Acts governing environment (n=344)

Law/Act	The house holds' responses			
	Observed	Expected	χ^2 Calculated	χ^2 Tabulated
The 1995 Uganda Constitution	147	344	112.8	9.21
The National Forestry & Tree Planting Act	185	344	73.5	9.21
Forestry Policy 2001	167	344	91.1	9.21
The National Environment Act	161	344	97.4	9.21
Uganda Wildlife Act	139	344	122.4	9.21
The Local Government Act	140	344	121.0	9.21
The Land Act	158	344	100.6	9.21
The Traditional Ruler's Act	137	344	124.6	9.21
The Leadership Act	127	344	136.9	9.21
The Magistrate Act	118	344	148.5	9.21
The Police Act	126	344	138.2	9.21

Notes: $df=2$ at $0.01 = 9.210$

The results show that the Magistrate Act was the most insignificant on compliance with amongst both the laws and acts governing environment at SBCFR, Mayuge district (χ^2 Calculated =148.5 > χ^2 Tabulated= 9.21). This was contrary to successful cases filed and won by local communities around Butamira Forest Reserve within the Busoga region and the Namanve Forest Reserve close to Kampala city (Tumushabe & Bainomugisha, 2004). The Police Act was also amongst the most insignificant according to the households adjacent to SBCFR (χ^2 Calculated =138.2 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). The Uganda police has been rated as the most corrupt institution in the country thus lost credibility in forest crime prevention at SBCFR, Mayuge district (Kazoora *et al*, 2005; Lwasa *et al*, 2009).

Table 4.5 clearly showed that environmental protection coiled in the public administration acts viz. The Leadership Code (χ^2 Calculated =136.9 > χ^2 Tabulated= 9.21); The Traditional Rulers' Act (χ^2 Calculated =124.6 > χ^2 Tabulated= 9.21); Local Government Act (χ^2 Calculated =121.0 >

χ^2 Tabulated=9.21) and the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (χ^2 Calculated =112 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21) were insignificant on compliance with as laws/ acts governing environment at SBCFR, Mayuge district. This could be attributed to the fact that the occupants of the portfolios governed by these acts/laws were beneficiaries of illegalities in the forest reserve either directly or by proxy especially politicians (Otieno, 2003; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). They thus defended encroachers in SBCFR, hardening the work of NFA in the area by truncating these acts, to suit their activities and ignoring environmental protection aspects of the acts.

Table 4.5's results showed that environmental laws/ acts were statistically insignificant on governance of SBCFR as follows; Uganda Wildlife Act (χ^2 Calculated =122.4 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21); Land Act (χ^2 Calculated =100.6 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21); The National Environment Act (χ^2 Calculated =97.4 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21); The Forestry Policy 2001 (χ^2 Calculated =91.1 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21); and The National Forestry & Tree Planting Act 2003 (χ^2 Calculated =73.5 > χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). These results therefore confirmed lawlessness in the management of SBCFR, Mayuge district especially the local communities' ignorance The Forestry Policy 2001 and the National Environmental Act (Table 4.5). The lawlessness manifested in encroachments and hostile relationship between the locals and NFA officials in the area was nothing but a reflection of these results (Alweny, 2007; Nsangi, 2006).

Non-compliance with environmental policies governing natural resources precipitates enforcement of the policies by the lead agencies concerned. Table 4.6 shows the local communities' satisfaction with the lead agencies on environmental conservation with emphasis on SBCFR, Mayuge district. The lead agencies charged with enforcement of the environmental policies associated the Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR were; Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), National Forestry Authority (NFA), Uganda Police Force, District Forest Services (DFS), District Local Council (DLC), Internal Security Organisation (ISO), and Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF).

Table.4.6.The local communities' satisfaction with Lead Agencies' enforcement of environmental policies related to the conservation of SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Lead Agency	The local communities' satisfaction	
	Yes	No
Uganda Wildlife Authority	182 (52.9%)	162 (47.1%)
National Environment Management Authority	194 (56.4%)	150 (43.6%)
National Forestry Authority	207 (60.1%)	137 (39.9%)
Uganda Police Force	158 (45.9%)	186 (54.1%)
District Forestry Services	162 (47.1%)	182 (52.9%)
District Local Council	167 (48.5%)	177 (51.5%)
Internal Security Organisation	143 (41.6%)	201 (58.4%)
Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces	124 (36.0%)	220 (64.0%)

The results from Table 4.6 shows that about two thirds (60.1%) of the households were satisfied with the enforcement activities of NFA at SBCFR, Mayuge district. More than half of the respondents were also satisfied with the enforcement of forestry related policies at SBCFR as follows; NEMA (56.4%) and UWA (52.9). Over half of the respondents were dissatisfied with environmental policies enforcement at SBCFR as follows in reference to Table 4.6; UPDF (64.0%), ISO (58.4%), Police (54.1%), DFS (52.9%), and DLC (51.5%).

The data presented in Table 4.6 was analysed using Chi square test for goodness of fit to determine the level of significance of the lead agencies on enforcement of forestry and relate policies on SBCFR by the local community's satisfaction. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.7.

Table. 4.7. Summary of chi square statistic value of the enforcement activities of the lead agencies on environmental policies in SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Lead Agency	Local communities' satisfaction			
	Observed	Expected	χ^2 calculated	χ^2 Tabulated
Uganda Wildlife Authority	182	344	76.3	9.21
National Environment Management Authority	194	344	65.4	9.21
National Forestry Authority	207	344	54.6	9.21
Uganda Police Force	158	344	100.6	9.21
District Forestry Services	162	344	96.3	9.21
District Local Council	167	344	91.1	9.21
Internal Security Organisation	143	344	117.4	9.21
Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces	124	344	140.7	9.21

Notes: $df=2$ at $0.01 = 9.210$

Table 4.7 shows that even NFA, the lead agency in forestry, does not satisfy most of the local communities. NFA was statistically insignificant as per the table (χ^2 Calculated =54.6 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). Despite the statistical results, NFA's work compared to other lead agencies was acknowledged by 60.1% (Table 4.6). The acknowledgement could have been attributed to their presence at SBCFR compared to the rest. The statistical insignificance was attributed to the bitter relations that existed between NFA and the local communities on conservation of the forest reserve, orchestrated by conflict of interest manifested, in physical confrontations in the area (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005; Nsangi, 2006; Natusiimira, 2007; Jaramogi, 2008; Watasa, 2009).

Table 4.7 also shows that the role of other organisations in the environment docket were also insignificant statistically viz. DFS (χ^2 Calculated=96.3 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21), UWA (χ^2 Calculated=76.3 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21), and NEMA (χ^2 Calculated=65.4 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). The results show a contradiction in the Environmental Regulation and Enforcement Team (ERET) in Uganda, which ensures well-co-ordinated, integrated development and implementation of environmental impact assessment and audit monitoring in the country (NEMA, 2004/5). DFS, like most civil service sectors in Uganda, was ill equipped to effectively aid NFA in enforcement of Forestry Policy in SBCFR, Mayuge district as per the interviews carried out. Thus a relatively dismal performance (χ^2 Calculated=96.3 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). NEMA and UWA were semi-autonomous bodies with sufficient financing compared to DFS yet failed to assist NFA as per ERET (Table 4.7).

The DLC also performed dismally (χ^2 Calculated=91.1 $>$ χ^2 Tabulated=9.21) as revealed by the results in Table 4.7. The DLC is both administrative and political head of a district according to the decentralization and leadership hierarchy in Uganda respectively (Sanginga *et al*, 2004; Nsita, 2006 and Banana *et al*, 2007). Banana *et al*, 2007 added that the DLC crafted by-laws and had forestry policy enforcement in their jurisdiction. But events in SBCFR, Mayuge district did not reflect the forestry policy enforcement as the politicians instigated the local communities against the NFA viewed as anti-development in the area (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005; Nsangi, 2006; and Natusiimira, 2007). Despite the support the DLC gave the local communities engulfing SBCFR on illegalities, they did not get overwhelming acknowledgement of their role in enforcement of forestry policy possibly due to lack of enlightenment of the local communities.

Table 4.7 portrays the insignificance of security forces in enforcement of forestry policy at

SBCFR, Mayuge district as follows; UPDF (χ^2 Calculated=140.7> χ^2 Tabulated=9.21); ISO (χ^2 Calculated=117.4> χ^2 Tabulated=9.21) and Police (χ^2 Calculated=100.6> χ^2 Tabulated=9.21). UPDF could not yield much satisfaction for it is engaged on external insecurity likely to affect the country or flashing out guerilla war fare in the forests (Otieno, 2003; Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). ISO was not also exposed to the local communities living adjacent to SBCFR, Mayuge district. Thus dismal satisfaction as exhibited by the statistic value posted against it (Table 4.7). The police force therefore remains the only formidable force to ensure enforcement of environmental/forest crimes in unison with the other lead agencies such as NFA, UWA and NEMA. Table 4.7 shows a statistically insignificant satisfaction of their work on enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR by the local communities engulfing the forest reserve. This could be attributed to the fact that the police force in Uganda has been labeled corrupt; lacks personnel, technical support and capacity to effectively handle environmental crime (Kazoora *et al*, 2005 and Lwasa *et al*, 2009).

In order to establish the relationship between enforcement activities and compliance with environmental/forestry policy, Table 4.8 was constructed. It shows the correlation between the variables in both Tables 4.4 and 4.6.

Table. 4.8: A correlation of the communities' awareness and satisfaction with the government regulatory system at SBCFR, (n=344)

Subject	Data from Table 4.4 Enforcement by Lead Agencies			Data from Table 4.6 Compliance with Environmental/forestry laws/acts			d	d ²
	Lead Agency	Responses	Rank	Law/Act	Responses	Rank		
1	UWA	182	3	Uganda Wildlife Act	139	6	-3	9
2	NEMA	194	2	Environment Act	161	2.5	-0.5	0.25
3	NFA	207	1	Forestry Policy	161	2.5	-1.5	2.25
4	Police	158	6	Police Act	126	8	2	4
5	DFS	162	5	NFTPA	185	1	4	16
6	DLC	167	4	Local Government Act	140	5	-1	1
7	ISO	143	7	Leadership Act	127	7	0	0
8	UPDF	124	8	The 1995 Constitution	147	4	4	16
							Σd^2	48.5

From Table. 4.8 a Spearman rank correlation was computed to establish the relationship between enforcement and compliance with environmental/forestry laws/acts at SBCFR as under:

$$\text{Spearman's 'r'} = 1 - \frac{6\sum d^2}{n(n^2-1)}$$

Where d is the difference between the two rankings and $\sum d^2$ is the sum of all the d^2 values while n is the total of the subjects as in Table 4.8 (Amin, 2005; Kothari, 2005)

$$r = 1 - \frac{6 \times 48.5}{8^3 - 8}$$

$$r = 0.422$$

This value lay on a (0.40-0.59) segment of the strength of a correlation, manifesting a modest/moderate correlation, at a 0.05 level of significance (Fowler *et al*, 1998; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003 and Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008). It could therefore, be concluded, that there was a modest/moderate relationship between the enforcement activities of the environmental lead agencies, and the local communities' compliance with either environmental laws or acts affecting SBCFR, Mayuge district (Table 4.8).

When compliance with the laws and Acts governing the environment was correlated with enforcement agencies performance and plotted on a scatter diagram it was as in Fig. 4.2 shows no linearity.




Fig 4.2: Scatter diagram of compliance with Acts and Laws of Environment conservation and Enforcement Agents at SBCFR, Mayuge District

Thus the expected summary based on the line was non-existent manifesting a relationship which was not linear (Vogt, 2007). This was in line with the correlation results of 0.422 a moderate correlation (Fraenkel & Wallen 2008).

A Strength Weakness Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis was done to establish the efficacy NFA, the lead agency in forestry in Uganda. The results were as in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: The SWOT Matrix for NFA on enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge District

THE SWOT MATRIX	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Has a structure from village to national levels -There is a NFPTA -There are sister organisations in the same business such as; NEMA, UWA, etc. -Has a pre-existent infrastructure inherited from Forestry Department. -Has authority to enforce policies. -Carry out and implement the results of researches carried out. -Has authority to enforce policies. -Practice strategic management in having a vision, mission, objectives and values. -Has trained personnel. -Constitutionally accepted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Has no alternatives given to victims of evictions. -Has inappropriate sensitization -Corruption eminent amongst some of its personnel. -Has few personnel at its disposal. -There is large expanse of area under their jurisdiction. -Has insufficient power to enforce policies. -Has insufficient funding.
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Hand outs given by some NGOs in conservation. -There are active NGOs in the same area. -Donations are available. -Has financial support internationally. -Has government support on from management. -There are numerous other policies related to theirs such as; land, water, and environment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Long standing mistrust of foresters. -Politicians' flexible stands on enforcement. -Ossification of the local communities' engulfing the reserves. -The forests reserves are located in remote areas. -Mob justice by the local communities engulfing the reserves.

In Table 4.9 shows that the strengths out-weighed the rest of the options viz. weakness, threats and opportunities. Constitutionally, NFA is the lead agency charged with the management of central forest reserves in the country as in the NFPTA 2003 Act thus, strength as portrayed in the table (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). NFA is part of the environmental bodies entrusted with ensuring the conservation of natural resources in the country in conjunction with other autonomous bodies such as; NEMA, and UWA as in the table. NFA has trained personnel both fresh and others inherited from the then FD, this allowed strategic management of the organisation for it was clearly understood by most members. But observably, this was not on the

ground for illegality was rampant in the forest reserve such as farming, charcoal burning, settlement and the next ostensibly carried out with impunity. The illegalities underplayed the apparent strengths as in Table 4.9. The key issues in the weakness which usurped strengths were insufficient power and corruption.

NFA is an autonomous body and can run without interference from elsewhere, hence the authority but power rested in politicians who swayed the local communities into non-compliance. In this case power was viewed as the capacity to cause or bring about action or results (Sodaro, 2001). Thus political power superseded the authority of NFA for it had the capacity to affect outcomes by controlling or influencing the state in nation wide governance. The strength of political power could be manifested in government's uncompromising position on granting over 7100 hectares (17,544 acres) of Mabira Central Forest Reserve to Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) amidst public protests besides technical, professional and expert advice. This culminated in the resignation of the board and staff of the NFA in protest (NAPE, 2011). By the time of this research, there was an executive order from His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda deterring NFA officials from evictions which had not been revoked (refer to Appendix VII). Thus, despite the mentioned strengths rendered NFA powerless (Table 4.9).

Corruption which apparently was inherited from the then Forest Department (Hamilton, 1984) does not go well with the values expected by the organization which are integrity, excellency and transparency (NFA, 2005). Close to half of the households (47.2%) living adjacent SBCFR claimed that NFA officials took bribes from people carrying out illegal activities in the forest reserves and 62% of them confirmed that the body was corrupt. Corruption disregards legalities by overlooking illegalities in the forest reserve as portrayed in the charcoal burning in the proximity of the NFA offices at SBCFR in Plate 4.1. Besides, corruption misappropriation of international financial support, government support, donations and hand outs given by the NGOs appeared on both strength and opportunities (Table. 4.9). This contradicted articles 70–80 of the NFTP 2003 (refer to appendix VIII to confirm) (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). So it was clear that strengths superseded weakness yet in essence the reverse was true on the ground by observation.

Table 4.9 shows that other weaknesses included NFA's have few personnel at its disposal, inappropriate sensitization, no alternatives given to victims of eviction, large expanse of area

under their jurisdiction, and insufficient funding. These weaknesses were connected in that the few personnel could not appropriately supervise large expanse of the forest reserve. For instance, there were only five personnel at NFA station, SBCFR, Mayuge district at the time of this research. These were to man 16,382 hectares of SBCFR with 7341 households with vested interest in the forest reserve (Mayuge District, 2006). There were also about 10,000 households settled in the forest reserve (Watasa, 2009). Besides, the NFA station at SBCFR was ill funded, as in the table with only one working motor cycle, whose fueling meant a lot of paper work according to one of the officials, to cruise through the vast forest reserve. This therefore, curtailed effective sensitization worsened by no alternatives given to victims of evictions from the forest reserve (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 shows externally, opportunities slightly out competed threats. The organisation being established by an act of parliament, NFTP 2003, had government support despite all the odds such as politics. It therefore by both constitution and act manages 506 CFRs in the country (The Republic of Uganda, 2003). Besides the government support, other policies also related to the Forestry Policy in their implementation hence indirectly aiding NFA in forestry conservation viz. land, water, and environment in addition to the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. NGOs also acted to the advantage of NFA for they gave in some money. Donations and international financial support were also available such as from Norwegian International Development Agency (NORAD) and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). But with all these opportunities at the exposal of NFA, the forest reserve continued to be depleted as a result of non-compliance with the forestry policy.

The following are external threats to NFA in their endeavours to enforce forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district; long standing mistrust of foresters, politicians' flexible stands on enforcement, ossification of the local communities' engulfing the reserves, the forests reserves are located in remote areas and mob justice by the local communities engulfing the reserves (Table 4.9). The cardinal observable threat was the political stand especially their meddling in the conservation. This was seemingly due to the fact that politics in Africa lack ideology but has plenty of handouts thus the forest reserves due to population pressure outside has land which politicians could merely pronounce arbitrary gazetted and positively yield votes (Sodaro, 2001; Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). Politicians either directly or by proxy engineer mob justice against NFA officials viewed as development detractors. This was evident in bodily harm, assaults, abuse and

killing of NFA officials by the local communities within and engulfing SBCFR (Nsangi, 2006; Natusiimira, 2007; Siminyu, 2009). This area had about 10,000 house holds settled in the forest reserve an opportunity any politician cannot imagine loosing or ignoring bearing in mind that politics is a game of numbers (Watasu, 2010). This therefore could have led politicians into interfering with the enforcement activities of the NFA in the area hence a threat as in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9 also shows that other than political interference internally the foresters were untrustworthy. NFA did not have enough time to clean itself though it started with much pomp (Kamugisha-Ruhombe, 2007). Besides, politicians hardened the attitudes of the local communities making them unwilling to change, despite sensitization. The remoteness of SBCFR discouraged effective enforcement of environmental policy on natural resources, by other related organisations in environment such as NEMA and UWA. This therefore, posed a threat to the enforcement of the forestry policy and other environmental policies on natural resources at SBCFR, as reflected in Table 4.9. Generally, the weaknesses of NFA were stronger than the strengths hence de-legitimization of the policy manifested in encroachment of CFRs in Uganda in general and SBCFR in particular. Despite the institutions being new in the country, there was a need for either induction of the officials, over haul of the system or political divorce from conservation.

Table 4.10: The mode of eviction at SBCFR, Mayuge District (n = 344)

Mode of eviction	Response	
	True	False
Notices of evictions given in advance	198 (57.6%)	146 (42.4%)
Abrupt evictions carried out	216 (62.8%)	128 (37.2%)
Evictions done by NFA and Police	247 (71.8%)	97 (28.2%)
Prior consultations done with evictees before evictions	138 (40.1%)	206 (59.9%)
Compensation arrangements done prior to evictions	102 (29.7%)	242 (70.3%)
The evictees resettled	118 (34.3%)	226 (65.7%)
The encroachers imprisoned occasionally	227 (66.0%)	117 (34.0%)
The evictees incurred heavy losses of domestic properties during evictions	240 (69.8%)	104 (30.2%)
Evictions done by NFA and the Local Council officials	180 (52.3%)	164 (47.7%)

Many of the households' respondents (71.8%) conceded that the evictions especially if forceful, evictions were carried out by the NFA officials and the police officers (Table 4.10). Besides more than half of the house holds (52.3%) agreed that the Local Council (L.C) officials could also be present in the process of evictions. The L.C officials, involvement's low responses could be attributed to the evictees being voters. From interviews, it was crystal clear that the L.Cs

being part and parcel of the local communities in the proximity of the forest reserve, were involved in the illegalities in SBCFR either indirectly or by proxy. But all in all presence of government officials or their representatives during an eviction authenticated the process.

The results presented in Table 4.10 show that 70.3% of the households' respondents claimed that there was no provision for compensation and 65.7% denounced availability of resettlement opportunities. Through interviews with NFA officials there was a claim that the encroachers had land where they came from and thus not homeless as per say. This acted contrary to Article 11(i) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, determining that the right to housing is part of the African Charter (Amnesty International *et al*, 2007).

Table 4.10 also shows that, there was a claim that the evictees incurred heavy losses of domestic properties during evictions by 69.8% of the households' respondents. Interviews had it that what was lost included among others food crops; household utensils; construction materials; clothes; and some even claimed money lost. Yet no compensation but the encroachers were occasionally imprisoned as claimed by two thirds (66.0%) of the households' respondents (Table 4.10). Thus the loss of domestic properties, especially uprooting crops from the gardens of the encroachers, imprisonment of culprits is taboos in the Soga culture, the dominant community engulfing SBCFR. This, hence, soured the relationship between the law enforcers and the complaints at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Many of the households' respondents (62.8%) claimed that the evictions were carried out abruptly (Table 4.10). Contradictorily, more than half (57.6%) of the households' respondents, admitted that notices were often given before evictions (Table 4.10). The abruptness of evictions could be attributed to the mode of notification; and mostly to the lack of an opportunity for genuine consultations with these evictees viewed by 59.9% of the households' respondents. The lead agencies' interviewed claimed that consultations were regularly done. A deduction from the two opposite views showed that consultations if any were not effectively thus, qualifying evictions to be abrupt with its domestic loss consequences amongst the culprits.

4.4 Politicians and the enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge District

This was viewed as in the following sub-headings:-

4.4.1 The characteristics of politicians in the proximity of SBCFR, Mayuge district

The politicians accessed had the following characteristics as presented in Table 4.11.

Table. 4.11: Characteristics of politicians representing the local communities living adjacent to SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=76)

Characteristics	n	%	Characteristics	n	%
Elective post			Responsibilities		
L.C I	40	(52.6%)	Chairpersons	09	(11.8%)
L.C II	03	(03.9%)	Vice chairpersons	12	(15.8%)
L.C III	13	(17.1%)	Speaker	04	(05.3%)
L.C IV	03	(03.9%)	Deputy Speaker	03	(03.9%)
L.C V	03	(03.9%)	Secretary for Finance	06	(07.9%)
Experience in politics			Secretary for Information	09	(11.8%)
<5 years	34	(44.7%)	Secretary for Production & Environment	14	(18.4%)
6-10 years	07	(09.2%)	Others	19	(25.0%)
11-15 years	29	(38.1%)	Constituencies		
16-20 years	02	(02.6%)	Bubinge parish	07	(09.2%)
>21 years	04	(05.3%)	Bukalenzi parish	13	(17.1%)
Occupation			Bukatabira parish	06	(07.9%)
Politician	30	(39.5%)	Bwondha parish	07	(09.2%)
Politician/ self employed	46	(60.5%)	Kityerera parish	06	(07.9%)
			Kityerera sub-county	07	(09.2%)
			Malongo sub-county	06	(07.9%)
			Namadhi parish	07	(09.2%)
			Wandegeya parish	16	(21.1%)

More than half of respondents from the local politicians (52.6%) were L.C I and above one sixth of the politicians (17.1%) were representing the L C III (sub-county) (Table 4.11). Politically, these were the only active points of decision making within the proximity of SBCFR, Mayuge district and were constitutionally empowered to make by-laws affecting SBCFR besides the LC V, the highest decentralized political council in the district.

Table 4.11 shows that more than half of the politicians (55.3%) were seasoned politicians having been in politics for more than one five year term (The Republic of Uganda, 1995). Incidentally, 5.3% of them were serving their either a fourth or fifth term as presented on the table. Table 4.11 also shows that more than a third of the politicians (39.5%) were not engaged in any other activity other than politics. In line with Rosenthal's writings cited by Tumushabe and Bainomugisha (2004) the local politicians tend to be part and parcel of their constituents, to

make voters feel their physical association with them through talking, sharing agony with them and communicating their problems to them forming a therapy even if the problems are not solved. The politicians attended funerals, made casual visits and attended any other occasion soliciting views from their electorates. SBCFR's neighbourhood had population pressure on land and poverty as their major challenges; cardinal in their proposed solutions was either land reclamation or change of SBCFR boundaries to allow them freely use both the forest resources and estate. Thus articulating these issues meant re-election or election to any elective post given the presidential backing (refer to Appendix VII); a peril to effective compliance with and enforcement of the Uganda forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

It was found that three quarters (75%) of the respondents from the political domain were people whose dockets forestry policy had a stake viz. chairpersons, speakers, and secretaries for; finance, information, production and environment. This force was appropriate in effective management of forestry within their constituencies given the mandate they had over environment within their areas of jurisdiction as in the Uganda National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003, Forestry Policy 2001, Local Government Act 1987, and the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (The Republic of Uganda, 1995; The Republic of Uganda, 2003). This therefore made their decisions and enacting of by-laws paramount in either compliance with or enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The results from the table also show that more than half of the members of the village councils responded to the questionnaires viz. Bubinge parish (77.8%), Bwondha parish (77.8%), Namadhi parish (77.8%), Bukatabira parish (66.7%) and Kityerera parish (66.7%). This therefore, authenticated the results given the fact that these politicians worked close to their constituents who are in the immediate neighbourhood of SBCFR, Mayuge district.

The background given from discussion of Table 4.11 clearly indicated the fact that given the powers that coalesce around politicians both local and national influenced the situation at SBCFR, Mayuge district. The opened space for a five tier political system with much representation and competition on the Ugandan political landscape, had a relationship with the diminishing of forest reserves in Uganda as portrayed by (fig 4.3 and fig 4.4) in a period of ten years.

The year 1995 was very vital for it was a year preceding the first ever direct presidential elections and members of parliament besides the five tier system. The competitiveness of

elective posts led politicians to stop evictions from SBCFR, backed by the then incumbent president of the republic of Uganda (Mugenyi *et al*, 2005). The two maps (fig 4.3 and fig 4.4) testifies disparities on vegetation coverage by showing much devegetation in 2005 compared to the 1995 ostensibly as a result of political meddling into enforcement of forest policy




Fig. 4.3 South Busoga Central Forest Reserve before competitive politics in 1995

Source: National Forestry Authority, Kampala




Fig. 4.4: South Busoga Central Forest Reserve at the helm of competitive politics in 2005
 Source: National Forestry Authority, Kampala

4.4.2 Politicians involvement in enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district

The local politicians representing their local council (L.C) constituencies are expected to positively involve themselves in the management of SBCFR, Mayuge district in accordance to

The Local Government Act (Decentralization); The Leadership Code and the 1995 constitution of the republic of Uganda (The Republic of Uganda, 1995) as in Table 4.11.

Table 4.12. Local politicians involvement in enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Politician's activities	Local Communities' Responses	
	Agreed	Disagree
Make by-laws which protect SBCFR	202 (58.7%)	142 (41.3%)
Make enforcement strategies for the forestry policy	165 (48.0%)	179 (52.0%)
Protect SBCFR individually	159 (46.2%)	185 (53.8%)
Can convince their constituents to comply with the forestry policy	209 (60.8%)	135 (39.2%)
Act as mouth pieces of their constituents on conservation of SBCFR	202 (58.7%)	142 (41.3%)

Results in Table 4.12 shows that these politicians could positively get involved in convincing their constituents on compliance with the forestry policy. This view was perceived by close to two thirds (60.8%) of the household respondents as in Table 4.12. This was in line with the fact that politicians had the power to cajole the local communities compared to the NFA official whom the local politicians viewed as anti-development (Nsita, 2006; Nsangi, 2006; Natusiimira, 2007). But the politicians' mobilization prowess was thwarted by the need to grab the votes from environmental criminals. Justifying the fact that politics and environmental conservation are parallel in goals (Pearl, 1996). Hence continued degradation of SBCFR, Mayuge district evidenced by settlement, farming and charcoal burning in the reserve with the consent of the local politicians.

More than half of the respondents (58.7%) agreed that those politicians did the following; made by-laws which protected SBCFR and acted as mouth pieces of their constituents on issues to pertaining conservation of SBCFR (Table 4.12). The politicians in these doings were representing their constituencies both nationally and locally given the five tier system of LCs. By-laws making has oscillated between local and central government as per the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute in 1993 and the instrument N^o 52 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda respectively. This mainly affected the CFRs in Uganda (Nsita, 2005 cited by Banana, *et al* 2007). Because of insufficient sensitisation the locals were apparently unaware of the changes. On the contrary, these acts were not well known within SBCFR which was devegetated with their conscience.

Table 4.12 shows that more than half of respondents disagreed with the following roles of

politicians in relation to enforcement of the forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district; protect SBCFR individually (53.8%) and make enforcement strategies for the forestry policy (52.0%). This disagreement could have a bearing on the fact that the local politicians were both active participants and participated in the illegalities within SBCFR by proxy to according many local communities interviewed. It therefore meant that the politicians from the communities engulfing SBCFR did not maximally endeavour to either protect or make strategies which could conserve the forest reserve in their proximity hence, the immense non-compliance with the forestry policy manifested by illegalities in SBCFR, Mayuge district.

4.4.3. Politicians interference with enforcement of the Forestry Policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district

The politicians representing the local communities living adjacent to SBCFR were found detrimental to the success of enforcement of the forestry policy on aspects presented in Table 4.13.

Table. 4.13: Local communities' response on political interference with the enforcement of the forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Politicians' Activities	Local Communities Responses	
	Agreed	Disagreed
Side with the locals in non-compliance activities	180 (52.3%)	164 (47.7%)
Use radio programmes to express dissatisfaction with NFA	195 (56.7%)	149 (43.3%)
Stop evictions during campaigns especially national	235 (68.3%)	109 (31.7%)
Exploit voters conflicts with NFA to campaign	198 (57.6%)	146 (42.4%)
Promise to change boundaries of the forest reserve	215 (62.5%)	129 (37.5%)
Advocate for land reclamation from the forest estate	212 (61.6%)	132 (38.4%)

More than two thirds of the households (68.3%) agreed that politicians stopped evictions from the forest reserves during the national political campaigns periods (Table 4.13). It was found that the following utterances came out of the politicians during the campaigns; promises of change of SBCFR boundaries (62.5%) and land reclamation from SBCFR (61.6%). Politicians were believed to be mouth pieces of the local communities in on issues related to SBCFR as reflected on Table 4.13. Given their charisma and power the locals side with them and they also do the same noted by more than half the respondents (52.3%). This loyalty to politicians at SBCFR was manifested in local community's perception that professional foresters were anti-development, anti-people and ill advisers (Natusiimira, 2007). Therefore deterred compliance with and enforcement of the forestry policy at SBCFR, as manifested in degradation of the forest reserve

as in a comparison of Figures 4.3 and 4.4.

More than half of the respondents agreed according to Table 4.13 on the following; politicians exploited conflicts between their constituents and NFA to campaign (57.6%); politicians used radio talk show programmes to express their dissatisfaction with the NFA as a campaign mechanism (56.7%) and they sided with their constituents on non-compliance (52.3%). All these were done by politicians to get votes for political positions either locally or nationally. Therefore the fight between the political side of the government and civil service led to the peril of SBCFR which is directly under the civil service as seen in Fig. 4.4. Table 4.14 shows the views of the lead agencies on politicians' interference with the enforcement activities of NFA at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Table. 4.14. The Lead Agencies' views on politicians' interference with enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=31)

Politicians' Activities	Views of the Lead Agencies	
	Agreed	Disagreed
Side with the local communities' on non-compliance	28 (90.3%)	03 (09.7%)
Exploit voters' conflicts with NFA officials to campaign	30 (96.8%)	01 (03.2%)
Express disagreement with NFA over radio programmes	31 (100%)	00 (0)
Promise to change SBCFR boundaries	23 (74.2%)	08 (05.8%)
Reclaim the ancestral land	28 (90.3%)	03 (09.7%)
Stop evictions during campaigns	26 (83.9%)	05 (16.1%)

From Table 4.14 it was clear that the lead agencies in totality (100%) agreed that politicians use radio talk show programmes to express their disagreement with the NFA as a campaign strategy. Most (96.8%) politicians exploited their constituents' conflicts with NFA officials to campaign. Politicians; backed their constituents' non-compliance with the forestry policy (90.3%) and advocated for land reclamation from the SBCFR estate (90.3%). More than three quarters of the lead agencies (83.9%) agreed that politicians stopped evictions from SBCFR during political campaign seasons; and promised a change in SBCFR boundaries (74.2%) as a campaign burner for elective posts (Table 4.14).

Statistically, the views of both the local communities and the lead agencies on political interference was correlated using Spearman's correlation to establish level of association of political activities with non-compliance of the forestry policy at SBCFR (Table 4.15).

Table 4.15: A correlation of the views of local communities and lead agencies on politicians' interference with enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR

Subject	Political Activities	Views of the local communities (Table 4.12)		Views of the Lead Agencies (Table 4.13)		d	d ²
		Agreed	Rank	Agreed	Rank		
1	Back their constituents on illegalities at SBCFR	180	6	28	3.5	2.5	6.5
2	Express disagreements with NFA over the radio	195	5	31	1	4	16
3	Stop evictions during campaigns	235	1	26	5	-4	16
4	Exploit voters conflicts with NFA to campaign	198	4	30	2	2	4
5	Promise to change boundaries of the forest reserve	215	2	23	6	4	16
6	Advocate for land reclamation from SBCFR	212	3	28	3.5	-0.5	2.5

Σd^2 60.75

From Table. 4.15 a Spearman rank correlation was computed to establish the relationship between local communities' and lead agencies' views on political interference with either compliance with or enforcement of the forestry policy at SBCFR as under:

$$\text{Spearman's 'r'} = 1 - \frac{6 \Sigma d^2}{n(n^2 - 1)}$$

Where d is the difference between the two rankings and Σd^2 is the sum of all the d^2 values while n is the total of the subjects as in Table 4.15 (Amin, 2005; Kothari, 2005)

So from Table 4.8 the it follows that:

$$r = 1 - \frac{6 \times 60.75}{6^3 - 6}$$

$$r = 0.74$$

This value lay on a (0.60-0.79) segment of the strength of a correlation, manifesting a strong correlation, at a 0.05 level of significance (Fowler *et al*, 1998; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003 and Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008). It may therefore, be concluded, that there was a strong relationship between the politicians' interference and enforcement of forestry policy at SBCFR (Table.4.15). Hence politicians' meddling in forest policy enforcement had de-legitimised the policy expressed by the observable lawlessness in SBCFR.

4.4.4 Politicians and Compliance with Forestry Policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district

Local and national politicians from SBCFR's neighbourhood had both direct and indirect link to compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 as manifested in the following tables 4.16 and 4.17.

Table 4.16: The role of politicians on major aspects of the forestry policy at SBCFR (n=344)

Statement	Local Communities' perception		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
Advocate for conservation before elections	165 (48.0%)	63 (18.3%)	116 (33.7%)
Advocate for conservation after elections	203 (59.0%)	44 (12.8%)	97 (28.2%)
Advocate for Collaborative Forest Management	179 (52.0%)	59 (17.1%)	106 (30.8%)
Encourage reforestation outside the forest reserve	206 (59.9%)	52 (15.1%)	86 (25.0%)
Encourage privatisation of the forest reserve	94 (27.3%)	63 (18.3%)	187 (54.3%)
Politicians should be involved in enforcement of forest policy	208 (60.5%)	53 (15.4%)	83 (24.1%)

Table 4.16 shows that about two thirds (60.5%) of the local communities around SBCFR, agreed that politicians should be involved in the enforcement of forestry policy. Thus they apparently supported that politicians must be involved in enforcement of forest policy. This active involvement of politicians in enforcement concurred with the fact that politics more than anything else is about how people organise their communities for the purpose collaborative tackling of problems they face (Sodaro, 2001). This therefore was positive given the politicians' charisma and organizational ability besides being elected by the same community.

In a positive gesture, 60% of the locals agreed that politicians did encourage them on reforestation outside the forest reserve and advocated for conservation after elections (59%) (Table 4.16). The politicians' minimally advocated for conservation before elections (48%) according to the local community. Admittedly, politicians from this region could not go contrary to a widely taken perception that politics is a game of numbers despite the nature of the voter (Schmidt *et al*, 2005). This therefore meant less campaigns on conservation before elections for it would be counter productive politically on about 10,000 people in SBCFR, Mayuge district (Watasa, 2009). However through observation the neighbourhood of SBCFR was reforested by exotic tree species.

Table 4.16 shows that more than half (52%) of the local community claimed that politicians advocated for CFM. The idea of CFM is a pillar in the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001. This would ease enforcement and compliance by legitimization of the rules and regulations of conserving the forest reserve. CFM is the current way forward world wide for it is a strategy for promoting rural

development resource conservation through empowerment and partnership with the local communities living adjacent the forest reserves. In this case, the local communities take responsibility for both protection and management of the reserve as agreed upon by the stakeholders besides reciprocation of accrued benefits (Fisher, 1995; Hoefsloot, 1997; Otieno & Buyinza 2010; Buyinza 2010). Contradictorily, SBCFR, Mayuge district had not adopted CFM and instead took on privatisation.

Table 4.16 shows that 54.3% of the respondents claimed that politicians discouraged privatisation. NFA licensed the Kakira Sugar Works and the Nile Ply Companies as investors in tree growing at SBCFR, Mayuge district (Temmerman, 2007). These companies have faced the local population's non-compliance with the policy with an apparent political backing manifested in uprooting, grazing on, and burning planted trees. On the same note politicians tested elsewhere on privatisation ended up planting beans and maize in the forest reserves (Lumu, 2007). All these justified the results given on Table 4.16 where more than a quarter of the locals conceded that the politicians encourage privatisation of SBCFR, Mayuge district.

Table 4.17 shows the local communities' perception on illegalities in SBCFR, Mayuge district. The study found that politicians sided with their constituents on derailing enforcement of forestry policy 2001 at SBCFR, hence degradation of the reserve as portrayed in Fig; 4.4.

Table 4.17: Politicians and illegalities in SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Statement	Local Communities' perception		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
Politicians encourage settlement in the reserve	158 (45.9%)	29 (08.4%)	156 (45.3%)
Politicians encourage free use of forest resources	167 (48.5%)	40 (11.6%)	137 (39.8%)
Politicians conflict with NFA over forest management	196 (57.0%)	52 (15.1%)	144 (41.9%)
Politicians actively participate in illegal activities	182 (52.9%)	58 (16.8%)	104 (30.2%)
Politicians incite people against NFA officials	159 (46.2%)	70 (20.3%)	115 (33.4%)
Politicians claim to fight for peoples properties' rights	218 (63.4%)	41 (11.9%)	85 (24.7%)

Table 4.17 shows that 63.4% of the respondents believed that politicians were fighting for peoples properties rights. These rights included among others land and household commodities lost after evictions. The former being attributed to the fact that the gazettement of SBCFR like any other was done arbitrarily making the locals claim it as an ancestral property (Mugenyi *et al.*, 2005). The local communities around SBCFR form constituents of both national and local politicians emanating from these areas who like any politicians elsewhere are accountable to

them (Sodaro, 2001). This therefore made politicians to vehemently pester for either resettlement or compensation for damages caused by evictions using all medias.

Results in Table 4.17 some 57% of the respondents stated that there was a conflict between NFA and politicians over management of SBCFR and their perception was based on encroachers in SBCFR. Whereas NFA view them as environmental criminals while politicians view them as voters capable initiating a political mileage. Jao and Kiyingi (2005) added that for long there has been confusing government policies in Uganda coupled with irresponsible political statements seeking cheap popularity. Thus, according to them over 80% of encroachment in forest reserves had the backing of politicians who trade forest reserve land for votes. This therefore undoubtedly spurs the conflict between the conservators (NFA) and masked engineers of utility (politicians) as manifested in Table 4.17. The conflict at extreme ended up making politicians incite the local communities against NFA officials as acknowledged by about half the local communities' responses (46.2%).

The results from Table 4.17 also show that the local community also acknowledged that politicians were active participants in the illegal activities by slightly more than half their numbers (52.9%). Active participation in illegal activities is negative and therefore could not solicit much positive response from the local community given the fact that almost half of these people's population were, had political ambitions, or will be active politicians. Through observation the following activities like in other CFRs in the country were evident; farming, grazing, settlement, charcoal burning and timber exploitation (Otieno, 2003; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010).

There was also a claim that politicians encouraged settlement in the forest reserve by about half the number of the local communities close to SBCFR (45.9%) a fact denied by the same (Table 4.17). To that effect the politicians encouraged free use of the forest resources accepted by almost half of the local community (48.5%). Plate 4.1 attests to the notion that politicians encouraged both settlement and use of forest resources. It was an established settlement where shopping and refreshments within that part of the forest reserve were done. To condone the practice, the government did establish police post not purposely to handle the forest crimes but social crimes of apparently forest criminals in Nakalyango trading centre and the neighbourhood deep in the SBCFR. The act was in contrary to Article N^o 33 of the NFTP 2003 which prohibits free use of forest resources (The Republic of Uganda 2003).

deep in the SBCFR. The act was in contrary to Article N^o 33 of the NFTP 2003 which prohibits free use of forest resources (The Republic of Uganda 2003).



Plate 4.2: Part of Nakalyango trading centre in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge District

4.5.1 The local communities living adjacent to SBCFR and Compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001

The local communities here entailed only those households established or resident in the proximity of SBCFR, thus having both direct and indirect contact with the forest reserve. Their participation in the making of the Forestry Policy; duration of encroachment without eviction and means of land acquisition in SBCFR is presented on Table. 4. 18.

Table 4.18: The local communities and encroachment of SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Characteristics	n	%	Characteristics	n	%
Parish of residence			Duration of forest land utility without eviction in terms of years		
Bubinge	20	(05.8%)	Never	56	(16.3%)
Bukalenzi	61	(17.7%)	<05	100	(29.1%)
Bukatabira	64	(18.6%)	06-10	78	(22.7%)
Bwondha	50	(14.5%)	11-15	35	(10.2%)
Kityerera	47	(13.7%)	16-20	20	(05.8%)
Namadhi	41	(11.9%)	21-25	24	(07.0%)
Wandegeya	61	(17.7%)	26-30	14	(04.1%)
Participants in forestry policy development			>31	17	(04.9%)
Politicians and foresters	106	(30.8%)	Means of land acquisition		
Foresters and NGOs	126	(36.6%)	Boundary extension	246	(71.5%)
Local Community participated	97	(28.2%)	Purchased	245	(71.2%)
Foresters only	94	(27.3%)	Free access	173	(50.3%)
All inclusive	43	(12.5%)	Political utterances	184	(53.5%)
No idea	241	(70.1%)			

highest number of participants at 18.6% while Bubinge had the least at 05.8%. This was a reflection of their population sizes and samples size already discussed in chapter three.

More than two thirds of the respondents (70.1%) claimed to have no idea of the developments of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 and hence decimally responded on those who could have participated in its development according to Table 4.18. Slightly more than a third of the households' respondents (36.6%) believed the foresters and non-governmental organizations participated in its making and that was the highest. Politicians and foresters had slightly below a third (30.8%) of the responses perceived to have participated in the development of the forest policy 2001. Slightly above a quarter of the respondents believed the local community participated in the development of the policy (28.2%). While 27.3% claimed that it was done by foresters alone.

The views presented by the local communities living adjacent to SBCFR showed that they were not represented in any consultative meeting on the draft policy or their representatives did not consult neither did they inform them of the outcome of the consultative meetings on the drafting of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001. According to the policy over 1200 people attended 4 regional workshops in Mukono (Central), Mbarara (Western); Lira (Northern) and Mbale (Eastern). The workshops were all inclusive viz. politicians, administrators, technicians, NGOs, researchers, large and small scale farmers, and other stake holders (The Republic of Uganda, 2001). The approach used in the making of the policy was excellent but did not have a trickling down effect. Thus, 70.1% claim to have no idea of its making amongst the households around SBCFR. Besides majority (87.5%) claimed that politicians, foresters, NGOs and the local community did not participate in its making (Table 4.18).

On occupancy of the forest reserve, Table 4.18 shows that there was a drastic increase in the number of recent encroachers (<5 years) acknowledged by more than a quarter of the respondents (29.1%). Close to this segment was (06-10 years) which was acknowledged by 22.7%. These like others engaged in illegalities in SBCFR by carrying out the following; farming, settlement, cutting trees, saw milling, bricks making, cultivating opium and charcoal burning. All these groups lay within the limits where NFA could evict given the fact that apparently they fall within the 1992 racket, a year when due to finances the then FD could not sustain evictions. These could be evicted without compensation (Watasa, 2010). Ironically the out pour could be attributed to the 2006 Executive Order (refer to Appendix VII) which by the

time of this research had not been withdrawn. Encroachers misinterpreted this ban to mean permanent settlement in SBCFR, Mayuge district (Siminyu, 2010). This was a challenge to the management of evictions at SBCFR by the NFA officials.

Table 4.18 shows that 32% of the household respondents claimed to have or their neighbours had utilized the forest land without evictions for at least 11 years to almost over 31 years. From both interviews and observations SBCFR had two types of settlers viz. permanent- the “*ittakalyange*” (landlords), very furious and referred to themselves as “*Talibans*”. They owned the following villages in the reserve; Corner Bar; Kabandho, and Nakalyango. These were the earlier encroachers and currently claim ownership of the forest estate. The recent settlers referred to as “*Americans*”, the moderates who knew the land belonged to government. They occupied the following villages in the forest reserve; Nairobi, Kampala, Walugyo, Musoma and Buwembe. According to Mugenyi *et al*, 2005 evicting these people or tribal groups from SBCFR given the duration they have spent undisturbed, without alternative source of livelihood does not only violate the provisions of The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 N^o 169 which Uganda ratified. The evictions also negate the primary responsibility of government to develop coordinated and systematic actions to protect property rights of tribal peoples and respect their integrity.

Results in Table 4.18 clearly show that there were two main ways of land acquisition at South Busoga Central Forest Reserve claimed by majority of the household respondents. These were local extension of the boundaries by local communities in the forest estate’s neighbourhood (71.5%) and purchase from those who acquired earlier referred to as the landlords (71.2%). Apparently due to population pressure and the 2006 Executive Order (refer to Appendix VII), most local communities extended their land demarcations into the forest reserve for the NFA officials were made powerless.

On purchase of land, through interviews it was established that the “*Talibans*” or “*Ittakalyange*” or land lords awarded land of 3 acres at UShs. 50,000/= (about \$ 25) per year and with time the tenants were assured ownership. The tenants constructed make shifts settlement as seen in plates 4.2 and 4.4 in the reserve. From a discussion with some tenants, it was believed that there was an agreement between the government and Iddi Mwondha, the chairman of land owner's association to share the 16,000 ha forest estate. This therefore gave him and his associates, a right to sell or rent the land, an issue viewed by 71.2% of the respondents (Table 4.18). It was also claimed that

these land lords invited others to come and settle in the reserve besides people positioning themselves in readiness to compensation, resettlement and land sharing should an opportunity strike (Acaye, 2006).

Some 53.5% of the respondents claimed occupancy of the forest reserve by political utterances (Table 4.18). Political statements from the highest political offices in Uganda especially President Museveni in 1996 and the then Vice President Dr. Specioza Kazibwe encouraged settlement in the area (Mugenyi *et al* 2005). For the local politicians, the reserve was viewed as a political asset, thus pledging the reserve would manifest into votes. Anderson *et al* (2005) claimed that local politicians are very instrumental in defining work area priorities, hence, only actively support forest governance when they see a positive political mileage in the support. Therefore, much as NFA officials had the authority to manage the forest reserves, politicians had power to usurp their authority hence, encroachment in the forest reserves as exemplified by the situation at SBCFR, Mayuge district.

There was free access to the forest reserve land as claimed by 50.3% of the respondents (Table 4.18). Given the large expanse of the estate; few NFA personnel, in-obstructable boundary demarcations; and general lawlessness in the forest reserve, it was accessible by anybody who wished to use it. Mugenyi *et al* (2005) reported that seasonal migrants from Teso, Kayunga, Mbale and Western Kenya utilized the land for maize growing season and left after harvesting. Siminyu (2009) added that the Kenyans set up residential make shifts for settlement, cultivate and cut trees for either timber or charcoal which they smuggle to their country through Lake Victoria. This free entrance and exit from the forest reserves exemplifies the magnitude of lawlessness in the SBCFR which is detrimental to the forest biome and any efforts done by NFA officials.

4.5.2 Factors leading to non-compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district

Non-compliance with the Uganda forestry policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district was manifested to as illegalities in the forest reserve; farming, settlement, cutting trees, saw milling, bricks making, cultivating opium and charcoal burning. These were done with impunity causing; bodily harm to NFA officials, neglect of enforcement of the policy, conflict with NFA officials

boldly harm to NFA officials, neglect of enforcement of the policy, conflict with NFA officials and abuse of office by NFA officials who carried them by either proxy or boldly. Non-compliance was attributed to factors exhibited on Table 4.19.

Table 4.19: Factors leading to non-compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 among local communities (n= 344)

Factors	Local communities' views		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
- The forest reserve has fertile soil compared to outside	261 (75.9%)	15 (04.4%)	68 (19.8%)
- Settling in the forest reserve is reclamation of ancestral land	196 (57.0%)	55 (16.0%)	93 (27.0%)
- Population pressure on land outside the reserve	241 (70.1%)	33 (09.6%)	70 (20.3%)
- Poverty a driving force	245 (71.2%)	38 (11.0%)	61 (17.7%)
- Reluctance of NFA officials leads to settlement	185 (53.8%)	50 (14.5%)	99 (28.8%)
- Free access to the forest reserve	159 (46.2%)	58 (16.9%)	127 (36.9%)
- Forest officials exploit the forest resources at the expense of the local community	183 (53.2%)	62 (18.0%)	99 (28.8%)
- The proximity of the forest reserve	232 (67.4%)	40 (11.6%)	72 (20.9%)
- The forest land was arbitrarily gazetted	186 (54.1%)	55 (16.0%)	103 (30%).

Results in Table 4.19 show that 75.9% of the respondents accepted, that the forest reserve had fertile soils compared to land outside the forest. This was in line with the occupation of most local community members viz. peasants 25.5%; politicians 22.0%; government employees 20.9%; self employed 17.1%; these indirectly or directly engaged observably in crop farming which needed fertile soils. Through observation farming was evident in SBCFR, Mayuge district as seen in plate 4.3.



Plate 4.3: Farming within South Busoga Central Forest Reserve to the proximity of Mayuge/ Bwondha road, Kityerera sub-county

This activity as portrayed in Plate 4.3 also took place at about 300m away from the NFA headquarters at Kityerera sub-county. Therefore, observably, Plate 4.3 served as a testimony for the de-legitimisation of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district. Davenport *et al* (1996) observed the same claiming that the forest reserve was engulfed by heavily populated agricultural land to both the north and east. The crops grown mainly were maize, beans, potatoes, cassava, and other annual crops. This had become a point of conflict of interest between the foresters who would wish to conserve the SBCFR with the local peasantry community which wants to share the forest land for farming.

Table 4.19 also shows that poverty was perceived by the majority (71.2%) of local community respondents as a driving force to non-compliance followed by population pressure on land outside the forest reserve (70.1%). From the socio-demographic statistics (Table 4.1) 58.3% of the respondents live below poverty line and 83.4% had dependants ranging from 1 to over 21. A testimony to this was the make shift shelters established in the forest reserve near Nakalyango a supposedly trading centre in the forest reserve as seen in Plate 4.4.



Plate 4.4: An established home stead in SBCFR, Nakalyango village-Mayuge district

The results show that poverty was a reality in the area, especially for households accommodating a family of six people or more who depend on adverse forest activities such as charcoal burning in the forest. Poverty was also explained by the fact that 59.3% of the respondents were below

internationally quoted US \$ 1 per day (Table 4.1). Man is generally a resource utilizing animal and therefore cannot stay without encroaching the resources loosely administered within his or her proximity, where the policy was de-legitimised. Besides, the national forest plan also acknowledges that its often the poorest who depend most critically on forest resources for their well-being and survival in the absence of other livelihood assets and opportunities (Republic of Uganda, 2002). Most households (91%) around WBFR admitted that poverty was a major reason for engagement in illegal activities leading to deforestation of the forest reserve (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). There is thus a postulation of a casual link between poverty and environmental degradation as seen in the two forest reserves.

In the context of agrarian technology as experiences in the rural Uganda, population increase and dependency syndrome leads to landlessness or pressure on land (Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). This was backed by more than half the respondents (53.9%) as in Table 4.1, claiming to have 6 to more than 21 dependants and generally poor. This therefore made political utterances an impetus to engagement in illegal activities in the forest reserve. Contradictorily, China despite the constant population increase had forested land area changed from 8% to 12% in 1949 and 1984 respectively (Agrawal, 2007). Thus, other factors stand on population's way to engage in non-compliance activities.

Results from Table 4.19 some 67.4% of the households living adjacent to SBCFR claimed that non-compliance with the forestry policy was attributed to the proximity of the forest reserve. Some of the NFA officials interviewed claimed that most of the settlers within the forests reserve were foreign to the area; and more so culprits who opted for Moslem names to disguise themselves. This view of the NFA officials were also shared by many of the interviewed local community members that majority of them were culprits from outside the forest reserve hence concealed their identity. Kenyans and other people from outside Busoga region seasonally came into cultivate food crops (Siminyu, 2009). From the socio-demographic characteristics (Table 4.1) it was clear that 37.7% of the respondents originally, came from within the district while 62.3% were foreigners to the forest reserve. This therefore dispelled the aspect of proximity as a major factor compelling non-compliance at SBCFR.

There was a claim by more than half (57%) of the households that settling in the forest reserve is reclamation of ancestral land which was depopulated as a result of sleeping sickness epidemic 1901-9 arbitrarily gazetted it as forest reserve by the colonial government (Table.4.19) (Webster

& Osmaston, 2003). This therefore led to the formation of ‘*ittakalyange*’ pressure group; presumed land lords of the area led by Iddi Mwendha, who were renting out or selling parcels of the forest estate with impunity and led to non-compliance with the policy acknowledged by 54.1% of the respondents and report by Otieno (2003). This was dispelled by more than half of the lead agencies interviewed. The local communities’ position was correct since there was no record on their relatives consulted in either gazettelement of the forest reserves or forestry policy making. The various sectorial laws covering wildlife, forestry, fisheries and the next, during the colonial times referred to as ordinances were a direct replica of the English law covering similar sectors in Britain (Tumushabe & Bainomugisha, 2004).

Reluctance of the NFA officials leading to settlement in the forest reserve was noted by 53.8% of the respondents (Table 4.19). This was opposed by more than half of the Lead Agencies interviewed and yet at the same time these agencies claimed that no effective policing of the forest reserve was being done by the same rating. Few of the Lead Agencies claimed that there was frequent sensitization of the local communities living adjacent SBCFR. All these combined to expose the reluctance of the NFA officials leading to non-compliance.

Results in Table 4.19 explicitly show that more than half the community living adjacent to SBCFR (53.2%) claimed that forest officials exploited the forest resources at the expense of the local community. This view was not a direct activity as statistics showed and could be by proxy. The same view was held by the local communities surrounding WBFR (Otieno, 2003). It was revealed that they participate in felling trees for timber (51.5%); Cultivating crops (39%) and charcoal burning (35.8%). Thus, though minimum the locals could not spare them exploit at their expense hence de-legitimization of the policy at SBCFR. This selective exploitation at the expense of the local communities dates back to the Kitumbezi (Uganda) Estates which extensively fell the Mvule trees from 1927 to 1936 in the North West portion of SBCFR. Besides the said company, Buchanan’s Busoga Saw-mills also carried out Mvule felling operations in the area from 1934-1941 (Leggat, 1954). Thus selective exploitation had persisted for long, information passed to generation through stories as time went on yet reclamation of the land has always been in the offing.

Almost half (46.2%) of the household respondents according to Table 4.19 claimed that non-compliance was attributed to free access to the forest reserve (Table 4.19). This had a direct connection to an apparent reluctance of the NFA officials as earlier mentioned; improper

demarcation of the forest reserve especially using the demarcation stones and jathrupus spices; proximity and political calls. The local community had defaced the boundaries of the forest estate by destroying cairns, removing beacons, destroying sign plates and planting crops along the boundaries (Acaye, 2006). This was done with a hope that the president was giving them the land any time from the 2006 presidential elections. All these combined to make SBCFR both a free entry and exit contributing to non-compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.

4.5.3.1 Local communities' attitude towards compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district

A Likert scale was used to test the attitude of the local communities towards the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 based on preferences by authors such as (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987; Kumar, 1999; Kothari, 2004; Gay *et al*, 2009). This scale was scored by assigning weights for responses ie 5- very much willing to 1- very much unwilling. The weights were reversed for a negative question (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987; Gay *et al*, 2009). A total score for each respondent was calculated by summing the value of each item checked as in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20: Attitude of the local community living adjacent to SBCFR towards compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 (n = 344)

Variable/ Question	Local communities' attitude			
	Response	%age	Computation of the check	Attitude Index
Are you people living around the forest reserve willing to comply with the Forestry Policy 2001 so as to conserve the SBCFR?				
Very much willing	61	17.7	61×5	305
Much willing	80	23.3	80×4	320
Neutral	64	18.6	64×3	192
Unwilling	79	23.0	79×2	158
Very much unwilling	60	17.4	60×1	60
Are you people living around the forest reserve willing to stop illegal activities in SBCFR?				
Very much willing	54	15.7	54×5	270
Much willing	90	26.2	90×4	360
Neutral	63	18.3	63×3	189
Unwilling	68	19.8	68×2	136
Very much unwilling	69	20.1	69×1	69
Are you people living around the forest reserve unwilling to work with NFA Officials so as to conserve SBCFR?				
Very much willing	56	16.3	56×1	56
Much willing	86	25.0	86×2	172
Neutral	47	13.7	47×3	141
Unwilling	93	27.0	93×4	372
Very much unwilling	45	13.1	45×5	225

Table 4.20 shows that, at an attitude index of 305 the local communities engulfing SBCFR were very much willing to comply with the forestry policy. Besides that they were somewhat willing to comply at an attitude index of 320. In comparison, they negated at below neutrality attitude index of 192 thus unwilling at 158 and very much unwilling at 60. This therefore was indicative of an overall local communities' positive attitude towards compliance with the forestry policy at SBCFR, Mayuge district (Gay *et al*, 2009). Apparently, this willingness was thwarted by political incitements aimed at coalescing votes hence the practical non-compliance exhibited at SBCFR. It could also be deduced that non-compliance was intentional given the positive attitude of the local communities' living adjacent to SBCFR's towards the Forestry Policy.

Table 4.20 shows that the local communities in the neighbourhood of SBCFR were somewhat willing to stop illegalities at an attitude index of 360. They were very much willing to stop illegalities at an attitude index of 270. These showed a partial voluntary compliance given the fact that most of them (65.2%) had heard of the policy over the radio (Figure 4.1) and at $r=0.42$ there was no linear correlation between the lead agencies (enforcers) and community compliance with acts and laws governing environment in this area (Table 4.8). In comparison they negated at below neutrality attitude index of 189 thus unwilling at 136 and very much unwilling at 69. Thus on the overall local communities had positive attitude towards stopping illegalities at SBCFR (Gay *et al*, 2009).

There was a soar relationship between the local communities and NFA officials, where somehow at an attitude index of 372 the former were unwilling to work with the latter, so as to conserve SBCFR (Table 4.20). At the same time the attitude of the local communities at SBCFR's neighbourhood was very much negative at 225. But some of the local communities were willing to collaboratively work with NFA officials at 172 which more than the neutrality attitude index of 141; and very much willing at 56. This attitude negates the much cherished CFM where stakeholders are said to work in partnership for the conservation of forest reserve at their proximity (Otieno, 2003; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010).

4.5.3.2. Illegalities practiced at SBCFR, Mayuge district

The illegalities are a manifestation of non-compliance through human activities in SBCFR, in the country's forest reserves. These included among others the following in the forest reserve; farming, settlement, cutting trees, saw milling, bricks making, cultivating opium and charcoal burning. Table 4.21 shows some of activities tested in SBCFR.

Table. 4.21: Illegalities in SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Activity	Local communities' responses		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
Settlement in SBCFR	180 (52.3%)	30 (08.7%)	134 (39.0%)
Farming in SBCFR	249 (72.4%)	18 (05.2%)	77 (22.4%)
Charcoal burning in SBCFR	218 (63.4%)	42 (12.2%)	84 (24.4%)
Deforestation in SBCFR	174 (50.6%)	52 (15.1%)	118 (34.3%)

Table 4.21 explicitly shows that farming was the most dominant illegal activity in SBCFR, Mayuge district (72.4%). Through observation, arable farming was directly carried out by both people resident within and outside the forest reserve as depicted by Plates 4.3 and 4.4. The main crops grown in SBCFR were; potatoes, cassava, maize and beans. Encroachers were psyched to believe that their actions especially farming would lead to the conversion of the entire SBCFR into gardens for subsistence cultivation (Natusiimira, 2007). This has therefore been a point of conflict between the local communities in the neighbourhood and the forest resources managers in SBCFR.

Charcoal burning was viewed as the second most important activity by about two thirds (63.4%) of the respondents (Table. 4.21). The activity was organised as displayed Plate 4.1. Compared to farming interviewed encroachers, agreed that charcoal burning had a short gestation period hence giving quick returns. The activity was carried out by the local communities in SBCFR's neighbourhood and seasonal immigrants who included Kenyans (Siminyu, 2009). Some authors agreed that charcoal burning was backed by increasing urbanization in Uganda and the high cost of electricity besides easy storage, cheap equipment and technology, portability, high energy compared to wood fuel of charcoal (Muthoka *et al*, 1998; NEMA, 1999; Gachanja, 2000; Otieno, 2003). Experience has it that charcoal burning as a non-compliance manifestation activity that has led to deforestation of various forest reserves viz. Bahati and Emburu forests in Nakuru district and WBFR in Busia district (Gachanja, 2000; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010).

Results in Table 4.21 show that more than half (52.3%) the respondents agreed that there was settlement in the area of study. Watasa (2009) reported that the number of encroachers increased from 3000 with effect from the Executive Order of February, 2006 halting evictions (refer to Appendix VII) to 10,000. Watasa (2009) further reports that with the backing of both local and national politicians the encroachers had sealed off over half of the 16,000 hectare SBCFR. Through observation it was common to find make shift settlement hats (refer to Plates 4.2 and 4.4) in the forest reserve belonging to either indigenous local communities or those from outside the local community. Contradictorily deforestation which gave way to all the illegalities was the least agreed activity by 50.6% of the respondents (Table 4.21). Therefore, through these activities, it was clear that increasing human activities which were non-compliant to the Uganda forestry policy 2001, led to deforestation of SBCFR, Mayuge district. These activities were performed with impunity imbued in the local communities' perception as in Table 4.22 below.

Table. 4.22: Local communities perceptions on their relationship with SBCFR, Mayuge district (n=344)

Statement	Local communities' view		
	Agreed	Undecided	Disagreed
Evictees from the forest reserve have a right to life.	228 (66.3%)	39 (11.3%)	77 (22.4%)
The local communities and the forest reserve had mutual relationship before gazettelement.	201 (58.4%)	32 (09.3%)	111 (32.3%)
The relationship between the NFA and the local community is bad.	193 (56.1%)	65 (18.9%)	86 (25.0%)

Table 4.22 shows that 66.3% of the households' respondents acknowledged that the evictees had right to life. The lead agencies interviewed had an over whelming acceptance of this right. Ironically, the same rate of acceptance by the lead agencies falsified compensation of the evictees. This right to life has a backing from Article 22 of the Ugandan Constitution (The Republic of Uganda (1995)). In this case, the right to life integrates the right to sustenance and livelihood which includes socio-economic rights like right to food and shelter (Mugenyi *et al.*, 2005). From the local community, it was clear that 83.7% of the respondents had been eking livelihood either directly or indirectly (neighbours and relatives) from SBCFR uninterrupted for atleast months to over 31 years given the nature of evictions carried out (Table 4.18). This therefore calls for amicable handling of evictions by stakeholders at SBCFR.

Some 58.4% of the households recalled the nostalgic past when the forest reserve was flourishing, and they could apparently utilize the forest resources sustainably (Table 4.22). This was before gazattelement where the current forest estate was community owned. According to 56.1% of the households, their relationship with NFA was bad connoted in their localising the abbreviation NFA to "*nfa*" directly translated as "*am dying*" in the local dialect. Worse still the local communities were exploiting antagonism with politicians, hence, fighting NFA officials with impunity. This eroded the confidence and integrity of an environmental law enforcing agency, NFA and consequently de-legitimised the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR.

4.6.1 Local communities and evictions in SBCFR, Mayuge district

History has it that people encroached forest reserves in Uganda on unprecedented levels after 1972, on directions of the then President of Uganda Iddi Amin Dada. This was done on the auspice of "*double production campaign*" in 1973 with a declaration of an economic war after

History has it that people encroached forest reserves in Uganda on unprecedented levels after 1972, on directions of the then President of Uganda Iddi Amin Dada. This was done on the auspice of “double production campaign” in 1973 with a declaration of an economic war after expulsion of Asians. The president then declared that Ugandans were free to settle anywhere (FAO, 1988 cited by NEMA, 1996). In abid to conserve the forest reserves eviction of forest encroachers has often been done country wide, SBCFR inclusively. The last serious evictions were in 1991 where the government even cancelled all land titles, which had been issued for lands within the forest reserves between 1971 and 1986. The CFRs’ boundaries were re-surveyed and opened (NEMA, 2000/2001). Other evictions have since then been continuing but with hiccups especially the 2006 Executive Order halting official evictions (refer to Appendix VII). Despite this the encroachers had always leaned against several sympathizers as depicted in Figure 4.5.




Fig. 4.5: Apparent sympathizers with evictees of SBCFR, Mayuge district (n = 344)

Figure 4.5 shows that 247 (71.8%) of the households respondents clung on the politician’s apparent sympathetic gestures to ease their tensions on evictions. The reliance on politicians was exhibited by over 100,000 residents in Mayuge District petitioning members of parliament on the natural resource committee on evictions by NFA from Kityerera and Malongo sub county forest reserve (//E : \ NFA News, htm 2007). Anderson *et al* (2005) also acknowledged that politicians are worried about staying in power, hence in turn make choices about how to employ their limited time and resources to serve political as well as programmatic goals. For sure no politician would dare leave the support from over 10.000 people about half a constituency. From these

Figure 4.5 show that given the political backing (71.8%) of the evictees or encroachers, they apply mob justice (52.6%) to maintain their status quos. It was found that the encroachers were well organized to the extent that they used whistles to mobilize themselves in case of danger of evictions, or anything causing disorder. Tenywa (2007) observed that the encroachers had better organization with political support, making it increasingly difficult for the forestry authority to evict them. Acaye (2006) added that some of the encroachers especially at Buwembe, Corner-Bar and Bubode included many Uganda Peoples' Defense Forces veterans determined to create new villages in the forest reserve. They fiercely encounter any strategy to evict them forcefully by ill-equipped NFA officials.

Encroachers nursed a claim that the forest land belonged to them contrary to NFA officials' reference to them as trespassers. They thus provocatively grazed, set fires to the planted trees, and directly uprooted tree seedlings in the SBCFR, Mayuge district. Thus discouraged the Kakira Sugar Works and Nile Ply Companies, licensed investors in reforesting the SBCFR aimed at establishing commercial timber plantation in the reserve (Temmerman, 2007). These acts delegitimised the 2001 Uganda Forestry Policy, hence clashed with NFA with impunity.

Figure 4.5 has that more than half of the households (200) (58.1%) claimed that the Busoga Kingdom where SBCFR is located had also been a clinging point for rescue. Prior to colonization forests were communally owned by those communities living adjacent to them or the kingdoms where they were allocated in Uganda (Bikaako-Kajura, 2002). Hence, in reflection of the past the local community living adjacent to SBCFR had to cling on Busoga Kingdom for rescue. In interviews, The Busoga Kingdom references were always pronounced by the chairman of the landlords. This was also in concomitant to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (N^o. 169) which provides for recognition of ownership rights of land and resources that indigenous and other tribal peoples occupy enforced as from 5th September, 1991 (Seventy sixth sessions of the general conference of the International Labour Organisation on 27th June 1989, cited by Mugenyi *et al* 2005). This though unknown by most of the locals was handy to national politicians, who exploited it to advocate for Busoga Kingdom support.

Results in Figure 4.5 also show that more than half of the household respondents (196 (57%) depended heavily on the Uganda Courts of Law for rescue. This was done using the Executive Order 2006 by the President as annexure, which stopped evictions. Hence, defaming enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 activities especially evictions by the NFA

officials. The 2006 Executive Order was interpreted as an instrument formalizing encroachers' stay in forest reserves. Worse still the encroachers petitioned the president and the speaker about "harassment" by NFA and implicated the resident district commissioner Mayuge in fuelling conflict between "Landlords" and "cultivators" (Watasa, 2009 and Acaye, 2006). All these were done using the 2006 Executive Order as an appendix to sue for disturbance of the encroachers' tranquility in the forest reserve. Thus the so called encroachers were authentic owners of the forest reserve and used the Uganda Courts of Law to maintain their status in the forest reserve.

Figure 4.5 show that few of the households' respondent (151 (43.9%) could turn to the Uganda Human Right Commission to rescue their status. Most of them (193 (56.1%) were apparently ignorant of the Universal Declaration in Human Rights, which among other things, provides that every one has a right to property as an individual as well as in association with others and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property (Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cited by Mugenyi *et al* 2005).

Mugenyi *et al* (2005) continued to cite the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which further provided that people that have been dispossessed of their property rights have a right to full recovery of their property. It was, therefore, surprising that more than half of the respondents (57%) could opt for the Uganda Courts of Law when ignorant of their rights other than the Executive Order (Figure 4.5). This could also be attributed to the fact that international laws were rarely talked of or referred to; other than the Constitution of Uganda which was also conveniently truncated to justify any act. Hence, encroachment with impunity as the international non-governmental organizations which could offer that service also had low acknowledgement of (130 (37.8%) amongst the households' respondents (Figure 4.5).

4.6.2 Local communities' possibilities of compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at SBCFR, Mayuge district

The current trend in natural resource conservation requires the communities; partnership, co-management, CFM, privatisation and community based management (Otieno, 2003; Otieno & Buyinza, 2010). Therefore to that effect the local community was tested as in Table 4.23.

Table: 4.23: Possibility of local communities' compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 at South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Mayuge district (N = 344)

Aspect	Response of the households	
	True	False
Individual concern with conservation of forest SBCFR	246 (71.5%)	98 (28.5%)
Self reporting of encroachers/violators of forest policy	173 (50.3%)	171 (49.7%)
Criminalising failure to report and submitting false report	189 (54.9%)	155 (45.1%)
Rewarding self reporting by leniency in treatment	164 (47.7%)	180 (52.3%)

Table 4.23 shows clearly that more than two thirds of households' respondents (71.5%), believed that individual concern with conservation of forest reserve was a possibility for compliance with the Uganda Forestry Policy at SBCFR. The interviewed Lead Agencies view was also almost two thirds of their numbers in agreement with this aspect. Compliance is behavioral and should lead to real changes in individual's behaviour. According to Enger, and Smith (1995) environmental ethic must begin to express itself not only in national laws but also in subtle but profound changes in the ways people live daily. Thus, its acknowledgement by both the households and lead agencies was a panacea towards compliance slightly.

Table 4.23 further show that more than half (50.3%) of the households' respondents contended that self reporting of encroachers / violators of forest policy would be a positive aspect towards compliance with the 2001 forest policy at SBCFR. This drew slightly more than two thirds of the lead agencies' responses in interviews on this aspect. Self reporting could substitute government monitoring efforts thus reduce enforcement costs without deterrence. Cohen (1999) added that the magnitude of any penalty received had to depend on whether the violation was reported voluntarily or if government enforcement authorities discovered it when no self-report was made. If the latter, the penalty is considerably higher. Many environmental laws have adopted it but lacks on Ugandan law. The research revealed that the local communities were both willing (50.3%) and unwilling (49.7%) to accommodate it.

Results on Table 4.23 show that many (54.9%) of the households' respondents positively responded to criminalisation of failure to report and submission of false report to authorities. This idea was highly applauded by the lead agencies' interviewed. When reporting is properly managed then, failure to report and submitting a false report would be tantamount to imprisonment (Cohen, 1999). Ironically, this "carrot and stick" approach was certainly not understood by the local community for they falsified the carrot, which was rewarding self reporting by leniency in treatment by almost equivalent response on criminalization (52.3%) (Table 4.23). On the part of the lead agencies it yielded high positive responses for reducing enforcement costs.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the findings

The study was out to establish how environmental policies with specific reference to the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 could be effectively enforced so as to ascertain conservation of the forest resources in the CFRs in Uganda. De-legitimization of the policies marred both compliance with and enforcement of good policies on environment. Specifically, the study had the following objectives; to investigate the relationship between government regulatory system and local communities' compliance with the Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR, Mayuge District; to explain the impact of politicians interference in the enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 in SBCFR, Mayuge District; and to describe the attitude and willingness of the community living adjacent to SBCFR's to comply with the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001.

The first objective as stated amongst the specific objectives yielded to the following findings:- The media through which the forestry policy 2001 was communicated to the local communities were as follows radio (65.2%); lead agencies (35.1%); newspapers (34.8%); television (16.8%) and no idea (10.7%). This showed that the radio was the most widely used media for sensitization of the policy. The following aspects of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001 were positive in the area; promotional campaigns to grow trees outside the forest reserve (62.2%); privatization of the forest reserve (56.1%); effectiveness of the policy in the forest reserve (48.5%); CFM (41.6%); equitable sharing of forest resources (38.4%); and transparency in decision making (28.8%). The results therefore showed that only promotional campaigns for reforestation and privatization of the forest reserve were successful in SBCFR, Mayuge District.

Laws and Acts governing the conservation of SBCFR, Mayuge District were statistically insignificant for they were > 9.21 at 0.01 $df = 2$ as explained in Chapter 4. These included the following in order; the Magistrate Act at χ^2 calculated (148.5); the Police Act (138.2); The Leadership Act (136.9); the Traditional Rulers Act (124.6); The Uganda Wildlife Act (122.4); Local Government Act (121.0); The 1995 Constitution (112.8); The National Environment Act (97.4); The Uganda Forestry Policy (91,1) and; The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act

2003 (73.5). This could therefore explain the lawlessness in and around SBCFR, Mayuge District ostensibly backed by politicians.

A SWOT analysis matrix of NFA, the lead agency charged with the management of CFRs showed that the weakness and threats of the organization superseded the strengths and opportunities. This rendered the organization incapable of efficiently and effectively managing CFRs in Uganda. Thus, the following acts could exemplify this at SBCFR; insults, fighting and mob justice against them, claiming that they were agents of under development. All these were directly and by proxy backed by politicians.

The second objective yielded the following the main politician's interference with the enforcement of the UFP 2001 in SBCFR occurred during the campaigns period. This could mainly take place at national elections accepted by 68.3% of the local communities. They did this by stopping evictions of over 10,000 people within SBCFR's jurisdiction besides the many living adjacent to it. This was a heavy political capital during the campaigns to both presidential and parliamentary elections.

Other activities detrimental to enforcement by the politicians were; advocate for land reclamation from the forest estate (61.6%); forest boundary changes promise (62.5%); exploit voters conflicts with NFA to campaign (57.6%); side with the locals on non-compliance (60.8%); they act as the local communities' mouth piece on conservation (58.7%); and use radio programmes to express dissatisfactions with NFA (56.7%). All these expressed to poor and land hungry local communities attracted even people from far to occupy the open access forest reserve. This therefore impeded enforcement of the UFP 2001 at SBCFR.

Through political meddling in enforcement the following illegalities de-legitimizing the UFP, 2001 were exhibited; settlements as a claim for the peoples land right (63.4%) conflict with NFA over management (57%); discouraging privatization of the forest reserve (54.3%); unregulated use of the forest resources (48.5%); and general settlement in the forest reserve (45.9%). However positively after elections they camouflaged and advocated for conservation (59%); encouraged reforestation outside the forest reserve (59.9%); advocated for involvement in the management (60.5%) and advocated for CFM (52%). These elusive activities deterred progress of enforcement of the UFP 2001 at SBCFR.

The last objective's findings were as follows:- Land acquisition within the forest were through; boundary extension (71.5%); purchase from those who acquired earlier (71.2%); politicians' utterances (53.5%); and free access (50.3%). Occupancy of the land was for the following duration without eviction twenty years and above (16%) and below 20 years (67.7%). The latter being freely evictable but NFA was limited by forces beyond her control.

The following factors led to non-compliance with the UFP 2001 as established by this research; fertile soils within the forest reserve (75.9%); poverty, a driving force (71.2%); population pressure (70.1%); proximity of the forest reserve (67.4%); reclamation of ancestral land (57.0%) arbitrary gazettement of the reserve (54.1%); forest officials exploiting the reserve at the expense of the indigenous populace (53.2%); reluctance of NFA officials (53.8%); and free access of the reserve (46.2%). Observably free access could have been the main factor for due to ill equipment of NFA the locals could use the forest reserve at will. This therefore testifies the fact that de-legitimization of the policy overrides accessibility as discussed in Chapter Four where people came as far as Kenya to encroach SBCFR.

In case of evictions as had been before 2005 and several attempts thereafter the following sympathized and gave support to evictees; Politicians (71.8%); Busoga Kingdom (58.1%); The Uganda Courts of law (57.0%); Mob justice (52.6%); Uganda Human Rights Commission (43.9%) and Non-governmental Organisation (37.5%). Despite all the mentioned due to de-legitimization of the policy through interviews and document analysis, mob justice was the weapon for the defense of encroachers at SBCFR. This act was fully supported by politicians in the area and maximally barred NFA officials from doing their job.

5.2 Conclusion

Compliance with and effective enforcement of forestry policy lacks a political will leading to its de-legitimization in the central forest reserves. Thus with a direct and proxy backing by the politicians, the local communities with impunity carry out the following illegalities within the gazetted forest reserves; settlement, farming, sand mining, charcoal burning, and indiscriminate devegetation of the forest biomes to give way to human activities. The government regulatory system has been consequently rendered weak despite the authority vested on the system. This shows that the legislative arm of the government interferes with the executive rendering the executive ineffective.

The local communities living adjacent to forest reserves are meek and can be swayed into both compliance and non-compliance with the forestry policy. This could be exemplified by the perceptions towards them by both the politicians and the lead agencies viz. voters and encroachers respectively, yet they are the pivot through which both compliance and enforcement balance. They were aware of the policy, sensitized through all the medias besides both ecocentric and anthropocentric importance of the forests in their neighbour hood. Therefore were very much willing to conserve the forest reserve but apparently influenced by either politicians or the character of the lead agencies especially corruption off the latter. It could also be deduced from both their attitude towards the policy and illegalities practiced that they were meek; swayed by prevailing circumstances, hence with de-legitimization of the policy they exploit the status quo to encroach the forest reserve.

5.3 Recommendations

This research showed that there was lawlessness in the management of SBCFR; thus deforestation as a result of disregard to an apparently accommodative Uganda Forestry Policy 2001. The literature reviewed, documentary analysis and research carried out in the field puts SBCFR, Mayuge District as a tip of the ice burg in the forestry docket in Uganda. It therefore concluded that non-compliance was prevalent due to ineffective enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001, which boiled down to a meek political will manifested in de-legitimation of the forestry policy by all stakeholders at SBCFR. Basing on the major findings, the researcher therefore recommended the following conservation management framework to the stakeholders as summed up in Fig: 5.1.




Fig: 5.1: Recommended conservation framework

Source: Researcher's perception (2012).

From figure 5.1 the lead agencies in general and NFA in particular should reclaim both its power and authority over the forest reserves from the politicians who contend to have vested interest in these areas. This can be done by following the legal processes, constant seminars and workshops which include the politicians in the light of press. There should be harmonization of roles of

NFA the lead agency in forestry with sister organizations effectively to avoid either contradiction or duplication of services as portrayed by DFS and NFA.

Forestry policy should be amended to include politicians' role such as; mobilization, sensitization, making laws, by-laws and policies on sustainable use of forest resources in consultation with NFA as a lead agency in forestry and NEMA. The politicians should in the amendment also act as checks and balance for the lead agency. It should specify the eviction management which should include; resettlement and compensation procedures.

The local communities living adjacent and within the forest reserve should be allowed to practice agro-forestry where with time the trees over shadow crop growing. General sensitization on forestry resource sustainable use should be embraced by NFA using all medias following self-appraisals and embracing core values to change NFA's image. The image change may make the body admirable hence internalization of the sensitization message. Participatory monitoring should be prime so as to collect periodic data and record information on the activities of the local community members. This would keep track of the progress of the activities as per set out targets, for timely removal of constraints, carrying out corrective measures and re-planning of activities to avoid embarrassing situations and to justify the use of resources (Otieno, 2003).

The local communities engulfing protected areas and in particular the CFRs should be aware that political meddling on enforcement of policies are temporary. Their willingness to; comply with the Forestry Policy 2001; stop illegalities and collaboratively work with the NFA so as to conserve SBCFR should manifest in the following; self reporting of encroachers or violators of forestry policy; criminalization of failure to report and submission of false report on the forestry; rewarding self-reporting by leniency in treatment of the reporters and above all individual concern with conservation of forest reserve.

The local community should adopt family planning practices aimed at having manageable dependants; avoid or stop teenage pregnancies, elevate the status of women through empowerment; and short child spacing as a means of slowing rapid population growth and improving family well being (Muthoka, Rego & Rimbai, 1998). NEMA (2008) added that encouraging population movement from where there is high pressure to low pressure. The movement could be effective when income diversification, employment and education opportunities elsewhere form an incentive. This would consequently relieve pressure on the forest reserve.

5.4 Suggestion for further research

The cardinal finding of this research was that non-compliance was prevalent at SBCFR due to ineffective enforcement of the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001, which boiled down to ineffective political will manifested in de-legitimisation of the forestry policy by all seemingly stakeholders at SBCFR, Mayuge District. Specifically, there was minute efficacy of the lead agencies in enforcement of the forestry policy statistically using a chi square test $\chi^2_{\text{Tabulated}}=9.21$ and further tested using Spearman's rank correlation between enforcement and compliance resulting in $r=0.42$ was moderate relationship; manifested in lawlessness in SBCFR, Mayuge district. This dismal performance of the lead agencies is sufficient to warrant further research on lead agencies and conservation of forest resources at SBCFR, Mayuge district. The preferred topic would be "*Institutional dilemmas in forest resource management in Uganda: A case of South Busoga Forest reserve*".

In this research institutions were generally studied with much emphasis on NFA the lead agency charged with the management CFRs in Uganda. It would also be interesting to further study the possibilities of studying how the Uganda police force with a criminal investigating department would be used bringing sanity in forestry docket with many forestry crimes- illegalities. The Uganda police force is assigned the task of keeping law and order in the country. This therefore puts crime prevention and detection within their jurisdiction environmental crimes are of no exception in the criminal aspects.

REFERENCES

- Acaye, G. (2006). *Monitoring and community sensitisation in South Busoga Central Forest Reserve: A comprehensive field report that request for fast implementation of action points*. Mayuge: (unpublished).
- Agrawal, A. (2007). Population pressure = forest degradation: an over simplistic equation? *Silviculture. FAO Corporate Document Repository. File://E:\ Unasylya – No. 181 pp1-12*. Downloaded on 9th June, 2007.
- Akello, C.E (2007) a. Environmental regulation in Uganda; Success and challenges *Law Environment and Development (LEAD) Journal* Vol. 3 Pg. 22 – 25.
- Akello, E.C (2007) b. *Challenges in ensuring compliance with and enforcement of Environmental law in Uganda*. The INECE News letter inece.org/newsletter/15/Uganda.html-INECE Secretariat Washington.
- Almond, G.A; Powel G.B. Jr, Strom, K & Dalton R.J (2000). *Comparative Politics Today: A World view 7th Edition*. New York: Longman pp. 3 – 31.
- Alweny. S (2007, June). Making a call against global warming. *The Daily Monitor* June 5, 2007. Kampala: Monitor Publications.
- Amin, E.M. (2005). *Social Science Research: Conception, Methodology and Analysis*. Kampala: Makerere University.
- Amnesty International, COHRE Africa Programme, Kenya Land Alliance, Hakijamii Trust & Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2007, May). *No where to go. Forced evictions in Mau Forest, Kenya, Briefing Paper May 2007* www.amnesty.org Downloaded on 29th May 2010.
- Anderson, K.P; Gibson, C.C; & Lehoucq, F. (2005). Municipal Politics and Forest Governance: Comparative analysis of decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala. *World Development* Vol. 34 N^o. 3. Elsevier Ltd. pp. 576 – 595.
- Aryamanya–Mugisha, H.(1991). *The National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) process for Uganda. Focus on Environment Vol. 1, N^o1 June 1993* Kampala: Television For Development (TFD) pp. 4 – 8.
- Bailey, C.A. (2007). *A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. (2nd Ed)*. London: Pine Forge Press.
- Banana, A.Y, Vogt, N.D; Bahati & Gombya–Ssembajjwe (2007). Decentralised governance and ecological health: Why local institutions fail to moderate deforestation in Mpigi District of Uganda. *Academic Journals. Scientific Research and Essay* Vol. 2 (10) pp. 434 – 445.
- Bell, J. (1999). *How to complete your Research Project successfully*. New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors Ltd.
- Bikaako–Kajura, W. (2002). *Property Rights, community participation and Natural Resource*

Management: The dynamics of the tenure question and management of Kibale Forest Park: Net work of Ugandan Researchers and Research Users Working Paper 24, Kampala: NURRU Publications.

Bowman, C. & Asch, D. (1992). *Strategic Management*, London: Macmillan Education Ltd.

Brady, N.C. (2002). *The nature and properties of Soils (10th Ed)*. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India .

Broughton, A. (2002). *Regulatory compliance and enforcement: An annotated bibliography*. Graduate Seminar of the Faculty of Law, University of Calgary (Unpublished).

Buyinza, M. (2010). Income distribution analysis of Collaborative Forest Management Programme in Mt. Elgon National Park, Uganda: Dual Action for Poverty Alleviation and Environment Management. *Research Journal of Applied Sciencis* 5(2). *Med well Journals* pp. 101–107.

Canada, (2001 March). *Compliance and enforcement policy for Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999*. Montreal: CEPA 1999.

Carto, S.C. & Peter, J.P. (1993). *Strategic Management: A focus on Process (2nd Ed)*, Illinois: Irwin.

Cauvery, R., Nayak, U.K.S, Girija, M. & Meenakshi, R (2007). *Research Methodology*. New Delhi: S.Chand & Company Ltd

Cohen, M.A. (1999). Monitoring and enforcement of environment policy. *International year book of environmental and Resource Economics*, Vol. III Edward Elgar Publishers.

Contreras-Hermosilla, A. (2001). *Law compliance in the forestry sector: An overview*. (Unpublished). Down loaded on 19th July, 2010.

Cummings, M. C. Jr. & Wise, D (2003). *Democracy under pressure: An introduction to the American Political System. (9th Ed)*. Belmont: Thomson Learning. Inc. pp. 14 – 83.

D'silva, E. & Appanah, S. (1993). *Forestry management for sustainable development*. Washington D.C: The World Bank.

Davenport, T., Howard, P., & Mathews, R.,ed (1996). *South Busoga Forest Reserve Biodiversity Report*. Kampala; Forest Department.

De Blij, H.J ed (1988). *Earth ' 88 changing geographic perceptions*. Washington D.C: National Geographic Society.

Dietz, F. & Hoogervorst, N. (2002). *Goals for environmental policies: Analyzing the role of politicians and economists*. A paper presented at the Second World Congress of Environmental and resource economist 23rd-27th June, 2002. Monterey. C. A (Unpublished).

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1992). *Principles of environmental enforcement*. Washington: Author.
- Elliott, C. (2009). *Forest conservation and utilisation—paradigms of forest conservation*. Unasylva N^o. 187. http://www.fao.org/docrep/w_2149E/w2149e03.htm.(pp 1-9) Down loaded on 20th May 2009.
- Enger, E.D & Smith, B.F. (1995). *Environmental science: A study of inter-relationships (5th Ed)*, Boston, Massachusetts: WCB. McGraw – Hill pp 26–27.
- Fisher, C. (2007). *Researching and writing a Dissertation: A guide for Business Students (2nd Ed)*. Harlow: Prentice Hall-Financial Times.
- Fisher, R.J (1995). *Collaborative Management of forests for conservation and development*. Oxford: IUCN
- Forest Governance Learning Group–Uganda (2005). *Work plan for January – December 2008*, Kampala: ACODE.
- Fowler, J., Cohen, L. & Jarvis, P. (1998). *Practical statistics for field Biology (2nd Ed)*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. pp 132.
- Fraenkel, J.R & Wallen, N.E.(2008). *How to design and evaluate research in education*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education
- Gachanja, M (2000). View of an assessment report on degradation of Eburu Bahati Forest. *Forest Action News Vol. 1 N^o. 1*. Nairobi: Forest Action News Network. pp 5.
- Gay, L.R., Mills, G.E & Airasian, P.(2009). *Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Applications. (9th Ed)* New Jersey: Pearson Education International.
- Glaser, R. (1995). “Lecture summary on policy and institutional aspects of industrial compliance and enforcement” *Environment Law and Policy*. Nairobi: UNEP Publications. pp 139–144.
- Gomm, R. (2008). *Social research methodology: A critical introduction (2nd Ed)*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Hamilton, C.A. (1984). *Deforestation in Uganda*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
- Heyes, A (2010). *Implementing environmental regulation: Enforcement and compliance*: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London (Unpublished). Down loaded on 19th July 2010.
- Hoefsloot, H. (1997). *Collaborative management on Mt. Elgon: An account of first experience*. Nairobi: IUCN-The World Conservation Union
- Hornby, A.S (2000). *Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary 6th ed*. New York: Oxford

University Press

<http://E:\NFA News.htm>. Downloaded on 9th June; 2007.

<http://www.capital.fm.co.ke/News>. Downloaded on 1st April, 2009

<http://www/E:/PARTS II.htm>. Downloaded on 9th June 2007.

[http://www/E:/Population and Environment – A complex Relationship](http://www/E:/Population and Environment - A complex Relationship) downloaded on 9th June 2007.

[http://www/E:/Unsylva-Nº. 181- Silviculture- Population pressure = forest degradation](http://www/E:/Unsylva-Nº.181-Silviculture-Population pressure = forest degradation).
Downloaded on 9th June 2007.

<http://www/E:\Uganda Tours.htm> Downloaded on 9th June 2007.

<http://www.inece.org/enforcement principles.html>. Downloaded on 9th June, 2007.

<http://www.nation.co.ke/News>. Downloaded on 1st April, 2009.

<http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publications/Africa/121/minziro/chap3.htm>. Downloaded on 21st May, 2009..

INECE, (2008). *Performance measurement guidance for compliance and enforcement practitioners*, (2nd Ed) <http://www.ec.gc.ca> Downloaded on 1st April, 2009.

Ivanova, M.(2002). "Environmental crime and punishment in Russia: Law as reason for breach." *Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of global environmental change "Global Environmental Change and the nation state"*. Potsdam: Potsdam Institute For Climate Impact Research, pp. 77-86.

Jao, A.G. & Kiyangi, G.(2005, August). Encroachment and politics are bed fellows. *The Forester, News from the Ugandan Forestry Sector Aug. 2005. Issue Nº. 12* Kampala: NFA pp. 4–5.

Jaramogi, P. (2008, February 28). Landless in own homeland: The woes of Mt. Elgon Dwellers. *The New Vision*, Thursday February 28, 2008. Kampala: New Vision Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.

Jordan, A & O'Riordan, T (2000). *Environmental politics and policy process. Environmental science for environmental management (2nd Ed)*, Harlow Essex: Prentice Hall pp. 63 – 93.

Kagwa, R. (2006). "Mainstreaming environmental concerns into the policies plans and programmes of the Uganda Police Force". A paper presented at a training workshop to strengthen and enhance the capacity of police investigators and state prosecutors to enforce

environment laws 19th–21st March 2006, at Ridar Hotel Sseta, Mukono, Uganda.

Kaiza, D.(2001, April). Uganda gets \$ 22m loan to monitor industrial Pollution. *The East African* April 23 – 29, 2001. Nairobi: Nation Media Group.

Kaiza, D. (2006, June). AGOA: Uganda, all set for accreditation, *The East African*, June 18 – 24, 2001, Nairobi: Nation Media Group.

Kamugisha–Ruhombe, J. (2007, October). *Forest law enforcement and governance Uganda Country assessment and issues paper*. Kampala: Afornet.

Kaniaru, D. (2002). “UNEP Governing Council adopts guidelines on compliance with and enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements” *6th International Conference on Environmental compliance*. San Jose, Costa Rica pp 43 – 50.

Kantwi, P. (2001, March). Conserving by decree: Protecting the forests from the “Natives”. *The East African* March 19 – 25, 2001, Nairobi: Nation Media Group.

Karimi, J. (2001, June). Since 1902, Forests have been run arbitrarily. *The East African* June 4 – 10, 2001. Nairobi: Nation Media Group.

Kavanamur, D. (2001). *The interplay between politics and business in Papua New Guinea. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Working Paper N^o. 01/6*. A paper presented on 19th September, 2001 at the Australian Parliamentary Library.

Kazoora, C. & Carvalho, J. (2005). *Power tools: Improving forest justice*. Kampala: Sustainable Development Centre (sdc).

Kazoora, C.; Tondo, C. & Kazungu, B. (2005). *Routes to justice: Institutionalising participation in forest law enforcement in Uganda. Participatory learning and action* 53 December 2005. Kampala: (Unpublished).

Kenya Land Alliance (2005). *Fact finding mission on the evictions in Mau Narok July 2005* (Unpublished) . pp. 7.

Kiyingi, G. (2005). Mabira, Bugala Forests face degazettement. *The Forester News from the Uganda Forestry Sector Issue N^o. 13*. Kampala NFA pp(4–5).

Kiyingi, G. (2006). NFAs coverage in the media improves. *The Forester News from the Uganda Forestry Sector Issue N^o. 15*. Kampala: NFA.

Kok, F. (2005). *National strategy for environmental legislation enforcement: Seventh International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement*. 9–15 April 2005. Marrakech, Morocco: Proceedings Vol. 2 pp. 81 – 87.

Kombo, D.K.& Tromp, D.L.A (2006). *Proposal and Thesis Writing*. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa.

- Kothari, C.R. (2004). *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*, (2nd ed.) New Delhi: New Age International (P) Ltd, Publishers.
- Kumar, R. (1999). *Research Methodology: A step-by-step Guide for Beginners*. London: Sage Publishers Ltd.
- Leggat, G.J (1954, December). *Working plan for South Busoga Central Forest Reserve, Busoga District, Eastern Province-Uganda 1955 -1965*. (unpublished).
- Lind, E.M. & Morrison (1974) *East African Vegetation*. London: Longman Group Ltd.
- Loefler, I. (2000, January). Lets stop cutting down the government's trees. *The East African Jan 17 – 23, 2000*, Nairobi: Nation Media.
- Lumu, D.(2007, July) "Big Shorts grab forests to grow beans, maize." *The Weekly Observer*, July 12-18, 2007. Kampala: The Observer Media Limited.
- Lwasa, S; Mwebaza, R. & Mwanika, P.N (2009). *A situation report: The Nature and extent of environmental crime in Uganda*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.
- Marmon, T (2009). *Corruption in the forestry sector and illegal logging: The problem, its implications and approaches to combating it*. Eschborn: Gorman Technical Cooperation.
- Maps and Location data base (2011): South Busoga Forest Reserve external links. Updated 2004-02-27. *Travel journals.net*. Downloaded on 14th January, 2011.
- Mbaria, J. (2001, April). Japan joins Kenya's forest excision saga. *The East African March 26 – April 1, 2001*, Nairobi: Nation Media Group.
- Mc Cormick, J. (2001). *Comparative politics in transition (3rd Ed.)*. Albert Complex: Thomson Learning Inc. pp 14 – 76.
- Mckinney, M.L & Schoch, R.M (1998). *Environmental Science: Systems and Solutions*. London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Inc.
- Means, K. & Josayma, C (2002). *Community-Based Forest resource conflict management: A training package*. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. pp 4.
- Michalak, K. & Bularga, A. (2002). "New Independent States environmental compliance and enforcement network (NISECEN): An effective mechanism to strengthen compliance and enforcement in Eastern Europe and Central Asia." *6th International Conference on Environmental Compliance*. San Jose, Costa Rica: pp 61 – 79.
- Ministry of Water, Lands & Environment (MWLE). (2003). *Ministerial Policy Statement for Ministry of Water Lands and Environment Vote: 012, Head 112. Financial year 2003/2004*. Presented to parliament for the debate of the estimates for revenue and expenditure 30, June, 2003. Kampala: Author

- Mintzberg, H.; Quinn, J.B & Ghosal, S (1995). *The Strategic Process: European Edition*. London: Prentice Hall
- Morse, J.M. & Richards, L. (2002). *Read me first for a user's guide to qualitative methods*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Mugenda, O.M. & Mugenda, A.G. (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative & Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS).
- Mugenyi, O., Twesigye, B. & Muhereza, E. (2005). *Balancing nature conservation and livelihoods: A legal analysis of the forestry evictions by the National Forestry Authority, ACODE Policy Briefing paper N^o. 13, 2005*. Kampala: ACODE.
- Mupada, E. (1997, January). *Towards Collaborative Forest Management in the conservation of Uganda's rainforests*. A presentation on African rainforests and the conservation of biodiversity. Proceedings of the Limbe Conference 17 – 24 January 1997, Limbe, Cameroon: Earth Watch. Europe Oxford.
- Muthoka, M.G, Rego, A.B. & Rimbui, Z. K. (1998). *Environmental education: Essential knowledge for sustainable development*. Nairobi: Longhorn Publishers. pp 177
- Mwangi, E. (1998). *Colonialism, self-governance and forestry in Kenya. Policy, practice and outcomes*: Research in Public Affairs V 590 (Un published).
- Nachmias, D. & Nachmias, C. (1987). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences (3rd Ed)*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- National Association of Professional Environmentalists-NAPE, (2011, June). *Fourteen years of NAPE's environmental struggle in Uganda (3⁷th Ed)*. Kampala: Author. pp 13-14
- Natusiimira, P. (2007). "Imprisoned for Protecting a Forest". *The Forester*. Kampala: NFA.
- Ndemere, P. (2007). Policy and law. *Design of appropriate agro-forestry interventions in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers pp 66-86.
- NEMA. (1997). *Environmental economics guidelines for Uganda*. Kampala: Author.
- NEMA. (1999). Constitutional reforms. *State of environment report for Uganda*. Kampala: Author pp 225–228.
- NEMA. (2001). Policy responses: *State of environment report for Uganda 2000/2001*. Kampala: Author pp. 107–126.
- NEMA. (2008). *State of environment report for Uganda 2008*. Kampala: Author.
- NFA. (2005). *Guidelines for successful communication at the National Forestry*. Kampala: Author.

- NFA. (2010). *The current situation of encroachment in Central Forest Reserves and the way forward*. Kampala: Author.
- N.R.M Manifesto (2006). *Prosperity for all: Prosperity, transformation, and peace*. Kampala: National Resistance Movement.
- Nsangi, K. M.(2006, July). Open Lawlessness intensifies as NFA grapples with encroachers. *The Forester News from the Ugandan Forestry Sector*. Kampala NFA Issue N^o 15 pp. 7–8.
- Nsita, S.A (2006, June). *Key issues affecting management of Uganda's forest resources*. A paper presented to the workshop on Forestry organized for Senior Officers held at Ranch-on-the Lake hotel, Entebbe: 07 June, 2006.
- Nunah, F., Grant, U.; Bahiigwa, G.; Muramira, T.; Bajracharya, P.; Pritchard, D.; & Vargas, M.J. (2002). Poverty and the Environment. Measuring the links: A study of Poverty–Environment indicators with case studies from Nepal, Nicaragua, and Uganda, *Environment Policy Department Issue Paper N^o 2* pp 346.
- Obua, J., Banana, A. Y., & Turyahabwe, N (1998) Attitudes of local communities forest management practices in Uganda : The case of Budongo forest reserve ,*Commonwealth Forestry Review* 77 (2)
- Okumbe, J.A. (1998). *Educational Management: Theory and Practice*. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press.
- Olet, D.E. (1977). *The overall contribution of forestry industries to economic developments of Uganda*, Msc Forestry Thesis. The University of New Brunswick: (Unpublished).
- Omara–Ojunga, P.H (1992). *Resource Management in Developing Countries*. New York: Longman Scientific & Technical.
- Opala, K. (2000, December). To trade or not to trade: Ivory pits Kenya against Zimbabwe. *The East African* December 18–24, 2000. Nairobi: Nation Media Group.
- O'Riordon, T. ed. (2000). *Environmental science for environmental management*. Essex Pearson: Education Limited.
- Oso, W.Y & Onen, D. (2005). *A General Guide to writing Research Proposal and Report*. Kisumu: Option Printers & Publishers.
- Otieno, A.C. (2003). *Collaborative Forest Management: A strategy for controlling deforestation in West Bugwe Forest Reserve, Busia District*. M.A (Geog.) Thesis Makerere University. (Unpublished).
- Otieno, A.C. & Buyinza, M. (2010). Collaborative Forest Management in Uganda. A Strategy for controlling deforestation in West Bugwe Forest Reserve, Busia District. *Research Journal of Applied Sciences* 5(5). *Medwell Journals* pp. 337–344.

- Pearl, M.C. ed. (1996). *Tropical deforestation*. New York: Colombia University Press. pp 314–317.
- Penjore, D. & Raptan, P (2009). *Trends of forestry policy concerning local participation in Bhutan: Policy trend report*, Bhutan: The Centre for Bhutan Studies pp. 21–27. Downloaded 21st May, 2009.
- Pickering, K.T. & Owen, L. A. (1994). *An introduction to global environmental issues*. London: Routledge pp. 45–47.
- Poffenberger, M. ed. (1996). *Communities and Forest Management: A report of IUCN Working Group on Community involvement in Forest Management*. Washington D.C: IUCN.
- Republic of Kenya (2010). *The proposed constitution of Kenya 6th May, 2010*. Published by the Attorney General in accordance with section 34, of the constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008 (N^o 9 of 2008).
- Republic of Uganda (2002). *The National Forest Plan: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment October 2002*. Kampala: Uganda Forests.
- Republic of Uganda. (2003). *Forests and Trees – Our future: Briefing Notes on the Uganda Forestry Policy 2001*. Kampala: Ministry of Water, Lands, and Environment.
- Resource Management Activities (1998). <http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publication/Africa/121/minziro/chap3.htm>. Downloaded 21st May 2009.
- Saberwal, V.K. (2000). Conservation as politics: Wildlife conservation and resource management in India: 3(2) *Journal of International Wildlife law and Policy* pp. 1–12.
- Sands, P.Q.C. (2003). *Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sanginga, P.C., Kamugisha, R., Kakuru, M.A., & Stround, A. (2004). Facilitating participatory processes for policy change in natural resource management: Lessons from the highlands of south western Uganda. *Uganda Journal of Agricultural Sciences*.
- Schmidt, S.W., Shelley, M.C; & Bardes, B.A. (2005). *American government and politics today 2005–2006*. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth. pp 1–29.
- Siminyu, F. (2009). From the press: Kenyans encroach on South Busoga Forest Reserve. *The Forester. News from the Uganda Forestry sector issue N^o 24*. Kampala: NFA. pp. 6.
- Simon, I.G (1981). *The ecology of natural resources*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Sodaro, M.J. (2001). *Comparative Politics: A global introduction*. Boston: McGraw Hill pp. 27– 50
- Sounders, M. (1997). *Strategic Purchasing & Supply Chain Management 2nd ed*. Harlow, England: Prentice Hall-Financial Times.

- Stacy, R.D. (2000). *Strategic management and organisational dynamics: The challenge of complexity*. Harlow Essex: Pearson Education Ltd.
- Temmerman, E.D. (2007, March). 40,000 new encroachers in one year. *The New Vision Thursday March 22, 2007*. Kampala: The New Vision Printing and Publishing Co.
- Tenywa, G. (2007, March). Locals invade South Busoga Forest Reserve. *The New Vision Thursday March 22, 2007*. Kampala: The New Vision Printing and Publishing Co.
- Tenywa, J.S & Lufafa, A. (2007). Soil Conservation. *Design of appropriate agro-forestry interventions in Uganda*.(pp.24-54) Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- The Dutch Ministry of Justice.(2004). *The "Table of Eleven" a versatile tool version*: November, 2004. The Hague: Law Enforcement Expertise Centre.
- The Republic of Uganda. (1995). *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995*. Kampala: LDC Publications Printing Press.
- The Republic of Uganda (2003). *The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act*. Supplement N^o 5 Acts Supplement to the Uganda Gazette N^o. 37 Volume XCVI dated 8th August 2003, Entebbe: UPPC by Order of the Government.
- Thompson, A.A & Strickland, Jr.A.J III (2001).*Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases (12th Ed.)* Boston: McGraw Hill Irwin.
- Tumushabe, G.W & Bainomugisha, A.(2004). *Constitutional reform and environmental legislative representation in Uganda: A case study of Butamira Forest Reserve in Uganda*. ACODE Policy Research series, N^o 10, 2004. Kampala: ACODE.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics, UBOS. (2001). *Uganda Demographic Health Survey 2000-2001- Key Findings*, Entebbe, Uganda: pp 2-6
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics, UBOS. (2006, October). 2002 Uganda Population and House Censuses: Analytical Report Abridge Version. Kampala: Author.
- UNEP. (2006). *Compliance and enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements*. Training manual on International Environmental Law, Nairobi: Author. pp. 39-47.
- Valentine, J.V. (1991). *Resource management in Developing Countries*. London: Bergin and Garvey.
- Vink, A.P.A. (1975). *Land Use in advancing Agriculture*. New York: Springer-Verlag Berlin
- Vogt, P.W (2007).*Quantitative research methods for professionals*.Boston:Pearson.
- Watasa, M.(2009). Brawling Encroachers: Time to resume evictions: *The Forester News from the Uganda Forestry sector issue N^o 24* Kampala: NFA pp.7-8.
- Watasa, M.(2010, April). Forest evacuation: Lessons from Namwasa and Luwunga. *The Forester*

News from the Uganda Forestry sector April 2010 issue N° 26. Kampala: NFA pp. 4–5.

Webster, G. OBE & Osmaston H.A (2003). *A history of the Uganda Forest Department 1951–1965.* London: Commonwealth Secretariat pp. 7–30.

Whitmore, T.C. & Sayer, J.A. ed. (1994). *Tropical deforestation and species extinction.* London: Chapman & Hall. pp. 40-46

Zaelke, D., Stilwell, M., & Young, O. (2005). Compliance, Rule of Law and Good Governance: *Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance and sustainable Development Vol.I.* London: Cameroon May Ltd. pp. 29 – 53.

Zziwa, A. & Waiswa, D. (2007). *Training and Extension: Design of appropriate agro-forestry interventions in Uganda.* Kampala: Makerere University–Fountain Publishers – Kampala Uganda pp. 104–119.