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KENYA - ETHIOPIA RELATIONS: A STUDY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CO-OPERATION,
1963 - 1991

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


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
DECLARATION

I, Oduogo Cyprine Onyango, do hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.



ODUOGO CYPRINE ONYANGO

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as Supervisor.



DR. S.W. ROHIO

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses and explains the nature of inter-state relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. An analysis of the two countries' relations shows that despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite the fact that the two countries had different colonial backgrounds and different ideologies, Kenya - Ethiopia relations remained good. There was co-operation between them for more than two decades.

Further analysis shows that certain economic and political factors contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. The economic factor was mainly trade while the political factors included geopolitics and the security factor. The question that is raised here is : What was the significance of these factors in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations ? Specifically then , the study seeks to analyse and explain the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963 - 1991.

The aims of the study therefore were: 1. To show the extent to which trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. 2 . To show the extent to which the security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations .

3 . To show the extent to which geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations .

This study tested the following three hypotheses . 1 . That bilateral trade was significant in contributing to co-operative

Kenya - Ethiopia relations . 2 . That the security factor was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. 3. That geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations .

In this study, library research constituted the dominant source of information. The bulk of the information was obtained from secondary sources namely, books, newspapers, magazines, journals, and published and unpublished speeches of government leaders . This data collection technique was found useful to our study because it was cheap as most of the needed materials were found in the libraries within Nairobi where the research was conducted. Secondly this technique enabled us to find some data which could not be found through interviews, especially data on Kenya - Ethiopia security matters. We overcame this problem by reading journals like the African Research Bulletin ,Africa Contemporary Record, Africa Diary, and newspapers, where we could either find the whole treaty and communique quoted or part of the treaty and communique quoted.

The problem we faced by using this technique was that of confirming the factor that was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Due to such limitations, unstructured- oral interviews were conducted among some Kenyan and Ethiopian government officials involved in the two countries' relations. Those interviewed included, Kenyan government officials in, Kenya External Trade Authority; Central Bureau of Statistics and Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Ethiopian government officials

interviewed were mainly found in the Ethiopian Embassy in Nairobi. Through the interviews therefore, we were able to confirm the factor which was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

The findings shows that despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite the fact that the two countries had different colonial backgrounds and different ideologies, Kenya and Ethiopia traded with each other during 1963 - 1991. It was noted that the interdependence of the two countries and the convergence of their national interests made it imperative that they trade with each other.

According to Kenya and Ethiopia, fraternal relations and mutually beneficial economic co-operation could not be achieved without promotion of trade between the two countries. The emphases made by Kenya and Ethiopia to improve trade between themselves; the available trade figures between the two countries' and the findings of the interviews carried out confirmed that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Further findings especially those of trade figures between Kenya and Uganda and Kenya and Tanzania, however shows that Kenya traded more with her two East African neighbours namely Uganda and Tanzania. Those findings made us to argue that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations only to a small extent.

Further findings shows that the security factor also contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. It was deduced that Somalia always aims at incorporating what was formerly the

Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia however objects very strongly to Somalia's claims. The emphases to protect their territories against Somalia's claims were made in the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's and beginning of 1990's. That position was maintained by, Emperor Haile Selessie, Mengitsu Haile Mariam and Meles Zenawi all of Ethiopia and Presidents, Kenyatta and Moi of Kenya. According to Kenya and Ethiopia, the realization of self - determination would violate the territorial integrity of Kenya and Ethiopia.

During the interviews, we noted that the convergence of the two countries' national interests based on the need to protect their territories against Somalia's claims made it imperative that they co-operate. In fact, the security factor was the main factor that brought about the co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

Other finding shows that geopolitics also contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. It was noted that, nearness of Kenya and Ethiopia to each other, sharing of peaceful borders by Kenya and Ethiopia and Ethiopia's and Kenya's positions in the Horn of Africa made it imperative that the two countries co-operate. During the interviews however, we confirmed that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations, but that it was not the factor which was significant in contributing to the two countries' co-operative relations.

Basing our arguement on the findings of the written data and on those of the interviews, we conclude that the security factor was

significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Of the three hypotheses therefore, hypothesis two proved to be significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. A fact of shared interest therefore made it imperative that the two countries co-operate.

In the course of gathering our data, we encountered certain problems. First we discovered that despite the 28 years of Kenya - Ethiopia interactions, not sufficient literature has been generated dealing with their relations. We sought to overcome that problem by reading different journals especially, the African based journals like the African Research Bulletin, Africa Diary, Africa Contemporary Record and others.

Secondly, we found it problematic to acquire data on Kenya - Ethiopia security matters. This problem was considered to have been accentuated by the sensitivity of the topic. Information on the signed treaties and communiques for example could not be reached even after along trial as the interviewed officials considered them confidential. We again overcame this problem by reading journals like the, African Research Bulletin, Africa Contemporary Record, Africa Diary, Keesings Contemporary Archives, and Newspapers where we could either find the whole treaty and the whole communique or part of the treaty and communique quoted.

This study however provided some modest contribution to the field of international relations in general and the study of African

international relations in particular. Those interested in knowing the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991 are now provided with some data.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- B.U.J. - British Union Jack
- E.P.O. - Ethiopia's Province of Ogaden
- G.P.U. - Galla Peoples Union
- G.S.L. - Greater Somali League
- I.C.P. - Independent Constitutional Party
- I.E.A.C. - Imperial East African Company
- K.A.D.U. - Kenya African Democratic Union
- K.A.N.U. - Kenya African National Union
- K. A. U. - Kenya African Union
- K.C.A. - Kikuyu Central Association
- K.P.A. - Kikuyu Province Association
- L.S.Y.P. - Liberal Somali Youth Party
- M.A.A.G. - Military Assistance Advisory Group

- N.A.S. - National Assembly of Somalia
- N.E.P. - North Eastern Province
- N.F.D. - Northern Frontier District
- N.F.D.P. - Northern Frontier Democratic Party
- N.P.M. - National Peoples Movement
- N.P.P.P.P.- Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party
- N.P.P.N.U.- Northern Province Peoples National Union
- N.P.U.A. - Northern Province United Association
- O.A.U. - Organization of African Unity
- P.N.L. - Peoples National League
- S.A.U. - Somalia African Union
- S.N.L. - Somalia National League
- S.N.U. - Somalia National Union

- S.Y.L. - Somalia Youth League
- T.H.A. - Taita Hill Association
- U.N. - United Nations
- U.S. - United States
- Y.K.A. - Young Kavirondo Association

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Analysis of inter-state relations between Kenya and Ethiopia shows that Kenya and Ethiopia had different colonial backgrounds, different ideologies, and that there was change of leadership in both countries.

While Kenya was colonised by Britain who proclaimed a protectorate over the territory in 1895 and ruled the country until 1963 when Kenya got independence¹, Ethiopia was never colonised. In fact, Ethiopia like the European powers colonised other states. Emperor Menelik II for example extended his powers into the neighbouring Somali and Galla territories². Ethiopia was however, temporarily and partially occupied by Italians who annexed the country to Italy on June 1st 1936.³ They were however later defeated in 1941 by Ethiopia who got help from Britain.

Kenya and Ethiopia also had different ideologies. They also experienced leadership changes. During Emperor Haile Selassie's rule in Ethiopia, the country's ideology was that of feudalism (Ethiopia was also pro-west). Emperor Haile Selassie was however, overthrown in September, 1974 by a socialist leaning Military Junta - Dergue⁴ (the Dergue was pro- Soviet Union). Change of leadership in Ethiopia therefore came with change of ideology - Ethiopia went socialist.

Kenya also experienced change of leadership in 1978 following President Kenyatta's death in August of that year.⁵ The country's ideology during Kenyatta was that of mixed economy. Kenya was however, pro-West. The same ideology continued to be pursued by Kenya after Kenyatta's death. Available evidence however, show that despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite the fact that the two countries had different colonial backgrounds, co-operation continued to characterise their relations.

Further analysis shows that certain economic and political factors contributed to co-operative Kenya Ethiopia relations. The economic factor was mainly bilateral trade while the political factors included, security factor, and geopolitics. Available trade figures showed that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Kenya's exports to Ethiopia for example rose from K£140 thousands in 1963 to K£2 ,315 thousands in 1974 and to K£2,346 thousands in 1979.⁵ That fell to K£1,580 thousands in 1981 but rose again to K£8,886 thousands in 1987 and to K£11,762 thousands in 1990.⁷ Her imports from Ethiopia rose from K£36 thousands in 1963 to K£158 thousands in 1974.⁵ That fell to K£55 thousands in 1979 but rose again to K£4,424 thousands in 1983, but fell again to K\$£3,030 thousands in 1985 and to K£57 thousands in 1990.

Those trade figures further showed that between 1974 and 1979 when it was thought that Kenya would abrogate her relations with

Ethiopia because Ethiopia went socialist, the two countries trade increased though unproportionally. The direction of inter-state trade showed further that between 1980 and 1984, Kenya suffered a negative trade balance vis - a - vis Ethiopia but that was only for a few years. Between 1985 and 1990 however, Kenya benefited more than Ethiopia from that trade as her exports to Ethiopia rose from K£3,786 thousands in 1985⁹ to K£11,760 thousands in 1990¹⁰. Her imports from Ethiopia on the other hand fell from K£3,755 thousands in 1984 to K£3,080 thousands in 1985 and K£57 thousands in 1990.

From this analysis, one notes that the two countries' trade increased in the 1970s despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite their divergent ideologies. Ethiopia however, suffered negative trade imbalance in those years. It was also noted that Kenya seemed to have benefited more than Ethiopia from that trade but the two countries continued to co-operate.

Security factor (mainly based on Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims) also contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. As early as 1963, the two countries signed the Ethiopia-Kenya Agreement of Co-operation and Mutual Defence Assistance. In that agreement, the two countries emphasised the need to preserve peace and maintain their territorial integrity. They stated among other things that no nation would remain silent while its territory was challenged by an outsider.¹¹ Catherine Hoskyns has argued that the

nation referred to by Kenya and Ethiopia in the agreement was Somalia who claims their territories.¹³ The same position was confirmed in the Ethiopia - Kenya Agreement of Friendship and Co-operation signed in 1979.¹⁴ Article five of the treaty clearly stated that the contracting parties reaffirmed their unswerving opposition to expansionist policies pursued by any country.¹⁵ Kenya and Ethiopia also maintained that, for durable peace to prevail in the Horn of Africa, Somalia must unconditionally renounce claims to the territories of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.¹⁶

That position was also reaffirmed when President Kenyatta of Kenya visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June, 1967¹⁷ and when Emperor Haile Selessie of Ethiopia visited Kenya in 1964¹⁸ and 1970¹⁹. It was further reaffirmed when President Moi of Kenya visited Ethiopia in 1979²⁰ and 1991²¹ and when Mengistu Haile Mariam visited Kenya in December 1980²². It was also reaffirmed during different Kenyan and Ethiopian delegations and Ministerial visits and during Kenyan and Ethiopian Consultative Committee meetings.

Geopolitics also contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. This factor mainly refers to the positions of these countries in the Horn of Africa. First, Kenya's and Ethiopia's nearness to each other made it imperative that they co-operate; secondly, Ethiopia's and Kenya's positions in the Horn of Africa was important to both countries in as long as Somalia's claims on their territories continued and in as far as Somalia continued to receive support from the Soviet Union; Kenya and Ethiopia also

shared peaceful borders.

The preceding analysis leads to a number of observations.

First, it is observed that in the circumstances of change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia, co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations continued; second, it is observed that the ideological differences did not affect co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations; third, it is observed that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations; fourth, it is observed that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations and fifth, it is observed that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

The question that is raised here is: What was the significance of these factors in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations?. Specifically then, the study seeks to analyse and explain the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. It is in this context that this study seeks to analyse and explain the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya -Ethiopia.

1.1 THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

This study analyses and explains the nature of inter-state relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. An analysis of the two countries' relations shows that despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite the fact that the two countries had different ideologies and different colonial

backgrounds, Kenya - Ethiopia relations remained good. There was co-operation between them for more than two decades .

Further analysis shows that certain economic and political factors contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. The economic factor was mainly trade while the political factors included geopolitics and security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims. The question that is raised here is: what was the significance of these factors in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations? specifically then, the study seeks to analyse and explain the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991.

1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Broadly stated, this study aims at analysing and explaining the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations during 1963 -1991. More specifically the aims of this study can be encapsulated in these statements:

1. To show the extent to which bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.
2. To show the extent to which security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia

relations.

3. To show the extent to which geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

1.3. HYPOTHESES

This study will test the following three hypotheses.

1. That bilateral trade was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

2. That security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

3. That geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya -Ethiopia relations.

1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW

Whereas there is a growing body of literature on the determinants of foreign policy behaviour of African states in general, little has been done by way of detailed analysis on the determinants of Kenya - Ethiopia co-operative relations. Kenya's relations with Ethiopia is usually mentioned in passing by different scholars. Clajide Aluko identifies factors affecting foreign policies of African states as the nature and state of the state's economy, internal political pressures, colonial heritage, external environment, geographical location, existence of colonialism and

white supremacist regimes and the cold war environment.²³ Aluko's research is very broad, it looks at the determinants of foreign policies of African states in general.

Ali A. Mazrui emphasises that African diplomatic thought should be taken into consideration when analysing African states' policies. He believes that the African diplomatic thought is a corner stone of their policies.²⁵ While C-B Utete argues that the ability of a developing state to achieve its policy objectives varies in accordance with the given issue on issue area and he as such identifies four such issue areas as, high priority issues or "core values", regional issues, continental issues and global issues.²⁶

Robert Osgood argues that the national interest of a state should be taken into consideration when one is analysing her policy behaviour. He emphasises that every sovereign state has national interests which it always aims to preserve against opposition of other states. Basic to all kinds of national self-interests he argues is survival for upon survival depends the achievement of other self-interested ends. He notes that the exact nature of the national self-interest that must be preserved at all costs is open to various interpretations but above all is the nations' territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental government institutions.²⁷ Robert Osgood's argument agrees with Kenya's and Ethiopia's arguments. The two countries would like to protect their national interests in this case their territorial integrity against Somalia's claims. They would never allow

Somalia to take an inch of their territories.

John J. Okumu has argued that, Kenya's relations with the external world have been handled with great deal of caution uncharacteristic of many African governments whose activities in external affairs have been openly aggressive on issues concerning decolonization, non-alignment and liberation of African territories under the racist regimes. During the first years of independence, Okumu argues, Kenya adopted an extremely moderate and indeed a cautious stance in handling her external affairs. She has effectively maintained "a low profile" on many African burning issues and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as quiet diplomacy. It is a style which avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote.²⁰ Okumu identifies factors determining Kenya's foreign policy behaviour as the threat of secessionists in Kenya's North Eastern Province which alerted her to the primary need to consolidate her boundaries. Secondly, Kenya realised that a good neighbour policy based on mutual understanding was a logical step for the security of both her people and territory. Thirdly, a policy of vigorous economic development at home and economic co-operation and cultural exchange with her neighbours would strengthen her position in Africa and help in improving her economy.²¹ Okumu's study mainly attempts to examine the major factors which have conditioned Kenya's quiet diplomacy.

Korwa G. Adar argues that territorial integrity is the model determinant of relations. He emphasises that disrespect of the

principle of territorial integrity by Somalia has been the determinant of Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia. Adar argues that, the provisions of the Kenya - Ethiopia agreement signed in 1963, are a clear indication of concern for respect for the principles of territorial integrity.³⁰ Adar's (Phd thesis) mainly analyses the significance of the legal principle of "territorial integrity" as the model determinant of relations. He takes a case study of Kenya's foreign policy towards somalia.

Samuel M. Makinda notes that, from the beginning Kenya's policy was shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, maintain commercial links with neighbouring states, ensure the security of her borders and consolidate the domestic political power base. In pursuance of those goals he argues, Kenya maintained her independence in two different ways. First, there was a dependence on the wider East African market. Secondly, there was a security dependence manifested in a defence agreements with Britain. Makinda's study attempts to trace Kenya's foreign policy from 1963 and to explain the particular interest, goals perceptions and fears that motivated her behaviour in world politics.

Vincent B. Khapoya probes Kenya's foreign policy by analysing its relationship with the West particularly the United States and by trying to determine the extent to which that relationship has mediated Kenya's foreign policy behaviour. He emphasises that Kenya's concern has been to protect her borders and to improve the state of her economy. He notes that Kenya and Ethiopia had cordial relations. Khapoya analyses how the capitalist development

strategy mediated Kenya's foreign policy in a number of issues.¹¹

John Howell who was perhaps the first scholar to undertake a serious look at Kenya's foreign policy in 1963 argues that two distinct policies have been guiding Kenya. In global terms, external policy has been characterised by a strong sense of morality and idealism, while in East African affairs, Kenya's policy has been governed by a rather more conservative and legitimist thinking. Economic development and protection of her borders have been a concern to the country. He notes that Kenya's conservatism came to be reflected most forcibly in Kenya's display of determined nationalism towards Somalia.¹²

Daniel K. Orwa emphasised that, at the top of Kenya's objective list are the "core" interests which comprise territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, national security, economic development and commercial relations. He noted that those factors have been the determinants of Kenya's policy behaviour. Orwa also noted that in the foreign policy of Kenyatta regime, economic self-interest was as important as territorial integrity, internal security, political independence and stability. From the beginning he noted, KANU government undertook to promote rapid economic development and the Kenyan elites admitted that Kenya would participate fully in world trade. They emphasised that Kenya's diversification of her external trade and sources of foreign aid would stimulate her economic development.¹³

Colin Legum on the other hand argues that the factors that have been determining Kenya's foreign policy behaviour include, trade and Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories. He notes that Kenya and Ethiopia who have mutual interest to protect their territorial integrity against Somalia's claims have been very close friends since the time of Kenya's independence. Legum however mentioned Kenya - Ethiopia relations while he was analysing the general foreign policies of African states.

The preceding list gives the broad basis of Kenya's foreign policy. Co-operation with Ethiopia depend on how their interactions will serve those broad foreign policy objectives. It is however naive to think that co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia depend on how far their interaction serves Kenya's policy objectives only, Ethiopia also has her policy objectives which she wants to promote either in the international scene or locally. In her interaction with Kenya therefore, co-operation will depend on how those objectives are met by her relations with Kenya. We therefore argue that, co-operation will depend on the convergence of these countries' (objectives) national interests. At this stage therefore, it becomes necessary to take a review of Ethiopia's policy.

Negussay Ayele emphases that the determinants of Ethiopia's foreign policy are the geopolitical position of the country, the historical self- image of the people, the available human and material resources, the needs and the interests of the people and the pressures and influences from external world and the country's

state of economy. He notes that the most fundamental need of the people of Ethiopia is prosperity in security. Like most people of the world, Ethiopians wish to prosper and to be secure from aggression or threats of aggression. It is also in Ethiopia's interest to be powerful economically, politically and militarily. Ethiopia also has interest in playing a meaningful and effective role in international affairs. It also has interest in building solid foundation for peaceable relations among its neighbours and the world at large. 34

Ayele also notes that in one of the Emperor's visits to Washington, Haile Selassie stated that:

The grave concern which we at times manifest over the events developing around the Eastern Horn of Africa might make Ethiopians look more vigilant and sensitive than our friends wish us to be, yet some of the sad reminiscences of our history, the peculiar position which we occupy in world geography a delicate situation which is found at the periphery of an area always fragrant with turbulence, leaves us together with other fellow Africans who face similar situation with no alternative but to be extra cautious to safeguard our national integrity. 35

Ayele's research mainly analyses Ethiopia's foreign policy in general.

Colin Legum also notes that, during Haile Selassie's visit to Kenya in 1970, the two leaders (Haile Selassie and Kenyatta) agreed to intensify bilateral co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields. They reaffirmed the necessity for furthering economic, technical and cultural co-operation. Emperor Haile Selassie emphasised that fraternal relations and mutually beneficial co-operation could not be achieved without promotion of trade, to achieve that end the two Heads of State expressed

their willingness to take concrete measures to intensify commercial ties. ³⁶

Mesfin Wolde Mariam also argues that boundary problem has been the determinant of Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Somalia which have been claiming its Ogaden region. The Somali Republic, she notes, argue that the Somali minorities in Ethiopia must be for linguistic reasons united to form "a Greater Somalia". To Ethiopia she argues, the principle of self-determination poses special and dangerous problems as it may awaken the wider national consciousness and open the way for linguistic neighbours or regional rivalry and conflict.³⁷ Mariam's research analyses the background of Ethiopia - Somalia boundary disputes. She however, notes that in order to defend her borders, Ethiopia entered into an agreement with Kenya in July, 1963.

John Markakis and Asmalash Beyene note that, the Emperor's conduct of Foreign Affairs indicated a status - quo orientation and placed high value of such legal principles as political security, territorial integrity and economic development. ³⁸

David A. Talbot on the other hand emphasises that, Ethiopia's foreign policy is based on her self-interests. He notes that after the British had assisted Ethiopia to liberate the country from the Italian fascism, as a reward for their assistance the British attempted to prolong their stay in Ethiopia. But it was a gross miscalculation as the Emperor and the Ethiopian people could not agree. He notes that the Emperor made it clear to the

British that his country did not suffer so much struggling to get rid of Italian fascism merely to change masters but to conduct her internal and international affairs as she saw fit by maintaining her territorial integrity.³⁹

Makonnen S.A. also notes that Ethiopia's foreign policy is based on the principle of the United Nations Charter as well as on the Bandung and Accra declarations. These principles are among others, collective security, peaceful and active co-existence, non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations. He also emphasises that other interests of Ethiopia have been based on economic development and improvement of her commercial relations.⁴⁰

Like in Kenya's case, the preceding list gives the basis of Ethiopia's foreign policy. Co-operation with Kenya again depends on how their interactions will serve those foreign policy objectives. In other words, co-operation will depend on the convergence of the two countries' national interests. This review however, shows that only general analyses on the determinants of Kenya's and Ethiopia's foreign policies have been carried out by different scholars. No study have however, been done on the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya- Ethiopia relations. That will therefore be the concern of this study.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

It is apparent from the review above that various studies have been carried out on Kenya's foreign policy and Ethiopia's foreign policy behaviours, but with hardly any detailed analysis on Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Kenya's relations with Ethiopia is usually mentioned in passing when different scholars are analysing the determinants of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour and Ethiopia's foreign policy behaviour in general.

The review also revealed that no one has attempted to explore the significance of economic and political factors underlying cooperative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

John J. Okumu for example mentioned Kenya - Ethiopia relations when he was attempting to examine Kenya's quiet diplomacy .⁴¹ Samuel M. Makinda mentioned Kenya - Ethiopia relations while he was attempting to trace Kenya's foreign policy from 1963 and to explain the particular interests, goals, perceptions and fears that motivated her behaviour in world politics.⁴² Adar G. Korwa also mentioned Kenya - Ethiopia relations in his Phd. (thesis) dissertation, 1986. Adar's dissertation is however concerned with analysing the significance of the legal principle of "territorial integrity" as the Model determinant of relations.⁴³ Negussay Ayele also mentioned Kenya - Ethiopia relations but his study analyses the foreign policy of Ethiopia in general.⁴⁴ Mesfin Wolde Mariam on the other hand mentioned their relations while she was

analysing the background of Ethiopia - Somalia boundary disputes⁴⁵.

This study aims at showing the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations for a period of 28 years. The study is however significant in as far as it contributes to the generation of new insights on Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Such new insights will accrue from the examination of various economic and political factors that characterised their co-operative relations. The study will therefore be able to speculate on the likely future interactive trends between the two countries. An analysis of these states, relations will help us understand Kenya's and Ethiopia's range of actions taken in pursuit and advancement of their national interests which include economic prosperity, national security and political stability.

In this study the year 1963 is crucial because Kenya became independent then, and that set the political leaders on a path to deciding which policies were to guide the country. It was in that year when KANU manifesto stated among other things that: The responsibility of an independent Kenya government formed by KANU would undertake to protect the security of the people, preserve the national integrity of Kenya, maintain military force capable of protecting the people and state, conclude defence arrangements with regional states and participate fully in international affairs. ⁴⁶ The year 1963 is also crucial to both countries because it was the year when they signed a treaty of alliance

which marked the beginning of their official co-operative relations.

The year 1991 is equally important to the extent that it does not only bring us to the most recent dyadic interactions, but also marks a continuance of co-operative relations between the two states despite change of leadership in Ethiopia in that year. That year witnessed the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and as though Mengistu had not been overthrown, Kenya - Ethiopia co-operation continued. The continuity of that co-operation was shown by President Moi's visit to Ethiopia on 19th November, 1991 to meet with the new Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi. The two countries again renewed their old friendship which was started by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Kenyatta of Kenya.

1.6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories are empirical generalisations which help us to describe and predict phenomena of interest to us.⁴³ Generally speaking different theories have been adopted to explain the interstate relations. Those theories include, the realist or power theory, dependence theory, interdependence theory and decision making theories.

The choice of our theoretical framework is mainly determined by the need to show the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Consequently, we shall analyse this problem from the perspective

of interdependence and power theories. Before justifying those two models, it is useful that we examine the probable theories alluded to above.

The dependence theory mainly focuses on the historical origin of underdevelopment. The proponents of this theory namely John Galtung and Ali Mazrui argue that poverty in the underdeveloped countries were not as a result of their backward internal values, but because of severe exploitation by industrialised nations. Its premise is that it is impossible to comprehend the process and problems of development in the world without treating this within the wider socio-historical context of the world capitalist system.

This framework is inadequate to this study because it mainly seeks to explore the process of integration of the periphery into the international capitalist system and to assess the development implications of this peripheral capitalism. It also assumes that the less developed countries depend on the developed countries for their survival. Our study is however concerned with examining and explaining the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. This theory might therefore not be able to have an input in those countries' relations.

Decision making theory is concerned with how decisions are made. According to Frankel, decision making theory must take the objective environment into account. Braybrook and Lindblom also

argue that the factors affecting decision making are the situation in which the decision maker finds himself, public opinion, position of the decision maker and the time in which decisions are made. 50

Graham T. Allison has analysed three models that help analyse foreign policy. These are the rational actor model, organization process model and bureaucratic model. In rational actor model, it is assumed that the statesman knows what is good for the people hence he chooses the best policies for them. In organization process model however, decisions are seen as a result of several organisations only partly co-ordinated by governmental leaders. It is assumed that the government leaders can disturb but not control the behaviour of those organizations. The bureaucratic model on the other hand, assumes that decisions are reached as a result of bargaining among the components of bureaucracy, decisions depend on the alternative power of bargainers. 51

From the above analysis, it is clear that decision making theory is concerned with how decisions are made. It is considered inadequate to this study because it does not explain why different states co-operate. Our study is however concerned with examining and explaining the significance of economic and political factors that underlay co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

We find it imperative at this point to elaborate on the interdependence and power theories and their relevance to this study. Interdependence theory is another theory of international

relations. Its proponents are Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. They note that interdependence as an analytical concept, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries. These effects often result from international transactions such as flow of money, goods, people and messages across the international boundaries.⁵² Interdependence theory is deemed fit to our study in as far as it explains that Kenya and Ethiopia cooperate because of their interdependence on security matters, trade, and geopolitics.

The concept of national interest is also of central importance in any attempts to describe, explain, predict or prescribe international behaviour. Students of international relations agree that the primary justification of state action is national interest. According to Robert Osgood, every sovereign state has vital interests which it always aims to preserve against opposition of other states. Basic to all kinds of national self-interests, he argues is survival or self preservation for upon national survival depends the achievement of all other self-interested ends. He notes that the exact nature of the national interest that must be preserved at all costs is open to various interpretations but above all it is the nations' territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental governmental institutions.⁵³

Hans Morgenthau also notes that each and every sovereign state whether industrialised or non-industrialised has its own national

interests which it pursues vis - a - vis other states. All nations are compelled to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other states, ⁵⁴ he argues. They however need power to achieve those interests. According to Bertrand Russel, the world is made up of the powerful and the weak states both of which always attempts to increase their power. The weak in the society, in this case society of states, are usually willing to ally with each other to strengthen their powers. Power is therefore a means and an end. Power theory is also deemed fit to our study in as far as it explains the fact that, Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate due to the convergence of their national interests in security matters, trade, diplomacy and geopolitics.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

Library research constituted the dominant source of information. The bulk of the information was obtained from secondary sources namely books, newspapers, Magazines, journals and published and unpublished speeches of government leaders.

This data collection technique was found useful to our study because it was cheap as most of the needed materials were found in the libraries within Nairobi where research was conducted. Secondly, this technique enabled us to find some data which could not be found through interviews. During the interviews for example, we found it problematic to acquire data on Kenya - Ethiopia security matters. This problem was considered to have

been accentuated by the sensitivity of the topic. Information on the signed treaties and communiques could not be reached even after a long trial as the officers interviewed considered them confidential. We overcame this problem by reading journals like the African Research Bulletin, Africa Contemporary Record, Keesings Contemporary Archives, Africa Diary and Newspapers where we could either find the whole treaty and the whole communique or part of the treaty and communique quoted.

The problem we face by using this technique was that of confirming the factor that was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Due to such limitations, unstructured, oral interviews were conducted among some Kenyan and Ethiopian government officials involved in Kenya - Ethiopia relations. The people who were interviewed, were those concerned with policy making and policy implementation of the two countries. Interviews were conducted to enable us fill the gaps that may have arisen from using the above mentioned sources of information and to cross check the public record data especially the newspapers, as it is known that nearly all public records such as newspapers are the product of self-reporting and self reports are often biased as they are known to exaggerate facts which work to the credit of the reporting agencies and underplay facts which would discredit it.

During the interviews, stratified sampling was used. In this case, we first stratified or clustered the population to be

interviewed. Those interviewed included, Kenya government officials in, Kenya External Trade Authority, Central Bureau of Statistics and Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Ethiopian government officials interviewed were mainly found in the Ethiopian Embassy in Nairobi.

The purpose for clustering this population was to ensure that enough cases in each stratum fall into the sample to make analysis possible. The use of unstructured interview was also of importance to us because it allowed us to modify the questions asked and the order in which they were asked from one respondent to the other. In this case we had a definite list of topics we intended to cover. The topics included, the bilateral trade factor and its contribution to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991; the security factor and its contribution to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991 and the geopolitical factor and its contribution to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. These topics were covered in different orders and using different questions.

The advantage of the interview was that it enabled us to confirm the factor that was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. One problem that faced us, was that we could not get the information on Kenya - Ethiopia security matters through the interviews as they were considered confidential by the officials interviewed.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE BACKGROUND SITUATIONS OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

2.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the historical background of Kenya and Ethiopia. The purpose is to show that Kenya and Ethiopia had different colonial backgrounds and different ideologies and that there was change of leadership in both countries.

2.1. ETHIOPIA: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ethiopia (including Eritrea) covers an area of about 450,000 square miles. It is situated in the Horn of Africa and it is bounded on the Northeast by Somalia and on the South by Kenya.

Ethiopia was originally referred to by the early writers as Kush, Kushy, Aitopia, Ethiope or Abyssinia.¹ The Ethiopian dynasty antedated Emperor Menelik I son of Mekeda Queen of Sheba. Ethiopian legend has it that, Queen Mekada was a progressive ruler and learning of the great wisdom of King Solomon travelled to Jerusalem to see him. She was received by Solomon with great honour. The Queen remained in Jerusalem for sometime and when she returned she gave birth to a son for Solomon whom she named Menelik. After Menelik's education, Queen Mekeda made him King in her life time and so began the era of the dynasty popularly known as the Solomonic line.²

The history of Ethiopia show that the commercial and cultural contacts with the Jewish communities of Asia Minor and the repeated migrations from those areas had given Ethiopia life strong hebraic accents and the court had adopted the Jewish religion. Christianity gained its followers in Ethiopia during the first century of Christian era and became the religion of the country in 330 A.D. The rise of Islam became a turning point threatening Ethiopian religion. Between 1527 and 1543, Ethiopia was invaded by Muslims who rose to fight Christianity. Aid was solicited from Portugal to resist the Muslims attack. The Portuguese who were interested in securing the aid of such ally in the fight against Islam helped Ethiopia to defeat the Muslims. That was the first Ethiopian contact with the European powers. With the coming of the Portuguese therefore, the period of Ethiopia's isolation from civilization may be said to have ended. From there on, the accounts of historians, missionaries and adventurers became steadily more numerous.

In the 19th century European powers began to occupy the Coast along the Gulf of Aden. The borders of the Horn of Africa were in a condition of flux when the Europeans arrived. Although the Portuguese had tried to establish stations along the Gulf of Aden, it was left to the British, French and Italians to establish European colonies or protectorates. When the Europeans arrived they made treaties with the Africans, the British government being the first to make such treaties along the African Coast of the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Ajura in 1846. Britain however, delayed her effected occupation of those areas

for almost a half a century. Between 1862 and 1885 France was active around the Gulf of Tadjura making treaties with the Dankil chiefs, the Sultan of Tadjura and Grubbed and finally the chiefs of the Issa Somalis. Between 1887 and 1888 France signed treaties to determine the boundaries of her newly acquired territory with Britain and Ethiopia and between 1835 and 1907 the British concluded agreements with all the neighbouring powers to define their territory.

What needs to be emphasised here is that, the scramble for Africa coincided with the resurgence and extension of central authority in Ethiopia under Menelik. Already, as King of Shoa and one of the vassals of Emperor John IV, Menelik displayed great energy and skill in consolidating his position and extending his power into the neighbouring Somali and Galla territories. The extension of Ethiopian authority was pursued even more vigorously after his accession to the imperial throne as Emperor Menelik II in 1889.³

Ethiopia expansion was motivated by two principal factors. One was the desire to redeem all territories which according to Ethiopian tradition were once part of their empire. According to Menelik, Ethiopian domains extended as far as the Nile city of Khartoum in the North, Lake Victoria in the West, and the Indian Ocean in the South and East.⁴

The second factor motivating Menelik's expansionist policy was a defensive reaction to the establishment of European colonies

in the vicinity. Italy, Britain, and France were pushing inland from their respective Coastal possessions, and Menelik endeavoured to keep them as far as possible from the centre of his power in the highlands, through the expedient of extending his own frontiers.⁵ Ethiopia like the colonial powers therefore colonised other African states.

Italy was the last European power to claim her share of the spoils in that part of Africa (the Horn). In 1889 she took the precaution of ascertaining that the British had no objection to an Italian protectorate and the Sultan of Majiertein was the first to agree to place his country under the protection and Government of Italy. In the same year the British government was anxious to assist the Royal Italian government and persuade the Sultan of Zanzibar to hand over to the British government his lands and territories north of the mouth of river Juba including ports of Brava, Menurka, Mogadishu and Warsheilch on the explicit understanding that they should be transferred to the Italian government to be held on the best terms available from the Sultan, thus Italy gained virtual control at least of the Indian Ocean coastline east of Kismayu. Kismayu was to be administered jointly by British government and Italian government. The western limit of the Italian sphere of influence was to be the Juba river. With that land, Italy started her East African empire.⁶ She then began to think of joining her two colonies and to look at the Ethiopian territories.

In the year 1889 when Menelik II became the Emperor of Ethiopia,

Ethiopia and Italy signed the treaty of Ucciali . By that treaty Italy thought she obtained a virtual protectorate over Ethiopia for the Italian text stated that Menelik, "consents to avail himself of the Italian government for any negotiation which he may enter into with other Powers or Governments". However, the Amharic text, the only one signed, stated that the "Emperor might use the Italians if he so desired."

The dispute over that point of the treaty was the first serious conflict in Italian-Ethiopian relations. The Italians meanwhile consolidated their coastal and inland positions in the north, formally giving the area the name of Eritrea in 1890. That of course further angered Menelik II. Italy then sought to please Menelik by presenting him with additional quantities of arms and munitions. Menelik accepted the presents, but denounced the treaty of Ucciali. The Italian encroachment continued and with the danger in the north growing ever greater, an Italian - Ethiopian clash became inevitable. Ethiopia marched against the Italian forces and met and defeated them at Adowa in 1895. In her success at Adowa, Ethiopia for the first time won the respect of the great powers who now felt obliged to negotiate with her on the basis of mutual equality and independence. Following Adwa, Menelik experienced a respite from foreign intervention and used it to extend and to consolidate his own territorial holdings. He added thousands of square miles to the empire by military conquest, largely in the South East, and West.

In 1897 Ethiopia conducted negotiations with Britain and France

concerning the Somaliland borders and in March, 1897 signed an agreement with France. Another agreement between Ethiopia and Britain regarding the boundary of British Somaliland followed in May, 1897. The Ethiopia - Italian Somaliland boundary was however discussed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1897. The upshot was that Menelik drew a line on a map of Hebenicht and fixed his seal on it and handed it to Narazzini of Italy who took it back to Italy and both countries accepted that proposed line. The agreement of 1897, Mesfin Wolde Mariam argues, is at the root of the present frontier problem between Ethiopia and Somalia.⁹

What happened was that, the map with Menelik's seal was either lost or the Italians were unwilling to produce it. One was therefore left with the difficult task of reconstructing that line on the basis of the official declarations and publications of the Italian government. The most important of those was the report of Narazzini himself. His statement was full of contradictions. While Menelik was remembered to have said that the boundary was at Berdera, Narazzini claimed that the boundary on the side of Indian Ocean started from the intersection of Italian frontier with that of the English in the country of Somalia, a zone of absolute possession parallel to the Coast of about 180 miles in depth reaching the confluence of Vunder Deaken on the Juba river.⁹

Menelik rejected that claim. Berdera was therefore the western point of the boundary of 1897 agreement. Lugh was to remain outside the Italian frontier.¹⁰ The 180 miles claim must have

originated either as a mistake in calculating distances on the map or a deliberate attempt on the part of the Italian government to confuse the issue. Between 1897 and 1908 Italy was pressing Menelik to include Lugh in the Italian territory thus pushing the line further north.

At that time Menelik's health was declining. The European powers therefore sought to safeguard their interests in Ethiopia by the tripartite treaty of 1906 (England, France and Italy), in which they affirmed their desire to maintain the country's independence but agreed in the event of its disintegration to recognise each others "spheres of influence." Menelik protested thanking the three governments for their desire to maintain Ethiopia's independence but letting them know that he considered that agreement as in no way limiting his sovereign rights. That tripartite agreement gave Italy an incentive to push its boundaries further north.¹²

In 1907 an Ethiopia-British agreement was signed which brought the boundary of Kenya along the Dava to Dolo and following that agreement, even the Italians wanted their line pushed to Dolc. On Menelik's initiative, negotiations for a new boundary agreement began in 1908. Captain Collie was sent to Addis Ababa to negotiate a line that would start from Dolo to reach the Wabishehelle. From there the line would conform to the 1897 cartographic agreement and reach that drawn by the Italian-British agreement of 1894. The Italians also wanted a neutral zone to be created at Lugh. Menelik agreed to discuss the

boundary on that basis but he demanded, peculiarly, compensation for the value of the territory which Italy sought to possess. The Italian government agreed to pay three million Italian Lire to the Ethiopian government for about 50,000km² of territory acquired under the agreement concluded on 16th May, 1908. Article I of the 1908 agreement stated that the line of frontier between the Italian possessions of Somaliland and the province of Ethiopia started from Dolo at the confluence of the Dawa and the Namala, proceeded eastward by the source of Meidaba and continued as far as the Wabishebele following the territorial boundaries between the tribe of Rehanuin which remained dependent on Italy and all the tribes to its north which remained dependent on Abyssinia.

Italy interpreted the 1908 agreement to mean that the frontier started from Dolo at the confluence of the Dawa within the north of the Guabi and continued north of the 4th parallel and joined the Wabishebele. According to Article IV the boundary was to proceed North-Eastward from the Wabishebele following the line accepted by the Italian government in 1897, that was Menelik's line. It went on to state that all territory under Ogaden would remain dependent on Abyssinia. It was assumed in that article that the undefined tribal boundaries coincided with Menelik's line.

As Menelik's health declined, he appointed as his successor his elder daughter's son, Lij Yasu. When he died in 1913, Lij Yasu took up the throne but he proved incapable of governing. In 1916

he was deposed and replaced by Zanditu, Menelik's daughter. His highness Jazmatch Tafari Makonnen, the great grandson of King Sanhle Selessie of Shoa became the heir apparent to the throne and acted as regent with the title of Ras. Zanditu was crowned Empress on September, 17th, 1916 and Ras Tafari Makonnen was charged to undertake the administration of the government under Empress Zanditu as the heir apparent to the throne. In April, 1930, Empress Zanditu died and Tafari Makonnen ascended to the throne under the name of Haile Selessie I. On 2nd November, 1930 he was crowned the Emperor of Ethiopia.

When Haile Selassie came to power he made attempts to develop the country. His attempts however faced an interruption due to the humiliating memory of Adowa which gave to Mussolini and his fascist regime an excuse to invade Ethiopia. Let us explain this situation.

In the year 1931 Italian authorities without consultation with the Ethiopian government placed a boundary marker including the point of tribunation between Ethiopia and British and Italian Somaliland at a point approximately 80 miles from the Coast but the Ethiopian government registered protests to British and Italian governments against that unilateral demarcation of the frontier line and the Italians did not pursue the matter any further. Three years later in 1934, the unresolved border problem between Ethiopia and Italy erupted into open violence.

In that year the Ethiopia-British Boundary Commission encountered

Italian troops at Walwal in the Ogaden. The armed escort of the commission remained there while the commission itself withdrew from the area. For nearly two weeks the Ethiopian and Italian troops remained in their positions facing each other. A clash followed on 5th December, 1934 when 130 Ethiopians died and a large number were wounded against 30 dead and about 100 wounded on the side of the Italians.

The Italian government demanded a formal apology, a salute to their flag, compensation of 200,000 dollars and the punishment of the persons responsible. The Ethiopian government refused to comply and took the matter to the League of Nations.

Discussion was postponed in favour of direct negotiations but those soon proved fruitless. Ethiopia insisted that her frontiers with Italian Somaliland must be settled and that the first essential was to reach an agreement on the interpretation of the 1906 treaty. They were willing to accept arbitration but the Italians maintained that the Walwal incident was due to Ethiopia's aggression and refused to consider the frontier problem until reparations had been paid. The result was deadlock.

Then followed the Hoare-Laval proposal by which Britain and France helped to please the Duke by offering Italy practically the whole of Ogaden and of Tigre in exchange for a narrow desert corridor to the Red sea for Ethiopia. The Ethiopians died in defence of Ogaden and Ethiopia as a whole. The Italian

occupation of Walwal therefore became in reality the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. The fight that started at Walwal spread and transformed the region between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean into Italian East Africa. The boundary of Somalia was pushed further inland that the whole of the Ogaden, the middle valleys of Wabishebelle and Ghenele fell under Somalia. On October 3rd, 1935 an attack was launched by Italy on Ethiopia. The Emperor, Haile Selassie, fled the capital on 3rd, two days before the Italians entered it. Abebe Aragai one of the patriot leaders continued to fight the Italians until Emperor Haile Selassie's return in 1941. Although the Italians took the capital, Ethiopians were never conquered. The Italians enjoyed a partial and temporary victory. They formally annexed Ethiopia to Italy on May 9th, 1936 and on June 1st, 1936 the King of Italy was proclaimed Emperor and Ethiopia combined with Eritrea and ex-Italian Somaliland was renamed Italian East Africa.

In 1940 Italy entered World War II as an ally of Germany, that made Britain to align with Ethiopia. Britain who did not support Ethiopia during Ethiopia's negotiations in the League of Nations now helped Ethiopia against Italy. They entered Ethiopia through Sudan in 1940 - 1941 and in six months of actual fighting had recaptured the country from Italians. In 1941 therefore, the whole of Somalia region of the former Italian East Africa came under the British administration. It was during that time when the British Somaliland, ex-Italian Somaliland and the Ethiopian Ogaden were under British administration that the idea of "Greater Somalia" was promoted by Mr. E. Bervin.

In 1946 Mr. E. Bervin the then British Foreign Secretary proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the adjacent part of Ethiopia if Ethiopia agreed would be lumped together as a trust territory so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance.¹³ Ethiopia refused the idea.

In 1950s the great powers backed by the Latin American States wanted to place Somalia under United Nations trusteeship for eventual independence. Italy urged the claim to return to Somalia as an administering power so that the proper development of Somalia would not be interrupted. That received strong support and Somalia was placed under trusteeship of Italy for ten years. That and the eventual independence of Somalia was agreed upon.

The United Nations General Assembly once again urged Ethiopia and Italy to proceed to arbitration but since the two could not even agree on the arbitrator, the King of Norway was asked to nominate the arbitrator, whereupon he named Tygre Lie. After a preliminary meeting in Paris in July, 1959, a conference was held in Oslo at which both sides were heard. The two countries still disagreed, Tygre Lie then formulated a draft compromise which recognised that Ethiopia - Somalia frontier had been established by the agreement of 1908.¹⁴ But the amendments of both the Ethiopian and Italian delegations became irreconcilable and the conference reached a deadlock once again. In the midst of that, the Republic of Somalia was born and was destined to be at

loggerheads with Ethiopia. The conflict between the two countries over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia continues to date.

The foregoing analysis of Ethiopia's historical background shows that Ethiopia like the European powers colonised a number of territories. It also shows that Ethiopia was never colonised and although an attempt was made by Italy to colonise it, Ethiopia through the help and support of Britain managed to defeat Italy in 1941.

2.2. LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY IN ETHIOPIA 1963 - 1991

The Ethiopian leader in 1963 was Emperor Haile Selassie. He was crowned Emperor of Ethiopia on 2nd November, 1930 and he ruled the country for a period of about forty four years (1930- 1974). During his rule, Ethiopia's ideology was that of feudalism. The Emperor was however deposed on September 12th, 1974, and his government was replaced by a socialist leaning Military Junta - Dergue. ¹⁵

What needs to be emphasised here is that, change of leadership in Ethiopia did not interfere with co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations, in fact, after the Emperor's overthrow, the new Ethiopian government announced that it would maintain and further strengthen the existing relations with Kenya, Somalia and Sudan and the Kenya government said that they considered the undertaking as appropriate and hoped that the Emperor's exit would not affect the honouring of the existing Ethiopia - Kenya protocols.¹⁶

In November, 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam became Ethiopia's President after Emperor Haile Selassie. During his rule, Ethiopia's ideology was that of socialism. He ruled the country for a period of about seventeen years (1974 - 1991) when he was overthrown and Meles Zenawi became Ethiopia's President.

The overthrow of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam did not however affect co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. The two

countries continued to co-operate and the continuity of their relations was proved by President Daniel T. Arap Moi's visit to Ethiopia on 19th, November, 1991.¹⁷ On President Moi's arrival in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, he was given a red carpet welcome by his host President Meles Zenawi. Moi noted that his visit at President Zenawi's invitation would strengthen the long-standing relations between the two countries. Zenawi welcomed Moi to Ethiopia and said that the visit would open new opportunities of co-operation.¹⁸

The foregoing analysis shows that, there was change of leadership in Ethiopia in September, 1974. Change of leadership in Ethiopia came with change of ideology. The country went socialist when Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power. The analysis shows further that change of leadership again occurred in Ethiopia in 1991. In that year Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown and Meles Zenawi became Ethiopia's new President. The analysis however, showed that change of leadership in Ethiopia in 1974 and in 1991, did not affect co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. The two countries continued to co-operate despite their ideological differences and despite change of leadership.

2.3 KENYA: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Republic of Kenya is located on the Indian Ocean Sea board. It is boarded by Tanzania in the South, Uganda in the West, Sudan and Ethiopia in the North and Somalia in the East.

The external boundaries are a result of a series of international agreements promulgated in late 19th and early 20th century. Kenya's boundary with Ethiopia was for example agreed upon in 1907 and was amended as recently as 1963 - 1964,¹⁹ while Sudan and Kenya reached an accord on a northern boundary in 1930,²⁰ and the eastern boundary with Somalia dates from 1924²¹.

Before its occupation by Britain, Kenya was the habitat of African tribes some practising settled agriculture and others pastoral nomads.²² All had but the slightest of contact with the outside world. Arabs in search of slaves and ivory provided the first of outside contacts.

In 1885, the Berlin act by which the great powers agreed on a general code of behaviour to be followed in annexation of African territories set the stage for the ensuing "scramble". Britain was however not interested in acquisition of territories at first. In 1888, Sir William Mackinnon's East Africa Association secured a charter to administer the interior of the British spheres and began work at the Coast and in the interior as the Imperial East African Company (I.E.A.C.)²³. The company later found itself unable to administer the country successfully. The

British government then stepped in and declared a protectorate over Uganda.²⁴

The reason to the change of policy was to be found in Britain's strategic interests in the area of the Upper Nile. To the British statesmen, the route to India remained all important. By a logical extension the country controlling the headwaters of the Nile became a key piece in the big saw puzzle of international diplomacy and that country was Uganda. Uganda came to be seen as an essential part of Britain's overall strategy.

Once Uganda was held it was relatively a simple step to set up further protectorate over the territory between Uganda and the Coast. The British government then declared a protectorate over Kenya in July, 1895.

As at that time the only form of transport was the traditional head porterage, attempts to develop trade proved disastrous, decision was then reached to build a railway to Uganda whose construction began at Mombasa in December 1895 and Indians were invited to do the construction work. For the up country stations, the beginning of the line had several implications. Increased traffic on the road and the approach of railway parties involved finding more food from the fertile districts around Machakos and Fort Smith, while the railway demands for local labour in addition to workers recruited from India meant that labour recruits had to be found from up country tribes. Those, made the railway building to be met with resistance. But despite

the interruption, the railway building was completed in 1901.

After the completion of the railway to Lake Victoria, Sir Clement Hill, the senior official in charge of protectorates, said that the whole length of the railway should be under one administration, thus in April, 1902 the East province of Uganda was transferred as the East African Protectorate. Before then, the boundary between the two protectorates namely, Uganda and East Africa, was situated in the Rift Valley.

The problems that faced the Europeans in Kenya was economic. Once the railway was completed, Sir Charles Elliot argued that the resources of the country must be developed and that the railway once built must be made to pay for itself. He encouraged the European settlement and relying on him the settlers began to arrive in numbers. By 1904, the number of new settlers arriving was so great that they inundated the facilities for receiving them. They came in waves, with peaks reached in 1904 and 1908, and then in steady streams.

The leader of the settlers was Lord Delermere, who did so much to recruit and organise them into effective political force. The settlers quickly became immersed in politics. They made their first written demands on the colonial government in 1902 and within a few years became the predominant political force in the country.

Lord Delermere said that the white highlands be reserved for

white settlement and in 1903, Sir Charles Elliot publicly announced that no grants except of small plots were to be made to Indians between Machakos road station and Fort Ternan. That was the beginning of the white highlands racial segregation and land alienation from the Africans. Settlers urged the establishment of native reserves, few in number but of large extent far removed from European centres. Native villages were encouraged on settlers farms on the basis of cultivation rights in exchange for labour. Such natives were to be registered and any unregistered person was to be removed to reserves.²⁵ The natives held only limited lands. To ensure that labourers who were employed in the farms never ran away, a system called "Kipande" was introduced. That measure was introduced by the Registration Ordinance of 1915. Recruitment to the labour force included men, women and children.

Africans were also not represented in the Legislative Council. Before 1920, all members of the Legislative Council were "nominated" or appointed by the Colonial government. The first Council which met in 1907, consisted of eight persons,²⁶ two of whom were nominated unofficial members. In the beginning only the representatives of the European settlers sat as unofficial members, but in 1909 a prominent Indian, A.M. Jeevanjee was appointed to a seat.²⁷

In 1920 the first elections for the Legislative Council were held. Only Europeans voted, and the settlers were represented in eight of the eleven constituencies. Since they outnumbered

the Europeans, Indians were soon agitating for more representations and election to the Legislative Council on the basis of a "common roll" (election by Europeans and Indians jointly).²⁴ They were however denied common roll and equal representation with the Europeans by the Colonial government.

Although the Indians did not achieve their aims, the settlers also suffered a serious blow in 1923. As a result of the issue of Legislative Council representation, the British government published a famous white paper, "Indians in Kenya," in which it declared, "primarily Kenya is an African territory--- the interests of the African natives must be paramount".²⁵ Although that statement was made in 1923, the first African to the Legislative Council, Eliud W. Mathu, was nominated in 1944. ²⁹ Before then, Africans were represented by a white missionary.

Due to forced labour, land alienation, non-representation of Africans in the Legislative Council and other grievances, the Africans formed political organizations with which they hoped to put pressure on the Europeans to give them their rights. Such organizations included, the Young Kavirondo Association, the Young Kikuyu Association - later known as Kikuyu Central Association, Taita Hills Association, the Kikuyu Province Association, Kenya African Union and others. Those organizations demanded the return of alienated lands; stop to racial segregation and discrimination, representation in the Legislative Council, stop to forced labour etc. Those organizations were however met with stiff restrictions from the Colonial

government.

Their leaders were sometimes exiled or imprisoned and their organizations banned. That was for example the fate of the first Kikuyu organization, the Young Kikuyu Association (Y.K.A.) - later known as the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.) whose leader, Harry Thuku, was exiled to Kismayu. Though at times those parties were banned and their leaders exiled or imprisoned, the Africans continued to fight for their rights.

More changes however came after the second World War. The Africans who went to fight during the war on the side of Britain came back with a keen political awareness, newly acquired skills and a desire to improve their positions. Due to their pressure, Eliud Mathu was nominated in 1944 as the first African to the Legislative Council. The number of Africans in the Legislative Council increased to two in 1946, to four in 1948 and to eight in 1951.³⁰ Africans, however, still remained in a minority position.

Among Africans, political activities increased as new organizations were created, membership increased and more leaders emerged. The most important African organization was the Kenya African Union (K.A.U), formed in 1946. Its first President, James Gichuru, gave way to Jomo Kenyatta. Oginga Odinga, a leader of the country's second largest tribe, the Luo, joined KAU in 1950.

K.A.U demand was the abolition of the racial segregation, parity of seats in the Legislative Council, a common electoral roll based on a limited franchise , financial assistance to African farmers, a new land policy, freedom for labour unions to organize legal and educational reforms. Those demands were all denied. Governor Mitchell refused to appoint Jomo Kenyatta to a seat on the Legislative Council upon his return to the country, even though he was the acknowledged Kikuyu leader. In May, 1951 the Colonial Secretary of the British Labour Party Government, James Griffins, visited Kenya but turned down the KAU demands and the European settlers, still demanding immediate self-government, rejected any idea of a multiracial partnership.

Discontent among the Africans continued to mount. Awakened by their leaders, many Africans became increasingly hostile towards the settlers and the Colonial government. Riots and strikes broke out, the crime rate in Nairobi shot up and secret organizations and new religious cults were formed. Fearful that the settlers would achieve their goals, more and more Africans turned to violence.

Of the various secret organizations which broke out at that time, one was to become world famous and had innumerable repercussions. That was "Mau Mau" . In the beginning the Mau Mau was probably similar to other nativistic movements, but it evolved into a major terroristic society with military-like organization. Its membership was generally confined to the Kikuyu and the closely related Meru and Embu tribes . The organization was banned on

12th August, 1950, and the Governor, Sir Everlyn Barring declared a state of emergency on 20th October, 1952. Among the causes of Mau Mau were, land alienation, racial segregation, discrimination and the banning of political activities. Although the emergency continued until January, 1960, the weight of Mau Mau activity was confined to 1952 -1956. British troops were brought to the colony and a war was waged against the Mau Mau.

Kenyatta was arrested in 1952 for managing the Mau Mau movement. He was arrested with other people who included, Achieng' Oneko, Fred Kubai, Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba and Bildad Kagia. He was sentenced to a seven year prison term and an indefinite period of detention. The Africans did not however give up their fight for independence.

The years after Mau Mau rebellion were dominated by the drive for independence. The Africans between 1954 and 1959 insisted on independence based on a government founded on majority rule. The British government latter agreed to grant independence to Kenya on the basis of a majority rule constitution. They called for a Constitutional Conference for Kenya to be held in January, 1960 , at that time the principle for majority rule was adopted for the country. In March, 1957 the first African elections to the Legislative Council took place in eight constituencies throughout the country on the basis of a limited franchise and multiple voting. District parties were formed and in one of the more noteworthy races between two Luos in the Nairobi constituency, Tom Mboya defeated C.M.G. Argwings Kodhek in a

close contest.

National parties that had been banned following the out break of Mau Mau were allowed again to operate in 1959. In August, 1959, the Luo and Kikuyu leaders formed a preliminary alliance and in June, 1960 it was organized into a national party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Kenyatta was chosen as its leader but, since the government forbade that, James Gichuru became the acting President; Oginga Odinga Vice President; and Tom Mboya Secretary. Gichuru later stepped down for Kenyatta who then became the party's President. A month later, there was division in the party as some people like Ronald Ngala, Daniel T. Arap Moi, M. Muliro and others felt that KANU was dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo leaders. They separated and they formed their own party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) , with Ronald Ngala as the President , Masinde Muliro as Deputy President, and Daniel T. Arap Moi as the Chairman. KANU called for a national government whereas KADU called for a quasi-federal government (Majimboism).

In the spring election of 1961, KANU won 16 seats; and KADU 9 seats. Because Kenyatta was still detained, Mboya, Odinga and other KANU leaders in the Legislative Council refused to take Ministerial positions. Consequently KADU formed a minority government in April, 1961. Kenyatta's release in August, 1961 and his subsequent election to a vacated seat by James Kariuki Njiru in January, 1963 brought him to a position of the opposition leader.

By the autumn of 1961 the political struggle had turned from a racial one into a tribal one. A task remaining before the political leaders was to draft a new constitution under British supervision so that internal self-government could be granted. The KADU leaders realised the circumstances in which they found themselves, especially since the independence constitution would be based on the principle of majority rule. Most Kenyan tribes gave their votes wholly to one party, and the Kikuyu-Luo combination alone constituted a third of the African population. The Kikuyu and Luo, with the Kamba and other allies, outnumbered all other tribes in the country. Encouraged by Great Britain, a coalition was formed in April, 1962, and general elections were held in May, 1963. KANU won 19 seats while KADU won 11 seats. KANU therefore showed itself to be a truly national party.

On June 1st, 1963, internal self government was granted to Kenya and Jomo Kenyatta became the country's first Prime Minister. Independence was later granted to Kenya on December 12, 1963.

The forgoing analysis shows that Kenya was colonised and ruled by the British. During the British rule, their land was alienated from them and they were forced to work for the Europeans and pay taxes. They were also not represented in the Legislative Council. Kenyans however fought the colonial powers and they got their independence in December, 1963.

2.4 LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY IN KENYA 1963 - 1991

Kenya became independent in 1963 with Mzee Jomo Kenyatta as its first Prime Minister. He ruled the country for a period of about fifteen years (1963-1978). During his rule, Kenya's ideology was that of mixed economy. Kenya was however pro-west, she got most of her aid for example from the Western European countries.

President Kenyatta died on August 22nd, 1978 at his official residence in Mombasa during his sleep. Kenya experienced change of leadership following President Kenyatta's death. After President Kenyatta's death, the then Vice President of Kenya, Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, was sworn in as the acting President of Kenya and under Kenya's constitution, was to hold office until a new President was elected within ninety days. Moi was later proclaimed the second President of Kenya on October 10th, 1978 following his election. When he came to power, he pledged to serve Kenya "in a spirit of love and dedication following the footsteps of the late President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta."

Change of leadership in Kenya did not however, interfere with co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. President Moi continued to co-operate with Ethiopia despite the two countries' ideological differences. When Moi came to power for example, he made his first visit since becoming President when he made a State visit to Ethiopia in January, 1979. While in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, he was well received by Mengistu Haile Mariam as though there had been no change of leadership in Kenya.³² In his speech

during a dinner hosted by the Ethiopian leader in his honour, President Moi praised the excellent relations that existed between Kenya and Ethiopia and reaffirmed his administration's commitment to co-operate with Ethiopia irrespective of the latter's political ideology and turn to the Soviet Union's camp.²³

The above analysis shows that Kenya's ideology was that of "mixed economy". It also shows that, Kenya experienced change of leadership in August, 1978. Change of leadership in Kenya did not however interfere with her co-operative relations with Ethiopia. The two countries continued to co-operated despite their differences.

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CHAPTER THREE

KENYA - ETHIOPIA RELATIONS: THE BILATERAL TRADE FACTOR

3.0. INTRODUCTION

Interaction between nation - states usually rotate around trade, diplomacy and socio-cultural exchanges. This is because no single nation-state in the international system is completely independent or self -sufficient. All states depend on each other and it is a result of that interdependence that interactions between nation - states are perceived as co-operative.¹

This chapter addresses Kenya-Ethiopia trade interactions. Specifically the chapter seeks to establish the extent to which bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya- Ethiopia relations during 1963- 1991. By looking at Kenya-Ethiopia trade interactions, we will be able to prove or disapprove our first hypothesis which states that bilateral trade was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya- Ethiopia relations.

3.1. CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN TRADE, 1963-1991

Available evidence show that trade was one of the factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. In that period, Kenya's major exports to Ethiopia included unmilled maize, tea, beer made from malt, vegetables (fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved), beans, live animals and meat, refined petroleum products, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, paper and paperboard and lubricating oil.¹ Others included beverages and tobacco, animal and vegetable oils, other oils, common salt (sodium chloride), natural sodium carbonate, paints, vanishes and pigments, polishing and cleansing preparations, textile yarn, fabrics (woven or made).²

Ethiopia's major exports to Kenya during that period included, aircraft engines-complete assemblies, parts of aircraft engines, parts of helicopters and aircraft mechanically propelled and passenger motor cars (other than public service type vehicles, assembled of an engine capacity exceeding 1200 cc. but not exceeding 1500 cc.)⁴. Others included pumps or compressors, construction and mining machinery, office machines, typewriters and cheque writing machines, automatic data processing machine, statistical machines etc.³

From the above analysis it's evident that Kenya's major exports to Ethiopia were both agricultural and industrial. Ethiopia's major exports to Kenya were however, industrial.

The trade figures between Kenya and Ethiopia for the years 1963 - 1969 (Table one) shows that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations in the 1960s. The table shows further that trade between the two countries in the 1960s was very little. Although Kenya's trade with Ethiopia in the 1960s was little, the two countries still put emphases on the need to improve trade between themselves.

As early as 1963, Kenya and Ethiopia showed interest in improving trade relations. One of the factors stressed in the Ethiopia - Kenya Agreement of Co-operation and Mutual Defence Assistance was the need to improve trade. Taking into account the peculiar setup of regional co-operation that was already in existence among East African states, Kenya and Ethiopia further reaffirmed in the agreement to employ the method of close consultation among African states in the fields of economic trade with the view of harmonizing their respective national development plans in the struggle against neo-colonialism.⁵ By signing the 1963 agreement, Kenya and Ethiopia showed that they were interdependent and that their national interests converged.

When Emperor Haile Selessie visited Kenya in June, 1964, he and President Kenyatta emphasised the need to improve trade between their countries. In a joint communique issued at the end of the Emperor's visit to Kenya, both governments agreed to establish a Consultative Committee with a view of co-ordinating the policies of their governments in international and pan-African matters (the committee was formed in late 1964). The two leaders

further agreed to meet as frequently as possible for consultation on matters of common interests such as trade and security.¹

In 1965, Kenya's Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Murumbi and Minister for Commerce and Industry, Dr. Kiano visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July. An official communique issued in Addis Ababa, said that the two countries would improve trade between themselves. Specific emphases were laid on the need to complete the Nairobi-Addis Ababa road linking the two countries. The communique further said that the two parties underlay the significance of the road project as a means of increasing the level of trade between the two countries and both parties agreed to co-ordinate their effort for the speedy completion of the project.² That road was completed in 1970s. Kenya's side was completed in 1977, some years after Emperor Haile Selassie's overthrow. The statements of the communique signed by Kenya and Ethiopia on that occasion showed further that Kenya and Ethiopia were interdependent and that bilateral trade contributed to their co-operative relations.

More on the need to improve trade between Kenya and Ethiopia was emphasised in 1966 when Kenya's delegation again visited Ethiopia on July 10th, 1966. During that visit, the two countries agreed to improve trade between their countries. They also discussed ways and means of improving communication between their countries saying that the Nairobi - Addis Ababa highway be completed.³

TABLE ONE: DIRECTION OF INTER-COUNTRY TRADE BETWEEN 1963 - 1969
(KE,000)

Years	Kenya's exports to Ethiopia	Ethiopia's exports to Kenya
1963	140	36
1964	209	26
1965	180	92
1966	224	36
1967	279	18
1968	273	7
1969	501	15

Source: Economic survey 1970, (Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1970).

The need to improve trade was again discussed when President Kenyatta visited Ethiopia in October, 1967. President Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Salessie in that year agreed to intensify bilateral co-operation in economic, social and cultural fields. They stressed the importance of increasing contacts between the two countries and towards that end decided to speed up the completion of the Nairobi - Addis Ababa highway which was then under construction.¹⁰

Further emphases on the need to improve trade between Kenya and Ethiopia were made in 1969 when Ethiopian trade delegation visited Kenya in October. The Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kibaki, called on Kenyan businessmen who used to import goods from Europe to focus their interests on markets in Africa. Mr. Kibaki also emphasised that the visit of the Ethiopian delegation made a new mark in trade relations between Kenya and Ethiopia.¹¹

The leader of the Ethiopian delegation, Mr. Ato Taffera Degeffer, then General Manager of Commercial Bank of Ethiopia told Mr. Kibaki that, the purpose of their visit to Kenya was to open ways in both commerce and industry between the two countries. He urged Kenyan traders to make exchange visits to Ethiopia. The delegation also called on the then Assistant Minister for Agriculture Mr. William Murgor, who promised that his Ministry would do what was within its powers to make co-operation between their countries more fruitful.¹² The statement made by Ethiopia-

Kenya delegations further proved that the two countries were interdependent and that their national interests converged. Trade therefore contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The forgoing analysis of Kenya - Ethiopia trade relations in the 1960s show that co-operation characterised the two countries' relations for reasons related to bilateral trade. It is as a result of that, that we argue that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The two countries put emphases on the need to improve trade although the trade figures show that there was little trade between them in the 1960s.

The 1970s opened with the same objectives of improving trade between Kenya and Ethiopia. In June, 1970, the Emperor of Ethiopia again visited Kenya. During his visit, Emperor Haile Selassie and Kenyatta pledged continued economic co-operation. They reaffirmed the necessity for furthering economic, technical and cultural co-operation between their countries. They noted that was the essence of the philosophy behind the foundation of the Organization of African Unity. It was through co-operation among African countries that unity and solidarity could be expressed, in a concrete and meaningful manner.¹³

In pursuance of that policy, they emphasised that fraternal relations and mutually beneficial economic co-operation could not be achieved without promotion of trade between their countries.¹⁴ To that end the two Heads of State expressed their willingness

to take concrete measures to intensify commercial ties.

President Kenyatta on that occasion reiterated the support of Kenya government for Ethiopia's entry into the East African Common market established under the treaty of East African Co-operation in 1967. Haile Selassie on his part noted that Kenya and Ethiopia shared common borders and common problems of economic and social development and said that those made their relations even more stronger.¹⁵

The statements of Emperor Haile Selessie and President Kenyatta showed that trade made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate. Co-operation was therefore contributed to by trade. It further showed that the two countries were interdependent and that their national interests converged.

Emperor Haile Selassie's visit to Kenya was followed by the Consultative Committee meeting of Kenya and Ethiopia. The meeting took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972 to discuss promotion of bilateral trade; issues of security; and issues of communication between the two countries.¹⁶ Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Mungai, who led his country's delegation to that meeting said that Kenya would do what was within her powers to improve trade with Ethiopia and to ensure that no more border clashes occurred between the tribes living on the borders.¹⁷

To achieve economic trade, the delegations discussed the need to complete the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway, the Kenyan section of

the road had reached about 48 metres beyond Marsabit and was expected to reach the border at Moyale by March, 1972. Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs Minister on his part confirmed that work had began on the Ethiopia's section from Dilla but completion was not expected until 1974. Ethiopia also agreed to join the East African Community (E.A.C). The statements made by the two delegations further confirmed that they were interdependent and that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

Although the Emperor agreed with Kenyatta to improve trade when he visited Kenya in 1970, the year 1974 witnessed his overthrow though his departure did not affect the two countries' relations.¹⁸ While many people thought that Kenya - Ethiopia co-operation would end, the available trade figures, for the years 1970- 1979 (table two) shows that Kenya's export to Ethiopia more than doubled in the 1970s. Certain factors explain that increase.

In the 1970s a number of problems faced Ethiopia. There were pressures on Emperor Haile Selassie's government. The shadow cast by the approaching end of Emperor Haile Selassie's long rule, became darker in 1973 as concern mounted at all levels of Ethiopian society over his failure to prepare for a peaceful transition during his own life time.

Nature also added weight to those gathering pressures.¹⁹ A devastating drought hit Tigre and Wollo provinces. For two years

almost no rain fell and by the year 1972, with harvest severely depleted, peasants began to leave barren countryside that had already claimed thousands of lives by starvation. The mood was marked by frustration throughout the entire modern sector over the lack of effective government highlighted by the cruel ineptitude in dealing with the ravages of drought and the failure to arrest inflation or to increase wages and salaries to cushion the new burdens. Protests increased and the continued rebellions in Ethiopia led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in September, 1974.²⁰ The Emperor's government was then replaced by the Dergue - a Military Junta. It was officially admitted in May, 1973 that 800,000 people were affected by the famine although the real figure was probably three times higher. Over 100,000 people were estimated to have died.²¹

While those problems were facing the country, perennial, regional and ethnic divisions in Ethiopia became more apparent. Ethiopia always faced an uphill struggle in keeping its ethnically unruly population unified under central direction. In the 1970s that traditional problem reached an alarming proportion.²² At the same time, Ethiopia's frontier with Somalia was once again challenged by a country then militarily stronger than it had ever been.

TABLE TWO: DIRECTION OF INTER-COUNTRY TRADE BETWEEN 1970 - 1979
(K£,000)

Years	Kenya's Exports to Ethiopia	Ethiopia's exports to Kenya
1970	918	106
1971	1,016	163
1972	1,059	187
1973	1,800	174
1974	2,315	158
1975	1,185	104
1976	1,701	56
1977	1,923	245
1978	2,705	616
1979	2,346	2,241

Source: Economic Survey 1977, (Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning: 1977).

In the Ogaden region, especially in Balle and Horar provinces, the Dergue was faced with stiff resistance from the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) which began to receive substantial logistical support from Somalia as early as 1975. Meanwhile, ethnic divisions became worse. By early 1976 Ethiopia looked like falling into three different parts. First, the South, mainly Galla (Oromo) country where the local population who stood to benefit more than other Ethiopians from land reform asserted themselves to throw off the yoke of Shoan landlord domination. They engaged in local contacts for dominance among the tribes of the difficult provinces. The other groups which intermittently threatened the Dergue's interests were the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) - a Marxist group supported by desperately poor peasants in Tigre.²³

The Dergue was also faced by a number of internal problems. By February, 1977, the feuding within the Dergue took a grisly turn. On February 3rd, 1977, Head of State Taferi Benti who had apparently enhanced no power position in December, 1976 reorganization of the Dergue at the expense of Mengistu Haile Mariam was put to death with other members of the Dergue for attempting a coup against the revolution.²⁴ Mengistu Haile Mariam decided that time had come to have himself on the throne. In Addis Ababa however, there were ill feelings about Mengistu's appointment as Head of State.

In 1977, drought and famine continued to affect large areas particularly the Ogaden and Dankil regions and poor harvests were

again reported in Wollo province.²⁵ Distribution of relief supplies was however, hampered by security problems in the region. Ethiopia entered 1978 with the same problems. In that year Mengistu Haile Mariam was still struggling to gain absolute control of military junta and the revolution was spinning out of control and although the Ogaden war ended officially on 9th March, 1978, when Somalia announced after the United States intervention that it was withdrawing its forces from Ethiopia, the Eritrean movement entered the year 1978 in the strongest military position they had enjoyed in seventeen years of guerrilla struggle.²⁶

In that year, the Dergue also had to grapple with the prospects of economic collapse and the reality of drought, famine and locusts emergency whose effect were as bad as in 1973 - 1974. Meanwhile, the Dergue's land reform policies led to a fall in production in areas where collectivisation of agriculture had not penetrated.²⁷

Although there is no precise measure of social cohesion, it is clear from the foregoing evidence that Ethiopia suffered from internal dissension, rebellion and turmoil. That situation made the country's economic performance in the 1970s to be very poor. Drought, locusts, army worms, the widespread administrative breakdown, pay increases (especially for the army), trouble between the landlords and peasants, inflation and the high rise in fuel costs (caused by the fuel increase in 1973) contributed to shake the economy to its foundation.²⁸

The January, 1974 issue of the Central Statistics Office, estimated that only 37% of Ethiopia's population were engaged in economically active production.²⁹ With the countryside aflame in a plethora of rebellions, continuous political violence in urban areas, administrative and legal systems in increasing disarray and political division still affecting its internal operations, the Dergue struggled to maintain assense of direction and assemblence of control in Ethiopia. It struggled to prevent the dismemberment and disintegration of the country rather than reform the economy as had been expected by the Ethiopians after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

In it's preoccupation with the political aspects of revolution therefore, the regime allowed the economy to drift without a new development plan or even a published budget.³⁰ Its emphases on developing agriculture which provides a living for 90% of Ethiopians mostly at a subsistance level was offset by labour problems in the industrial sector. Laudable efforts to cope with the continuation of drought and famine conditions which did so much to spark off the revolution in 1973 had been hampered by the war and the accompanying refugee problems especially in the most drought stricken region, the Ogaden.³¹

Activity in agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors were characterised in 1977 by irregular production and returns due to continuing political and social chaos. There was general stagnation in the commercial and tourist sectors of the economy. In 1977, many companies were forced to close down including

export - import firms as well as the United Touring Company-Singer, one of the first foreign companies set up in Ethiopia. The tourist trade fell to negative levels and the capital's luxury hotels remained all but empty and passenger traffic, the Ethiopian Airlines dropped.

The nationalization of distributive sector even resulted in a marked decline in economic activity and induced a number of shortages of domestic as well as imported products. Ethiopia's President, Mengistu Haile Mariam, admitted in 1978 that food shortages presented a frightening situation which he blamed on counter-revolutionaries, reactionary merchants, misguided fears and on the exigencies of the twin war efforts (The Ogaden and Eritrea wars)³². He recognised that the state of agriculture, industry, internal communication, external trade and basic day-to-day availability of food supplies was disastrous.³³

What is evident here is that, Ethiopia's economy was badly affected by wars, drought and locusts which caused famine in the country. The country's economy was affected to the extent that Ethiopia could not feed its own population. Ethiopia whose major exports to Kenya are industrial goods could also not export enough to Kenya. The situation in Ethiopia in the 1970s, therefore explains her little exports to Kenya compared to her imports from Kenya.

Although Ethiopia exported very little to Kenya in the 1970s, the year 1979 witnessed a tremendous increase of her exports to

Kenya. That was because the first year of central economic planning, under the National Revolutionary Economic Development Campaign (NREDC) launched at the beginning of 1979 to help reform the economy, produced what could only be interpreted as spectacular results.¹⁴ Official figures for the first year of campaign (October, 1978 - September, 1979) showed that GDP had grown by 5.2% very close to the first year target of 5.9% growth.

The first year of the campaign, officials claimed, had achieved 99% of its target for agricultural expansion, with 82,000 ha. of land being brought under cultivation (of a target of 82,600), bringing the total land under cultivation in the country to 155,000 ha. Industrial expansion achieved 93% of its target, with the gross value of industrial output increasing by 35.5% in the first year of the campaign.¹⁵ The inflation rate declined from 18% (based on the Addis Ababa retail price index), at the start of the campaign, to 13% at the end of the first year, with a further decline to 10% reported by the end of February, 1980¹⁶. The economic reforms in Ethiopia therefore explains her increased exports to Kenya in 1979 and the years after.

In the same year, (1979) Kenya and Ethiopia again put emphases on the need to increase trade between themselves. The emphases were made when President Daniel T. Arap Moi of Kenya visited Ethiopia in January, 1979. The two leaders noted that it was through trade that inter-state relations were always strengthened.

during that visit, the two countries also signed a treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The twelve-article treaty expressed the desire of the two countries to develop further relations in the fields of science, culture, mass media and education. It also recognised the importance of developing economic trade, scientific and technical co-operation.³⁷ By signing that treaty, Kenya and Ethiopia again showed that they were interdependent and that their interests converged. They had interest in trading with one another.

The 1980s opened with the same objectives. Kenya and Ethiopia in those years still put emphases on the need to improve trade between themselves. The need to improve trade was for example again expressed by the two countries in December, 1980 when President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia visited Kenya. After visiting a number of Kenyan industries, Mengistu Haile Mariam noted that Ethiopia and Kenya had a lot in common and that Ethiopia could import a lot from Kenya instead of importing most of her goods from European countries. He hoped for further trade developments between their countries.³⁸

The same emphases were made in 1981 during Kenya-Ethiopia Consultative Committee meeting which took place in Southern Ethiopian town of Awasa. At the meeting the two countries agreed to improve bilateral trade between their countries and to that end emphasised the need to build roads. The Ethiopian Airlines and Kenya Airways also agreed to operate daily flights between Addis Ababa and Nairobi for the same purposes. Kenya

also agreed to buy Ethiopian wine in exchange for selling Kenyan tea.³⁹

In the same year Foreign Ministers of Kenya and Ethiopia met in Addis Ababa from 29th -30th April, 1981 and agreed to improve co-operation in bilateral trade, communication, technology science, and security with special attention to roads, water resources, fisheries and animal disease control.⁴⁰

The same emphases were made in 1984 during Kenya-Ethiopia Consultative Committee meeting which took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in June, 1984. During the meeting, the two sides agreed on the need to improve co-operation in border trade, transport, communication and security. Still more on trade issues was made in 1989 when President Moi visited Ethiopia. Talking to President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia during his visit, President Moi said that Kenya and Ethiopia needed to improve bilateral trade between themselves. Mengistu on his part noted that trade played an important role in strengthening inter-state relations and said that, his country would work hand in hand with Kenya to see that their trade relations were improved.⁴¹ Mengistu also thanked President Moi for standing with Ethiopia during Ethiopia's man made problems.

What needs to be emphasised here is that, although Kenya and Ethiopia in the 1980s stressed the need to improve bilateral trade between themselves, the available trade figures in the 1980s (table 3) shows that Ethiopia exported more to Kenya than

it imported from Kenya between 1980 -1984. That happened because Kenya was faced with food shortages caused by the 1980 drought which had hit most parts of the country. In that year, Kenya was forced to import food to feed it's own population.⁴²

After seventeen years of remarkable economic growth since its independence, Kenya entered the 1980s facing a rather sombre economic future summed up in a Government white paper as a time of austerity during which there would be slower growth of the economy and less employment creation.⁴³ That frank appraisal by Moi's government came at a time of growing hardships underscored by the fact that Kenya normally a grain exporting country, was forced to import maize to avert food shortages and famine. A pinch began to be felt in Kenya soon after 1980 when commodities, especially staple food stuffs, began to become scarce, the acute shortages lasted for about 18 months.

In that year the level of imports rose sharply while exports increased at a much slower rate in the largest trade deficit ever recorded with exports only covering 55% of imports.⁴⁴ There were increases in the import volume of many items as a result of that drought. Kenya whose major export commodities to Ethiopia are agricultural products like maize, tea, vegetables, live animals, meat, beverages and tobacco, animal and vegetable oils, milk products, fruits, juices⁴⁵ etc. was therefore, unable to export enough to Ethiopia as shown in table 3. Ethiopia whose economy had been reformed at that time was however able to export more to Kenya as is shown in the same table. Ethiopia's exports

to Kenya between 1980 and 1984 mainly included aircraft engines, complete assemblies, parts of aircraft engines, construction and mining machinery, pumps or compressors, parts of helicopters and aircraft mechanically propelled, pure sodium chloride, hides and skins and wines.

After the year 1984, Kenya's exports to Ethiopia rose again while Ethiopia's exports to Kenya decreased. The decrease was so much to the extent that Ethiopia exported goods worth K£57 thousand to Kenya in 1990 while Kenya exported goods worth K£11,762 thousand to Ethiopia in the same year.⁴⁶ Certain factors explain that increase in Kenya's exports to Ethiopia and decrease in Ethiopia's exports to Kenya. One, as was mentioned Kenya was hard hit by drought which lasted for a period of about 18 months. After those months, Kenya again received enough rain and it was able to produce enough goods to export to Ethiopia. Ethiopia was however, once again faced with a serious drought which led to food shortages in the country. It was in that period when Kenya exported a lot of maize, beans, sorghum, vegetables, fruits, juices, live animals, meat etc. to Ethiopia.

While drought caused famine in most parts of Ethiopia, more wars from Eritrea affected the country, Mengistu also faced a lot of problems caused by the people who opposed the military rule and wanted the transfer of power to civilians. There were riots and rebellions which led to the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. Drought, like in the case of 1970s affected Ethiopia's economy to the extent that Ethiopia had very little to feed its

TABLE THREE: DIRECTION OF INTER-COUNTRY TRADE BETWEEN 1980-1990
(K£'000)

Years	Kenya's exports to Ethiopia	Ethiopia's exports to Kenya
1980	2,365	2,526
1981	1,580	4,259
1982	2,319	4,019
1983	2,982	4,424
1984	2,858	3,755
1985	3,780	3,030
1986	6,865	5,945
1987	8,886	2,700
1988	6,355	1,278
1989	8,993	153
1990	11,762	57

Source: Economic Survey 1991 (Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development: 1991).

Population on. She was therefore, forced to import more from Kenya.

Mengistu's overthrow did not however, end Kenya - Ethiopia trade relations. More emphases on the need to improve trade between Kenya and Ethiopia were for example made in November, 1991 when President Moi of Kenya again visited Ethiopia following his invitation by Meles Zenawi. During his meeting with the new Ethiopian President, Presidents Moi and Zenawi agreed to continue their co-operative relations in trade. They noticed that the two countries shared economic problems and they agreed to do whatever was possible to improve trade.⁴⁷

From this foregoing analysis, it is evident that bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. The two countries' insistence on the need to improve trade between themselves throughout the period under study (1963-1991) confirmed that fact. The available trade figures between the two countries in 1963 - 1991 also proved that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The figures show that Kenya's trade with Ethiopia was very little in the 1960s although it improved very much in the 1970s, 1980s and beginning of 1990s. Their trade improved to the extent that Kenya exported goods worth K211,762 thousands to Ethiopia in 1990⁴⁸

Basing our argument on the available trade figures and on the attempts made by Kenya and Ethiopia to improve trade between themselves therefore, there is a strong case for arguing that trade contributed to Kenya -Ethiopia co-operative relations.

when I interviewed a number of government officials dealing with Kenya's external trade however, I confirmed that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations, but only to a small extent and that Kenya traded more with her two East African neighbours; namely, Tanzania and Uganda.

Available trade figures between Kenya and Tanzania and between Kenya and Uganda in the period 1963-1990 (tables four and five) confirmed those officials arguments that, Kenya traded more with Tanzania and Uganda than it did with Ethiopia during the period under study. Apart from the late 1970s when Kenya exported relatively very little to Tanzania for example, the available evidence show that Kenya exported much more to Tanzania and Uganda than it exported to Ethiopia. By 1990 for example, Kenya exported goods worth K£32,264 thousands to Tanzania and goods worth K£64,643 thousands to Uganda, while it exported goods worth K£11,762 thousands to Ethiopia. In fact, goods worth K£11,762 thousands was the highest Kenya ever exported to Ethiopia throughout the entire period of study.

TABLE FOUR: DIRECTION OF INTER-COUNTRY TRADE BETWEEN
1964 - 1990 (K£'000)

Years	Kenya's exports to Uganda	Uganda's exports to Kenya
1964	12,581	7,244
1965	15,339	7,135
1966	15,619	7,317
1967	14,796	10,165
1968	13,265	8,650
1969	15,949	7,803
1970	16,698	10,043
1971	19,150	8,026
1972	17,832	7,706
1973	29,552	4,860
1974	39,676	3,943
1975	32,910	1,486
1976	33,162	818
1977	51,992	521
1978	38,443	1,977
1979	37,747	207
1980	66,378	1,206
1981	52,608	200
1982	58,596	547
1983	71,476	355
1984	67,583	1,149
1985	70,673	2,595
1986	72,625	2,155
1987	69,685	910
1988	83,696	1,266
1989	65,919	1,063
1990	64,643	1,314

Source: Economic Surveys: 1963, 1967, 1970, 1975,
1977, 1980, 1982, 1991.

TABLE: FIVE. DIRECTION OF INTER-COUNTRY TRADE BETWEEN 1964 - 1990 (K£'000)

Years	Kenya's exports to Tanzania	Tanzania's exports to Kenya
1964	13,771	4,207
1965	14,589	4,624
1966	13,608	3,898
1967	11,663	3,350
1968	13,069	3,695
1969	12,848	4,018
1970	14,752	5,936
1971	14,743	7,932
1972	19,428	6,196
1973	22,227	8,528
1974	25,249	10,686
1975	28,540	9,166
1976	33,442	12,406
1977	9,822	1,162
1978	2,756	353
1979	4,076	102
1980	5,216	302
1981	6,307	273
1982	6,836	859
1983	6,285	1,015
1984	9,727	3,019
1985	19,176	1,713
1986	27,257	2,212
1987	19,554	3,438
1988	24,284	6,044
1989	27,476	13,263
1990	32,264	12,508

Source: Economic Surveys: 1963, 1967, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1988, 1991

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CHAPTER FOUR

SOMALIA'S CLAIMS ON KENYA'S AND ETHIOPIA'S TERRITORIES:

KENYA'S AND ETHIOPIA'S POSITIONS4.0 INTRODUCTION

The principle of territorial integrity is based on the assumption that each state has fixed and safe boundaries which are not subject to any external violation.¹ This principle has been described in various documents pertaining to bilateral, regional and international agreements. Article X of the League Covenant for example states that: "the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League". Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states that: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

For the African States whose boundaries were artificially drawn by Europeans to serve European purposes on the basis of European power policies, the principle of territorial integrity is to be respected. They have for example inscribed in the Organization of African Unity Charter, Article III (3) which stipulates that:

"Member states solemnly affirm and declare their respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state for its unalienable right to independence". They argue that boundaries acquired at the time of independence are to remain Uti possidetis, their acceptance of the artificial boundaries is largely based on a domino effect. It is assumed that allowing changes of boundaries of a state or states through conflict or otherwise no matter how legitimate would lead to similar demands among other contested boundaries in Africa. Most African countries have therefore been very sensitive towards the demands for changes in their boundaries. They are against the so-called wars of liberation if directed against them and subversive activities which might prove dangerous to their political independence.'

Kenya and Ethiopia being the victims of the colonial legacy have consistently maintained their respects for the legitimacy of the boundaries at the time of Kenya's independence. Their position is influenced by constant Somalia's claims on their territories. This chapter looks at Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories and Kenya's and Ethiopia's positions. The first section looks at the introduction, the second section looks at the historical background of Somalia's territorial claims to Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories, the third section looks at Somalia's claims on Kenya's territory, the fourth section looks at Kenya's position on Somalia's claims, the fifth section looks at Somalia's claims on Ethiopia's territory, the sixth section looks at Ethiopia's position on Somalia's claims.

4.1 SOMALIA'S CLAIMS ON KENYA'S AND ETHIOPIA'S TERRITORIES:

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Somali Republic (Somalia) occupies a sizeable portion of the Horn of Africa. The Republic stretches eastwards from Babel-Mandeb or the southern gate of the Red Sea, along the Gulf of Aden to Cape Guardafui and southwards along the Indian Ocean to Ras Kiamboni. The Republic is bounded on the West by Ethiopia, Kenya on the South-West and Djibouti on the North-West.

The ethnic composition of the population of Somalia is homogeneous: Almost the entire population is Somali who comprise about 99% of the total population in Somalia³. There are however, some minority groups in that country who comprise about 1% of the total population. The major Somali clans include: Digil, Rehanwein, Hawiye, Dir, Darod and Isaaq⁴. From the point of view of their cultural impact, the most important minority in Somalia are Arabs. They are traders living in separate communities, mainly in the coastal towns, with a few dispersed groups in the interior. Some of these communities have been established for centuries, their ancestors having come from Yemen; others are more recent immigrants.

There are also scattered Negroid groups in Somalia whose origins are not known. It is believed that they are remnants of pre-Hamitic inhabitants of the region and that their ranks were reinforced through intermarriage with large numbers of freed slaves. They live in the segregated communities along the coast.

shebelle and Juba, as well as in the area between them. There are also small Indo-Pakistani population in Somalia, they are mainly traders, living in the southern region of the Somali Republic.

Other minorities are the Amaranis and the Bajunis who are of unknown origin. The Amaranis are merchants and sailors, they speak a Swahili dialect: They are concentrated mainly in Brava, though smaller communities are to be found in Merca, Mogadishu, and Afghoi. The Bajunis are mainly fishermen and live in Kismayu and the islands near it. What needs to be emphasised here is that the presence of minority groups in Somalia does not diminish Somali predominance in Somalia, nor detract from its ethnic homogeneity.

The Somali Republic claims self-determination for the Somalis living outside Somalia. This claim goes back to the time before Somalia's independence. The Somalis are a people who identify with a common ancestor. They share the same Muslim religion and speak the same language. The Somali nation is not a historical Kingdom or a centralised unit, but a kinship group that tells its members who they are; who their friends are; and who their enemies are. According to them identity does not prevent strife between cousins but it does distinguish such strife from war against a neighbour's attempts at domination'.

As a result of the partition of the Horn of Africa, the Somalis were divided among five different political entities: Somalia

(Italian Somaliland), British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Kenya. That division was not acceptable to the Somali nationalists, who began claiming the right to form a Somali nation-state, a "Greater Somalia". They aimed at establishing that "Greater Somalia" through the unification of Italian Somaliland (Somalia), British Somaliland, French Somaliland, and the Somali inhabited portions of Ethiopia and Kenya. The idea was started by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, 1900-1920.⁶

Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Hassan was determined to rid Somaliland of what he called European Christian infidels who were destroying the Muslim faith of his people. He was also determined to unify the Somalis under Islamic nation and he established what came to be known as the pan-Somalism. After his death in 1920, his campaign was taken over by political parties. The parties that took over his campaign included, the Somali National League (S.N.L.), the Somali Youth League formerly known as the Somali Youth club, the Greater Somalia League (G.S.L), the Independent Constitutional Party (I.C.P.) the Somali National Union (S.N.U.), the Liberal Somali Youth Party (L.S.Y.P), and Somali African Union (S.A.U). All those parties supported Somalia's independence and advocated a "Greater Somali State".

In 1948, for example, the President of SYL, Haji Mohammed Hussein, advocated a "Greater Somalia" when he said that:

We wish our country to be amalgamated with the other Somalilands and to form one political, administrative and economic unity with them. We Somalis are one in every way.

We are the same racially and geographically, we have the same culture, We have the same language and the same religion. There is no future for us except as part of a "Greater Somalia". The present international frontiers are artificial and the divisions are placing an unfair strain on the political, administrative and economic welfare of the country.... By this union only can we have the opportunity to give full expression to our national spirit and work out our destiny as a nation of normal human beings. Union with the other Somalilands is our greater demand which must take priority over all considerations.'

The SYL's position did not change since that statement in 1948.

In 1959, for example, the President of SYL, Abdullah Issa stated his government's commitment to Somali unification. He said that:

The Somali people form a single language, they inhabit a vast territory which in its turn constitutes a well defined geographical unit. All must know that the Government of Somalia will strive its utmost with the legal and the peaceful means which are its democratic prerogative to attain this end'.

That hope for Somali unification achieved its first success in July 1960 when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were amalgamated into a Republic. The Somali Republic now assumed the responsibility as an independent state to pursue its goals of self-determination for Somalis. Somalia's objective was to liberate and unite in a "Greater Somali nation" the other three Somali inhabited territories of Djibouti (French Somaliland), Kenya and Ethiopia. The five pointed stars on Somalia's flag symbolises the colonial division of Somalia into five parts. It serves to remind them that they might one day be united in a single nation-state, thus, the flag has been one instrument with which Somalia has expressed its dissatisfaction with the regional territorial status. Her position has been that these are Somali

territories-part of the Somali nation that should comprise the Somali state. Upon the independence of the former British and Italian Somalilands therefore, their newly-united inhabitants shared the general hope that their cousins still under foreign rule would soon join them.

The unification of the territories occupied by Somalis has been the corner-stone of Somalia's foreign policy. The Government bases their case primarily on cultural considerations, there is no territorial ambition but government of a free Somali state has special duty towards its countrymen across the borders who have a common cultural heritage and origin and who live against their will under a system of government which is not of their choosing.

Since Somalis form a majority in Somalia, the argument arises that Somali minorities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti must for linguistic and religious reasons be united to form a "Greater Somalia". As a nationalist race, Somalia claims that all Somali people living outside the Republic have a right to self-determination and thus, the right to become part of Somalia if they so wish. Somalia admits that the division of their people was created by arbitrary colonial boundaries which affected other African states but says that Somalia's case is unique, in that, Somalis have possessed for several centuries developed sense of nationhood and cultural uniqueness.

The Osman-Shermarke administration (1960-1964)' for example, advocated the unification of Somali people. Article 6(4) of

Somalia Constitution adopted in July, 1960 stipulated that: "the Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories." This article reveals that union of the Somali territories became an official commitment of Osman-Shermarke administration.

The principle of self-determination was continued by the Osman-Hussein administration (1964-1967). In one of his first press conferences held after his nomination as Prime Minister, Mr. Hussein stated his government's policy with regard to self-determination. He said that:

... the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be the prime consideration of my government during its term of office. The government's policy will be to intensify our activities of enlightening world opinion of the righteousness of the Somali case.¹¹

Hussein's statement showed that the new Somalia leadership was determined to pursue a policy consistent with that of the previous administration. He further said that:

...until the Somali people, a nation bound by the strongest links of race, tradition, culture, language and religion are allowed to achieve their unity with their motherland Somalia in the exercise of their right to self-determination, the border problems in the Horn of Africa would not be solved¹².

Osman-Hussein's administration was succeeded by Shermarke-Egal administration, 1967-1969¹². Like the previous administration, Shermarke-Egal administration also advocated for unification of Somalis outside the Republic. After his nomination as the Prime

Minister, Mr. Egal said that:

... the Republic's foreign policy cannot be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya and France cannot ignore the Somalilands they occupy Somali unification, as set forth in the constitution, meant the uniting of Somalis of their own free will, after they had achieved independence, my government is ready to achieve that end Somali Republic does not seek to annex Kenyan or Ethiopian territories, we only seek Somali territories inhabited by Somalis which belong to Somalia.¹³

Mr. Egal's statement showed that, his administration continued with the previous administration's policy.

Although the Prime Minister, Egal continued with the policy of the previous administrations, his term of office was very unique in that he pursued a policy of detente. The policy of detente pursued by his administration was not, however, meant to abandon Somalia's primary objective of unification. The Prime Minister explained that it was open to his administration to alter the policy of confrontation and to seek accommodation or a detente with her neighbours namely; Kenya, Ethiopia and France (Djibouti) as a preliminary to creating a suitable atmosphere without abandoning the context of their political aspirations and objectives.¹⁴

He emphasised that: "we shall continue to put emphases on those countries to this end through diplomatic channels and through the appropriate organs of such international bodies as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity." As far as the Shermarke-Egal administration was concerned, therefore, the unification of Somalis could be realized through the process of

accommodation of the neighbours.

Although Shermarke-Egal administration made efforts to pursue pan-Somali cause within the framework of detente, his rule did not last long. That was because of the military coup which toppled his government on 21st October, 1969. The military administration under Siad Barre also continued the previous administration's policy. President Barre once said that:

Although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country....To the Somali people independence was always synonymous with unity. The consistent struggle of the Somali people seems to surprise our enemies. They do not realise that the Somali people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing their freedom The liberation struggle was always part of the ordinary life of the Somali men, and however long it takes him, he will never forget the stage of the struggle remaining.¹⁶

President Barre's statement also showed that the military administration was prepared to unite the Somali territories still outside the Somali Republic. His administration was prepared to see that no Somalis lived under imperialism. His administration therefore continued with the previous administration's policy.

The forgoing analysis shows that Somalia claims self-determination for Somalis living outside the Somali Republic, namely Ogaden Somalis in Ethiopia, the North - Eastern Province (N.E.P) Somalis in Kenya and the Somalis in Djibouti. According to one Somali scholar, Yousuf Juma A. Duhul, the term "somali" includes all Somalis whether in Somalia or in the disputed

territories of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.¹⁷ As will be seen in the later sections of the chapter, however, Kenya and Ethiopia are opposed to Somalia's territorial claims on their territories. They would never allow Somalia to take an inch of their territories.

4.2 SOMALIA'S CLAIMS ON KENYA'S TERRITORY (NFD)

The Somali nationalists claim that the eastern portion of the Northern Frontier District (NFD), presently known as the North-Eastern Province (N.E.P), ought to be detached from Kenya and annexed to the Somali Republic. Their claim is centered on the principle of self-determination. The area in question comprises approximately one fifth of the total territory of Kenya. The N.E.P., comprises the districts of Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale and Wajir.

There are two main ethnic groups in the area, the Somali and the Gallas as well as other smaller groups. Of the total population of over 338,000, about 280,000 are of Somali ethnic origin.¹⁸ The dominant groups of these Somali-speaking people are the Darod, Hawiye, and Sab, who occupy parts of Somalia. The Kenya-Somalia boundary cuts across them. The Darod are split into the subdivisions of Anlihan, Abdallah, Abdwark, and Mohammed Zubeir, and they straddle the Kenya boundary into Somalia and Ethiopia (Cgaden) where their kinsmen live. The Hawiye are subdivided into Abjuran, Daqodia, Muville and Gurreh, who also move across the Ethiopian and Somalian boundaries.

The Sab are represented by Rehanwein and Laisan. Within the Adjuran and Gurreh subdivisions there are the Walomogeh who are described as half-Somalis. The Somalis described above occupy mainly the districts of Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, and Moyale and are of Islamic faith.¹⁹ Thus, geographically, the Somalis in the

N.E.P of Kenya mostly occupy the eastern part of Kenya.

The largest group of the Galla people are the Boran most of whom live in Ethiopia. The other Borans occupy areas around Isiolo and Marsabit districts. Besides the Boran, the other Galla people include the Gabra, the Orma, the Sakuye and the Wata. Numbering about 80,000, most of the Galla peoples occupy the north and the north western of the area, especially the Marsabit, Moyale and Isiolo districts.²⁰ The Galla language belong to the cushitic group of languages which are mainly spoken in Ethiopia.

Among the smaller ethnic groups are the Rendile, who number about 10,000.²¹ They live mainly around Marsabit district. Although the Rendile are of Somali hamitic origin, they show traces of Masai culture. Others are the Riverines, Korokoro, Boni, Malakoti, Malabulu, Pokomo, the Gelluba or Meville, the Burji, the Konso, and the Turkana. Those people occupy the districts of Marsabit, and Garissa. Table six illustrates the percentages of the distribution of the peoples of the Northern Frontier District presently the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. The table indicates the high concentration of the Somalis in the North-Eastern Province which comprises the districts of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera. However, the Somalis are also evenly spread in almost every district in the area under study.

The Somali, the Rendille, and the Galla-speaking peoples are pastoral nomads who share many cultural similarities. They all belong to the cushitic linguistic family. Although most of the

Galla have accepted the Islamic faith, some of them still follow ancient cushitic religious traditions. The Galla who have accepted Islam are the Boran of Isiolo district. Although some of the Rendille and the Riverines have accepted the Islamic faith, others still maintain their traditional religious beliefs. The Somalis are mainly Muslims.

As early as 1930's, the Somali nationalists formed national parties with an aim of uniting the Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Somalia (Italian Somaliland).

TABLE SIX

ETHNIC COMPOSITION IN THE N.F.D. (1962)

Districts(places)	Peoples	Percentages	Total
Garisa	Somali	72	100
	Galla(Orma)	7	
	Riverines	21	
Wajir	Somali	88	100
	Half Somali	12	
Mandera	Somali	49	100
	Half Somali	51	
Moyale	Galla(Boran&Gabra)	49	100
	Rendille	50.5	
	Elmolo	0.5	
Isiolo	Galla(Boran)	71	100
	Somali	19	
	Turkana	10	

NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT.

Somali	46
Half-Somali	16
Boran, Gabbra and Sakuye	22
Rendille	9
Riverines	4
Orma	2
Turkana	1

source: Great Britain, Report of the N.F.D. Command 1900
(London:1962), Appendix D.

One of the Parties formed with that aim was the SYL founded in Somalia in 1943. The party opened branches in Ethiopia and N.F.D of Kenya. Other political parties that were formed by the pro-secessionists in Kenya's N.F.D with an aim of re-uniting the Somalis in the N.F.D with Somalia included the Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party (NPPPP), the Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP), the Peoples National League (PNL) and the National Political Movement (NPM). These parties represented "Somali opinion". The NPPPP's policy for example stipulated that it:

Stands for secession of the Northern Frontier District from Kenya before it attains independence, there after creation of a special regime for the Northern Frontier District under the British, during which period the people of the Northern Frontier District would develop their political institutions, and eventually union with the Somali Republic as an autonomous unit.²³

That party's policy was supported by the other three parties.

What needs to be emphasised here is that not all ethnic groups who live in Kenya's NFD supported "Somali opinion". The non-Somalis and non-Muslims supported Kenya's opinion. That group of people came to be known as the anti-secessionist group. Like the secessionist group, the anti-secessionist group formed different parties to represent their views.

Those parties included, the Northern Province United Association (NPUA) founded to unite the Boran, the Gabra and other Galla

speaking people. NPUA was led by Mr. Galgalo Godana and it had its headquarter at Marsabit. It opposed the secession of any form and thus, wanted the Northern Frontier District to remain part of Kenya and to advance to independence with it. The President of NPUA once condemned the secessionist when he said that:

Somalia's claim to the NFD is a negation of pan-Africanism for all intents and purposes, the N.F.D is an integral part of Kenya. We consider ourselves Kenyans with sincerity and honesty and have all along believed that our backwardness and exploitation would end with Kenya's independence.²⁴

The other anti-secessionist parties were the Northern Province Peoples National Union (NPPNU) and the Galla Peoples union (G.P.U). The NPPNU was formed in an effort to unite the Riverines against Somalis opinion while the G.P.U was formed in an effort to unite the Galla. The NPPNU, the G.P.U, and the N.P.U.A represented the Kenya opinion. They were against secession.

The pro-secessionist feeling was reflected in 1961 when the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Reginald Maudling, visited Kenya in preparations for the Constitutional Conference which was due to begin in London early the following year. He met Mr. Lord who was then the President of NPPPP, who together with a delegation of chiefs and political leaders from the NFD, presented their case for secession and union with the Somali Republic. Mr. Maudling agreed that a delegation from the NFD could attend the Constitutional Conference and arrangements were made accordingly by the Kenya government. At a number of meetings held with delegates from KANU and KADU, and separately with the

Colonial Secretary, the N.F.D delegation pressed their case for secession and union with the Somali Republic on the principle of the right to self-determination. The secessionist group based their case on the close affinity that the character of the NFD and its people had with the territory and people of Somali Republic. The delegation said that:

...by racial stock and by language the people of NFD are kindred with the people of Somalia, but alien to the people of Kenya.... Likewise in the profession of Muslim faith.... Before any further constitutional changes affecting Kenya are made, autonomy be granted to the area which we represent (namely the districts of Isiolo, Garissa, Mandera, Moyale and Wajir) as a territory wholly independent of Kenya, in order that it might join in an act of union with Somalia when Kenya become independent.²⁵

The Secretary of State on his part informed the conference that Her Majesty's government had given careful considerations to the view which had been put forward by the Delegation and by the KANU and KADU and had come to a conclusion that an investigation should be undertaken in order to ascertain public opinion in the area regarding its future. As a result of that, an independent commission was formed to investigate the matter.

While the matter was still being investigated, the pro-secessionists issued a statement entitled: "A people in Isolation". It stated:

We, the political parties of the NFD of Kenya, will not permit anyone, European or African, to play about with our destiny. We have been divided from our brothers for long enough. We refuse to be "balkanized". We are members of a single Somali Nation. Somali is our language-spoken from the Gulf of Aden to the NFD. Islam is our culture, pastoralism our way. Not only do we want to be freed from an out-moded form of colonial administration in the NFD of Kenya, but we want to reunite with our brothers with whom we can evolve

an administration suited to our way of life. This is centered on Mogadishu and we shall unite with it.²⁶

The Somali drive for reunification reached its peak in march, 1963, when the commission report was released. Her majesty's government decided that, as part of the constitutional arrangements for internal self-government in Kenya, the predominantly Somali areas referred to in the report of Regional Boundaries Commission should be formed into a separate seventh region enjoying a status equal to that of other regions in Kenya. The creation of the new region would give its inhabitants greater freedom in the arrangements of their own affairs and more effective means of safeguarding their interests and maintaining their way of life.

Following that announcement, about 300 supporters of the NFD secession reacted by tearing the British Union Jack in Isiolo.²⁷ In Wajir also over 4,000 secessionists demonstrated against the British decision to create the North-Eastern Region. The delegates from the secessionist political parties later met with the NFD Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Peter Walters and told him that they had demonstrated to show that they did not accept the decision of the British government not to allow them to secede. "The people of NFD are ready to die if the British government does not reconsider. We want nothing less than immediate secession and union with our motherland Somalia".²⁸

As Kenya's independence approached, the pro-secessionists intensified their campaign for reunification. Thus, the

announcement by the British government to carry out the plans for elections in Kenya was rebuffed by the pro-secessionists. The NPPPP, for example warned that:

If Kenya is granted full independence under the present constitution, it will be another Congo (now Zaire) with the NFD as Katanga. If we fail to get what we want, we will form a government for the NFD at Garba Tulla."

The pro-secessionists showed their seriousness when they boycotted Kenya's General elections in May, 1963. On election day (May 18th, 1963), the secessionists surrounded the polling station at Isiolo to prevent the anti-secessionists from casting their votes. At the end of the elections on May 20th, 1963, it was estimated that about 80,000 voters in the NFD ... mainly in North-Eastern Region had boycotted the elections." KANU won most of the seats in the National and Regional Assemblies, thereby forming an integral self-government in June, 1963 under the Prime Minister Kenyatta. The people in the North-Eastern Region were later given another chance to elect their Regional and National representatives. The secessionists however stepped up their violent campaigns in the NFD against the supporters of the Kenya government in the area. It was estimated that there were between 600 and 1,000 shiftas (bandits) with about 750 firearms³¹ in the area. Since then, Kenya has fought shiftas suspected to be supported by the Somali Republic who advocates self-determination for Somalis living outside the Somali Republic.

Somali Republic support to the secessionists goes back to the time before Kenya's independence. Osman-Shermarke administration (1960-1964) for example supported secession and unity with the

Republic. In one of his public statements, President Osman stated that:

With regard to the Somalis in Kenya, the view of the Somali Republic is that the future of the NFD remains one for final settlement by the British government before Kenya achieves independence. It believes that the British should apply the principle of self-determination to the Somalis in the NFD, permitting them to become a part of the Somali Republic.³²

Somalia's interests on Kenya's NFD were again expressed when Mr. Jomo Kenyatta of KANU and Mr. Ngala of KADU visited Somalia in July and August, 1962 respectively. At a dinner hosted in honour of Mr. Kenyatta in Mogadishu, President Osman explained the Somali view of self-determination when he said that:

The principle of self-determination, when used properly to unify and enlarge an existing state with a view towards its absorption in a federal system of government is neither balkanization nor fragmentation. It is a major contribution to unity and stability, and is totally consistent with the concept of pan-Africanism.³³

Referring to the independent commission that was appointed to enquire into the opinion of the NFD people as to their future, Somalia's Prime Minister Dr. Shermarke said:

If the commission reports that the majority of the people wish to become a part of independent Kenya we will not object.... our hope is that the principle of self-determination will be fully respected and applied to the inhabitants of the NFD It has been applied in recent years to Togo, the Cameroons and elsewhere, and there are valid reasons why it should be applied to the NFD.³⁴

President Osman's statement showed that, Somalia claims Kenya's territory for Somalis.

The commission later announced that the NFD of Kenya would form the seventh Region, later Province of Kenya. Following that announcement, there were widespread, violent demonstrations in Somalia against Britain. The Somali government reacted by severing diplomatic relations. In a vote of 74 to 14, the Somalia Assembly approved a motion to break diplomatic relations with Britain. The motion stated that:

The National Assembly of Somalia (NAS) noting with deep regret that the foreign policy conducted by the United Kingdom damages the interests of the Somali nation, supports the decision by the Government⁵ to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.⁵

The Somalia government also rebuffed the announcement made by Britain to carry out plans for elections in Kenya. The Somalia Prime Minister, Dr. Shermarke stated:

The only way in which Her Majesty's government can avoid an outright and public charge of breach of faith would be to postpone all forth-coming elections in the NFD (but of course not in the Kenya proper) in accordance with the understanding that there will be no change in the status of the NFD until a decision has been taken on the political future of the territory. I cannot see that a postponement of elections in the NFD will in any way prejudice Kenya's constitutional progress towards independence which we have no desire to impede.⁶

The Prime Minister's statement showed that he supported secessionist opinion.

Somalia's interests on Kenya's NFD were again expressed during the Rome Conference which was held on 25th August, 1963. The conference was held between the Governments of Britain, Kenya and Somalia. It was meant to find a formular for settling Kenya-

Somalia disputes. The British delegation was led by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peter Thomas; the Somali delegation was led by the Prime Minister, Dr. Abdirashid A. Shermarke; and the Kenya government was represented jointly by the Governor, Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Gichuru, Minister of Finance, together with other Ministers including Mr. Tom Mboya and Mr. Joseph Mirumbi.³⁷

During the meeting, Somalia's Prime Minister, Dr. Shermarke, claimed that:

The Northern Frontier District is, and always has been, historically, geographically, economically and culturally a separate entity from Kenya proper, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of this area expressed to the recent independence commission, which ascertained their wishes as to their political future, their desire to unite with the Somali Republic; Her Majesty's government, having sole responsibility for the disputed area, has an obligation to take a final decision on its political future in accordance with the declared wishes of the people.³⁸

Speaking on behalf of the British government however, Mr. Peter Thomas, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, informed Somalia government that:

Since Britain would be responsible for Kenya for only a few more months, the British government considered that it would be wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of that country and that an agreement should be sought by the African governments concerned working and negotiating within an African framework.³⁹

The British government however, offered proposals which could form a useful basis for discussion. The proposal were as follows:

Primary consideration will be given to the welfare of the inhabitants of North - Eastern Region; Agreement shall be sought by peaceful and lawful means and all concerned will co-operate to reduce tension in the area; Her Majesty's government would take no unilateral decision involving a change in the frontiers of Kenya before

independence; with these points in mind: the Kenya government recognise the interests of Somalia in the future of any people of Somali origin residing in Kenya; the Somalia government and the Kenya government, taking into account previous contacts, will resume discussions at an early date to be agreed on; If these discussions do not result in agreement the Kenya government accept that the Somalia government will be free after Kenya's independence to bring the matter to the notice of African states within the spirit of Addis Ababa resolutions.⁴⁰

The position taken by Somalia during the Rome Conference confirmed further that Somalia lays claims on Kenya's territory.

Somalia's position continued even after Osman-Shermarke administration. Osman-Hussein administration for example inherited a consistent policy on the issue of the Northern Frontier District. According to Drysdale: "The Somali belief is founded on the principle that the right of self-determination does not end with transfer of power."⁴¹

In one of his first conferences held after his nomination as Prime Minister, Mr. Hussein stated his government's policy with regard to self - determination. He said:

The right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be the prime consideration of my government during its term of office. The government's policy will be to intensify our activities of enlightening World opinion on the righteousness of the Somali case.⁴²

The Prime Minister further explained that:

In regard to the dispute with Kenya over the Somali territory of the NFD, my government affirms that the only acceptable solution is one that takes into account the wishes of the inhabitants of the area⁴³

The Prime Minister's statement showed that the new Somalia

leadership was determined to pursue a policy consistent with that of the previous administration.

Prime Minister Hussein's position was continued by Shermarke-Egal administration. After his nomination as Prime Minister, Mr. Egal stated that: " The Republic's foreign policy could not be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti could not ignore the Somali lands they occupied".⁴⁴ His policy was more a clarification of previous Somalia government policies than a new policy. He declared that:

We do not wish to annex the territory of any state whatsoever, nor to expand into such territory. We do intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign domination in order that they obtain sovereign independent status through the process of self-determination.⁴⁵

Prime Minister Egal's statement showed that there was no fundamental differences in policy between the new Somalia government and its predecessor. The only difference was that Prime Minister Egal's policy, while not abandoning self-determination for the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, took positive steps towards a peaceful solution to the disputes.

The negotiations for a peaceful solution on the Kenya-Somalia dispute during Egal's term of office began during the Organization of African Unity's Conference which took place in Kinshasa, Zaire, in September, 1967.

During that conference, both Kenya and Somalia produced a declaration which paved the way for further negotiations. The declaration stated that:

Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of Article III of the Organization of African Unity Charter; the two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the Organization of African Unity Charter; the two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property; the two Governments have agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through Mass Media such as radio and the press against each other.⁴⁶

The next meeting took place in Arusha, Tanzania, under the chairmanship of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The Arusha Memorandum of Understanding which was signed by Presidents of Kenya and Somalia, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Shermarke respectively, stated that:

Both Governments will exert all efforts and do their utmost to create good neighbourly relations between Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the Organization of African Unity Charter; the two Governments agree that the interests of the people of Kenya and Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries; they reaffirmed their adherence to the declaration of the OAU conference at Kinshasa.⁴⁷

The Arusha agreement was a clear indication of the determination of the two countries to resolve their dispute over the NFD amiably.

Although Prime Minister Egal made efforts to pursue pan-Somali cause within the framework of detente, that did not last long because his government was toppled on 21st October, 1969 by

the Military administration headed by Siad Barre. The Military administration, like the previous administrations, however continued with the principle of self-determination for Somalis living outside the Republic. While explaining his government's policy, President Siad Barre said that:

The policy of the Revolution towards the parts of our country occupied by foreign powers, is that our people be allowed peaceful self-determination, to gain their freedom. Since the birth of the Revolution, we have been calling upon Kenya, Ethiopia and France to respect this principle.⁴⁹

Barre's statement showed that Somalia under his administration continued to claim Kenya's territory namely the North-Eastern Region.

The foregoing analysis shows that Somalia lays claims on Kenya's territory, namely the (NFD) or (NEP). As will be seen in the next section of this chapter however, Kenya objects strongly to those claims.

4.3 KENYA'S POSITION ON SOMALIA'S CLAIMS

While the Somali nationalists claim that the NFD of Kenya, presently known as the North-Eastern Province be detached from Kenya and annexed to the Somali Republic, the Kenyans are determined to safeguard their country's territorial integrity and oppose the cession of territory to Somali Republic. They stand by the principle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which sees the boundaries as uti possidetis. That stand goes back to the time before Kenya's independence. As early as 1960, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan told the House of Commons that: "Her Majesty's government did not and would not encourage or support any claim affecting the territorial integrity of Kenya That was a matter which could only be considered if that were the wish of the governments and peoples concerned".⁴⁹

That position was continued by Kenyatta's and Moi's governments. In 1962, when Jomo Kenyatta of KANU and Ronald Ngala of KADU visited Somalia in July and August respectively, Mr. Kenyatta made Kenya's position on the NFD clear when he said that:

We, and especially KANU, feel, and we have put it clearly before the Somalia government that we regard the NFD as part of Kenya. We also regard the Somalis who live in the NFD and elsewhere in Kenya as our brothers. They are part and parcel of Kenya in that fashion This is a question which we can discuss with the Somalis in the NFD, this being a domestic affair of Kenya.⁵⁰

Mr Kenyatta's phrase, "this being a domestic affair of Kenya",

was carefully linked with the doctrine of territorial integrity. Specifically any claim to the NFD, in Kenyatta's view, constituted a violation of Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The same theme was expressed by the Kenyan leaders during the first Summit Conference of the Independent African States held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963. The Kenya delegation, attending the conference as observers since Kenya was not yet independent, said that:

The Government of Somalia, states that the principle of self-determination should be followed in the case of NFD The new constitution leading to independence of Kenya government ... makes no provision for secession and such other disruptive activities. The question of the principle of self-determination for the NFD Somalis therefore does not arise The NFD is a part of Kenya and shall always remain as such.⁵¹

This statement conforms with that expressed by Mr. Kenyatta when he visited Mogadishu in July 1962 and with the speech expressed at the OAU Inaugural Summit Conference.

While reacting to speech made by the Somalia President, Aden Abdullah Osman, during the OAU Inaugural Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963, the Kenya delegation said that:

Seeking to create new African nations on the basis of tribal or religious identity is a sin against pan-Africanism and a most dangerous weapon for destroying African solidarity. The Somalis are Africans: Those who live in Kenya are Kenya Africans. Either they integrate with the rest of the Africans in the country or they are perfectly free to leave us and our territory and cross the border to the Republic of Somalia. This is the only way they can legally exercise their right of self-determination. After all, if every territory to which people of the Somali tribe migrate is to become part of

the Republic of Somalia, then the concept of territorial integrity of any other state becomes meaningless We have shed blood in the past in defence of our country and in the struggle for our freedom. We are prepared to shed our blood again in defence of every inch of our Kenyan soil and in full, support the African unity and solidarity....We in Kenya shall not give up even an inch of our country to the Somali tribalists, and that is final. There is no need of their cherishing false hopes.⁵²

That speech was a clear indication that Kenyan leaders viewed Somalia's claims on the NFD as a violation of Kenya's territorial integrity.

The same theme was again expressed by the Kenyan leaders when they met with the Somali leaders in Rome in August, 1963.

While the then British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peter Thomas informed the Somali government that the British government would be responsible for Kenya for only a few months and that it would be wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of that country, Kenya's Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Tom Mboya, "hailed the conference as a great victory for Kenya". He pointed out that for once Britain had categorically declared she could not act unilaterally over the NFD as Kenya would never agree to part with an inch of her territory."⁵³ Mr. Mboya's statement showed that Kenya was opposed to Somalia's claims even before her independence.

The Rome negotiations did not solve the NFD question. Kenya however agreed to negotiate with Somalia. The government made

a proposal which stated that:

Primary consideration will be given to the welfare of the inhabitants of the North-Eastern Region; Agreement shall be sought by peaceful and lawful means and all concerned will co-operate to reduce tension in the area; Her Majesty's government will take no unilateral decision involving a change in the frontiers of Kenya before independence.⁵⁴

Kenya achieved its independence on December 12th, 1963, thus joining the community of nations as a sovereign state. Once Kenya's sovereignty became a fact, any further claims to this territory (NFD) by Somalia were seen as a direct threat to Kenya's territorial integrity and an interference in her internal affairs.

During his address to the Kenya National Assembly in December 1963, the Prime Minister Kenyatta specified his government's policy with respect to the NFD and said:

The North-Eastern Region is part of our country and any problems arising there are internal and domestic, we cannot compromise on that. Being a believer in pan-Africanism, and as one of its founders, I went out of my way to discuss this matter thoroughly with the Somalia government We, the African governments, guided with the determination of the policy of African unity, ought to be one, ought to be friends, ought to settle our problems peacefully.⁵⁵

Mr. Kenyatta's statement was an indication that his government viewed the NFD situation as domestic. Thus, the Somali claim on the NFD was considered a violation of Kenya's sovereign rights and territorial integrity.

As a result of Somalia's support to the shiftas in the NFD, Kenya declared a state of emergency in the region on 28th December, 1963.

Contributing to the debate dealing with the North-Eastern Region emergency measures, one Member of Parliament stated that:

People who talk of African unity must accept the integrity of the sovereign states in Africa first The Kenya leaders should not sit with the Somalia leaders in conferences unless they are prepared to listen and respect the sovereignty and integrity of Kenya's territorial boundaries. Until the five stars on the flag of the Somali Republic are reduced to three we will not have peace in the North-Eastern Region.³⁶

The speech of the Kenyan Member of Parliament clearly implicated Somalia as the main source of conflict in the NFD. Thus, peace in the area could only prevail if Somalia respected Kenya's territorial integrity. He further said that: "We too, could also have territorial claims on Somalia's ... Jubaland ceded to Somalia in 1925 and 1926 But in the interest of African unity and in agreement with the charter of the OAU, we respect Somalia's rights to that territory, because that is a fundamental principle of the OAU."

In his address to the Kenya Senate, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Tom Mboya, expressed the same opinion with respect to the situation in the NFD. He emphasised that:

The North-Eastern Region must be regarded as the domestic responsibility which we refuse to share with Somalia or any other foreign Government because the North-Eastern Region is in Kenya.... We do not consider that they

(Somalia) have any legal direct or indirect, responsibility over the North-Eastern Region.⁵⁹

While addressing the National Assembly in June, 1967 President Kenyatta made Kenya's position clear when he said that:

Kenya wishes to live in harmony with all her neighbours. We covet no inch of their territory. We yield no inch of ours. We stand loyal to the Organization of African Unity and its solemn decision that all African states shall adhere to the boundaries inherited at independence. We pray that the day is not far distant when all African states will see the wisdom of honouring to the full that decision of the organization. All that Kenya wants is end to the bloodshed, misery and waste, so that our people in the North-Eastern areas may play a full part in our Government's plans for the development, and so that they may enjoy peace in the area and share in full, the benefits of our national prosperity.⁶⁰

President Kenyatta's statement showed that Kenya was opposed to Somalia's claims.

In the same year, the Kenya government published a document in which it accused Somalia of encouraging the shifta activities. It outlined specific prerequisites before it could negotiate with Somalia. It was provided that:

1. The Government of the Somali Republic should renounce all territorial aspirations ... declaring concurrently its readiness to recognise...
 - (a) that the Northern Frontier District of Kenya is an integral and de jure part of the Kenya Republic;
 - (b) that this recognition implies the launching of an era of peaceful and constructive co-existence between Kenya and Somalia.
2. The Government of the Somali Republic should ... halt the supply of arms and ammunition, plastic land mines and demolition materials to Shiftas
3. The Government of the Somali Republic should close down the Shifta training centres⁶⁰

The above statement by the Kenya government showed that Kenya believed that Somalia government was giving support to the Shiftas in Kenya's Northern Frontier District and that Kenya was opposed to that support.

What needs to be said here is that Kenya under President Kenyatta's leadership was opposed to Somalia's territorial claims throughout Kenyatta's rule. That position was continued by President Moi who became Kenya's second President following President Kenyatta's death. When he visited Ethiopia in January 1979, President Moi expressed his government's opposition to Somalia's territorial claims. He said that:

.... Excellent relations have been existing between Kenya and Ethiopia Kenya and Ethiopia share a long, well recognised and peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and co-operation We are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims must be avoided at all costs and we call upon Somalia to lay down her territorial claims.⁶¹

President Moi's statement showed that he was opposed to Somalia's territorial claims. He further said that:

To sacrifice oneself in the defence of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is an extremely noble and honourable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep love for one's country and its future... Kenya and Ethiopia are ready to protect their territories against Somalia's claims. We will never part with an inch of our territories, we attach great significance to the sanctity of borders of African states as obtained at the time of their political independence ...⁶²

President Moi's position on Somalia's territorial claims was again expressed in December 1980, when Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia visited Kenya. Speaking at a dinner hosted in

honour of Mengistu, President Moi attacked the "expansionist policies and military adventurism" of Somalia which he described as a thorn in the flesh of both Kenya and Ethiopia."

He said:

Mogadishu should renounce all territorial claims on Kenya and Ethiopia This should be done in a public and convincing manner to facilitate meaningful expansion of our present nucleus of regional solidarity.... Whether openly or in terms of fomented guerrilla warfare, Kenya and Ethiopia have been subjected to barbaric forms of aggression for over two decades or longer, and lives continue to be lost or sacrificed today....The sovereignty of the Republic of Kenya is beyond question, and will be fully protected against any form of aggression and intrigue.⁶³

President Moi's statement on that occasion further showed that his government was opposed to Somalia's territorial claims. The statement was made at a time when Shifita activities re-emerged in a large scale in Kenya's North-Eastern Province. In that year, shootings and reorganised assassinations were reported in the area. The matter came to a head with the killing of a District Officer near Somalia border followed by a raid by well trained gangs on the out-skirts of Garissa - the Provincial headquarter in which another five people were murdered. President Moi's opposition to Somalia's territorial claims continues to-date.

The foregoing analysis shows that Kenya opposes Somalia's territorial claims on her territory. Kenya would never allow Somalia to take an inch of her territory. That position was taken by President Kenyatta's government and has been continued by President Moi's government.

4.4 SOMALIA'S CLAIMS ON ETHIOPIA'S TERRITORY (THE OGADEN)

The Somali nationalists claim that the Ogaden region of Ethiopia ought to be detached from Ethiopia and annexed to the Somali Republic. Their claim is centered on the principle of self-determination. The area in question comprises approximately one fifth of the total territory of Ethiopia.⁶⁴

The main ethnic groups in Ethiopia are the Galla (Oromo); Abyssinians proper (including Agau & Beja); Somalis; Negroes; Sidama; Afar (Dankil) and Saho. The Galla are the largest single ethnic group in the population of Ethiopia, they comprise about 42.7% of Ethiopia's population.⁶⁵ They speak a Cushitic language and they inhabit the area immediately southwest, south and southeast of an imaginary line running along the Blue Nile through Addis Ababa and along the railway to Dire Dawa. Some of them have infiltrated, beginning in the sixteenth century, into regions along the eastern escarpment of the central plateau as far north as Makalle, and there is a small enclave of them fifty miles east of Lake Tana. The Galla extend all the way south of the Kenya border, and on their eastern limits are neighbours to the Somali of the Ogaden.

Populationwise, the Galla are followed by the Abyssinians (inc. Agau and Beja) who comprise about 32.6% of Ethiopia's population.⁶⁶ Abyssinians proper include Amharas, Tigre and Surage. Amharas speak semitic language - Amharic. They inhabit not only their home province of Amhara, but also Begemdir,

Shoa, and Gojam and the districts of Lasta in Wollo province. Their southern border runs along the edge of the Ethiopian tableland to the Dankil depression, then westwards following the Blue Nile, Awas watershed, and along the Blue Nile to the Sudan border, Addis Ababa is their southernmost extremity. They are christians.

Tigre are mostly nomad tribesmen inhabiting the lower hill country and the real lowlands of Eritrea, also some adjoining Sudan territory and the desolate Dankil Islands. The majority of them belong to the Beni Amer tribe who speak semitic language - Tigrinya. Other Beni Amer group speak Beja, a cushitic language. They are Christians.

Gurage on the other hand, inhabit the regions in Shoa province. They are mostly found around Lake Zeway, and the middle course of the Ghabie or Omo river. The population density is heaviest in the Woina-dega region, the Kolla region being more sparsely populated. There are among them Pagans, Muslims, Monophysites and Roman Catholics. They speak semitic language.

Agaw or Agau inhabit the northern and central Abyssinian plateau. They are mostly bilingual. The most northernly Agaw groups is represented by the Bilen in the Keren area of Eritrea. Most of them are able to speak Tigr'e. Their religion, until the Egyptian invasion of the Keren region in the second half of the nineteenth century, was Monophysite

Christianity, but since then Islam has claimed the allegiance of the majority of the Bilen, though Monophysite pockets survive, together with a sizeable minority of mission-converted Catholics.

Another Agaw group comprises the Kemtant and Kwara as well as the Falasha, all of whom live in the area west of the Takkaze and north of Lake Tana. Other Agaw groups live to the south of Lake Tana in Agawmeder and Damot. Those of Khamir and Khamta are found between the southern Tigrai and the amharic speaking Lasta.

Beja are divided into two main groups - a southern one of a pure hamitic strain, but speaking a semitic language (Tigr'e) who has only very recently emerged from an age-long serfdom, and a northern one, less pure in blood, but speaking a hamitic language (Beja) and displaying typical hamitic characteristics.

The third largest group in Ethiopia are the Sidama group. They comprise 10.1% of Ethiopian population.⁶⁷ They live in the south west of Ethiopia, in the area of Lake Margherita and the valley of the Omo river and its tributaries. While majority of Sidama have adhered to their paganism throughout the vicissitudes of their history, an upper layer of Hodya and Bali tribes did, at one time, accept Islam, and not a few have been converted to Christianity. They are of cushitic origin and they speak cushitic language.

Following the Sidama in number are the Negroes who comprise about 6.6% of the population of Ethiopia.⁶⁸ They are the Nilotic people who entered the country from the regions of the Nile Valley and the Nile tributaries, which lead to foothills of the Abyssinian highlands, and settled in the western parts of Ethiopia - generally not far from the Sudan. The Negroid group include, the Kuama and Baria, the former are found in the Beventu area between the rivers Gash and Sotit, the latter are found in the area north of the Gash river. The people are pagans with some relatively recent conversions to Islam and Protestantism. Among the small Nilotic group along the Ethiopian-Sudan border, Mekan, Mau and Gunza, are the Beni Shangul tribes who occupy the area between the Blue Nile and the Sudan frontier. They are Muslims.

In number, the Nilotic group are followed by the Somalis who comprise about 4% of the Ethiopian population.⁶⁹ They inhabit the entire southern portion of Ethiopia. Administratively, it falls within the Harar and Sidamo provinces. The place is populated almost exclusively by Somalis, except at its fringes where the population is intermixed and ethnic divisions are sometimes blurred. This is the case especially in the Dire Dawa, Harar, and Jijiga areas where a number of agricultural tribes are of mixed Somali and Galla origin. Moreover the Somalis are a minority in the three towns, which have large Amhara and Galla populations. Most of this area except for the three above mentioned towns is basically homogeneous, inhabited by the Somalis. They are of Cushitic race and they

speak a cushitic language. They are also Muslims although there is a survival in the interior of an ancient paganism.

The least in population are the Afar (Dankil) and Saho. They comprise about 2.8% of the population in Ethiopia.⁷⁰ Afar (or Dankil), inhabit the vast arid depression behind the Red sea Coast from the Gulf of Zulu to the Gulf of Tajura, with the Abyssinian highlands to the West. The Dankil refer to themselves as Afar, they are basically of hamitic stock, but considerable admixtures of other racial elements have been added. Their unity has been maintained by a common religion, Islam, and a common language, Afar or Dankil. They are nomadic herdsmen owning camels, cattle and goats.

The Saho live in the Coastal depression between Masawa in the North, the Gulf of Zula in the East, and the escarpment of the Akkula Guzay in the West. The majority are herdsmen. The indigenous language of the two large Saho tribes, the Assaorta and Manifere, is a cushitic tongue which is a kin to Dankil. They are Muslims with the exception only of those who have settled among the Christian highlanders.

Although Somalis are just one of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the Somali nationalists claim for them self-determination and reunion with Somalia. This claim goes back to the time of Sheik Mohammed Hassan who started the idea of pan-Somalism. His work was continued by the political parties formed in Somalia. The Somali Youth League (SYL) for example

opened branches in Kenya, Ethiopia, French Somaliland and British Somaliland with an aim of reuniting Somali people.

When Somali Republic achieved independence, it continued to demand self-determination for the Somalis living outside the Republic. The Osman-Shermarke administration (1960-1964) for example advocated the unification of Somali people. Article 6 (4) of Somalia Constitution adopted in July, 1960 stipulated that: "the Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories".

Speaking at the OAU Inaugural Summit Conference, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963, President Osman advocated the idea of self-determination for Somalis living outside the Republic and said that:

By becoming united, the Somali people feel that not only would their welfare be secured, but that as a single entity they would be able to contribute effectively to the ideals of African unity. In their present situation they cannot do so. They cannot develop into a coherent whole, while one and a half million of them are still living in areas administered by Britain, Ethiopia and France."¹

In relation to Ethiopian territory inhabited by the Somali people he said:

... it is not our wish, at this time to go deeply into the Somali territorial dispute with our host country-Ethiopia. We shall simply summarise our stand on this matter by saying that, Ethiopia has taken possession of large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants Let there be no misunderstanding about our intentions. The Somalia government has no ambitions or claims for territorial aggrandizement. At the same time, the people of the Republic cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren. The Somalia government, therefore, must press for self-determination for the

inhabitants of the Somali areas adjacent to the Somali Republic. Self-determination is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter, to which we all subscribe. If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to express their will freely, the government of the Republic pledges itself to accept the verdict.⁷²

This statement reveals that union of the Somali territories inhabited by Somalis became an official commitment of Osman-Shermarke administration.

Due to Somalia's claims on Ethiopia's territory, dispute between them broke into a conflict in February, 1964. At the OAU, Second Extraordinary Session of Council of Ministers meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 12th - 15th February, 1964 to discuss about Ethiopia-Somalia conflict of 1964, Mr. Abdullahi Issa of Somali Republic justified Somalia's course and said:

.... From the information at my disposal, the so called "bandits" are in fact a revolt of the Somali inhabitants in the area against Ethiopian domination, suppression and oppression. The solution to this problem will not be found by resorting to false charges against the Somali Republic but by the Ethiopian government facing squarely the realities of the situation and allowing the people to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination

....⁷³

The statement of Mr. Issa showed that Somali Republic supports the idea of self-determination for the Somalis living in Ethiopia. The resolutions adopted in that conference on Ethiopia - Somalia dispute stated that:

The Council of Ministers meeting in Dar es Salaam from February 12th-15th, 1964, for its Second Extraordinary Session, having heard the statements by the delegates of Ethiopia and Somalia concerning the tension between the

two sister countries, ... SOLEMNLY CALLS upon the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to order an immediate cease - fire and to refrain from all hostile action; RECOMMENDS to the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to take measures so as to put an end to all campaigns of provocative or insulting nature, by all media of communications; CALLS upon the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to act in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the OAU Charter by entering into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute; CALLS upon all African states with diplomatic missions in Ethiopia and Somalia to do their best to assist in the implementation of the cease-fire; DECIDES to place this border dispute on the agenda of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers which will meet in Lagos on February 24th, 1964, with a view to arriving at a peaceful and lasting solution.⁷⁴

Similarly, the Council of Ministers' meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, which took place in February from 24th - 29th, 1964, redirected the attention of Ethiopia and Somalia to adhere to the Addis Ababa spirit with respect to their disputes. The adopted resolutions on Ethiopia-Somalia conflict stipulated that:

The Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, from 24th-29th February, 1964, for its second session, Having considered the question of peaceful settlement of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, Having heard the statements of the delegations of Ethiopia and Somalia on the present position with regard to the border dispute between these two countries ... REQUESTS the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to maintain the cease fire which was ordered and the discontinuation of hostilities which intervened, and to refrain from any action which may compromise the cease -fire; REQUESTS the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article III of the OAU Charter as well as operative paragraph 3 resolution ECM/Res.3 (III) of 15th February, 1964, to open as soon as possible direct negotiations with due respect to paragraph 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter, with a view to reaching a peaceful solution of the long-standing dispute; REQUESTS them to make every effort towards full implementation of this resolution and to report on the result of their negotiations to the next conference of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU.⁷⁵

Somali's claims on Ethiopia territory was continued by Osman - Hussein administration. Speaking at the inaugural ceremony after his election as the Secretary-General of the Somali Youth League, Prime Minister Hussein specified the party's view with respect to pan-Somalism. He said that: "one of the very reason of life for our party, is the legitimate and strong wish for reunification of all Somali territories and brothers arbitrarily severed from their motherland".⁷⁶ The same statement was made when the Soviet Union Parliamentarians visited Somalia in December, 1964. Speaking in Mogadishu on December 25th, 1964, during a dinner hosted for the visiting Soviet Parliamentarians, the Prime Minister Hussein criticised what he called "arbitrary partition of the Motherland and its people into five parts by white and black colonialists towards the end of the last century. He told the visiting Soviet delegation that the two parts of Somalilands had been joined "but the other three parts still remained under foreign domination." The three parts of the Somalilands referred to in the speech were the NFD of Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the French Somaliland now known as Djibouti. By saying that three parts of Somaliland remained under foreign domination therefore, Hussein meant that Somalia still laid claims on Ethiopia's territory.

During his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Hussein again stated his position in relation to Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories. He said:

The Somali Republic's claim is not in the first instance a claim to Ethiopian or Kenyan territory. It is primarily a claim that the Somali people and territory under foreign domination should, as part of the evolution of African territories towards freedom from the former colonialists, be allowed to choose their own political future. This is the right of self-determination of the people in these areas and should they express a genuine desire to remain under Ethiopian and Kenyan administration and control, then there would be no question of a Somali claim of any kind. But those people in those territories must be given opportunity to express their own free choice.⁷⁸

The Prime Minister's statement during his visit to Federal Republic of Germany in 1966, further confirmed that Somalia laid claims on Ethiopian and Kenyan territories.

That policy was continued by the Sharmركة-Egal administration. On the occasion of the presentation of the new Cabinet, Prime Minister Egal emphasised his government's policy regarding the disputed areas and said:

The essence of the Somali problem is the desire of a people to participate in the spirit of the age-old and the post-colonial aspirations of Africans everywhere to decide their own destiny. Here are a people who find themselves denied the fundamental right of self-determination to link their fate, their lives and their destinies with wherever they saw their interests, their traditions and their ethnical origins. I have also realised that these points cannot be adequately conveyed to our neighbours except in an atmosphere of trust between our leaders and in the closeness of enduring friendlier ties.⁷⁹

Prime Minister Egal's statement confirmed that Somalia laid claims on Ethiopia's and Kenya's territories during his term of office. The speech indicated Egal's belief in achieving self-determination for the Somalis through the process of

peaceful negotiation. The policy was therefore not meant to ignore the major substantive issue, that is, self-determination of the Somalis in Ethiopia and elsewhere.

The military administration that toppled the Shermركة-Egal administration also continued with that policy. President Siad Barre for example made it clear that his administration was prepared to unite the five parts of Somaliland and to make sure that no Somalis lived under imperialism.⁸⁰ In one of his public speeches, Barre also said that:

The policy of the Revolution towards the parts of our country occupied by foreign powers, is that our people should be allowed peaceful self-determination, to gain their freedom. Since the birth of the Revolution, we have been calling upon Ethiopia, Kenya and France to respect this principle.⁸¹

President Barre's statements confirmed that Somalia under his administration still laid claims on Ethiopia's territory.

The above analysis indicate that Somalia, like in the case of Kenya, lays claims on Ethiopia's territory. As will be seen in the next section of this chapter however, Ethiopia strongly objects to Somalia's territorial claims.

4.5 ETHIOPIA'S POSITION ON SOMALIA'S CLAIMS.

Somalia's nationalism confronts Ethiopia with a grave challenge. It claims the right for the Somali populated region (Ogaden) to secede and join a "Greater Somalia state" That claim concerns one fifth of Ethiopian territory. But far more threatening than the loss of territory and population is the effect of the Somali challenge upon the political stability of this polyethnic state. Demands upon Ethiopian territory cause concern to the Ethiopian government who believes that the Somali demands might encourage demands by other groups in Ethiopia who belong to different races and divided by language, culture and religion. There are well over a hundred different groupings, speaking at least 50 different languages.

In view of the cultural and linguistic divisions, and of the historical antagonism in Ethiopia, it is feared that tribalism in Ethiopia may assume the character of secessionist movements. Sections of Galla population for example might be encouraged to press for a change in the status quo. The Galla people are spread throughout the country, and in some areas constitute the great majority of the population. Among some of them, notably in the southwest Ethiopia, memories of their post-colonial 'Independence', which they lost at the end of the nineteenth century are still very much alive. Others have been assimilated by Amharas and adopted Christianity. Although so far there is no Galla "nationalism", and the

Gallas are less conscious of their separate identity than the Somalis, the possibility of the development of some form of Galla self-assertion cannot be ruled out. At stake for Ethiopia is therefore not only one fifth of its territory occupied by Somalis, but the very foundation of the Ethiopian state. If the principle of secession is conceded to Somalis, it may stimulate similar demands by other sections of the population and gravely threaten the continued existence of the Ethiopian state in its present form. Ethiopia, therefore considers the Ethiopian Somalis to be Ethiopians. During his visit to the Ogaden region on 25th August, 1956, for example, Emperor Haile Selassie told the Ogaden Somalis that "all of them were by race, colour, blood, and custom, members of the Ethiopian family".⁸²

Ethiopia's opposition to Somalia's claims goes back to the time before Somalia's independence. As constitutional changes in British Somaliland during the late 1950s showed signs of catching up with the neighbouring Trust Territory of Somalia, which was self-governing in 1956, Ethiopia became increasingly alarmed. The possible union of the two territories was viewed by Ethiopia as a step towards the goal of 'Greater Somalia', for which Ethiopia blamed Britain. Criticising an article in the British Weekly Review - The Economist, the Government newspaper, The Ethiopian Herald, wrote sneeringly in August, 1958 of the "so-called British "commitment" given in 1956 to the principle of some kind of federation between the Trust Territory and British Somaliland." The Ethiopian Herald

continued: "a Greater Somaliland" under 'benevolent' British protection has long been visualised by United Kingdom policy makers in the Foreign Office as Britain's last hope for retaining some semblance of influence and authority in the Horn of Africa."³

That statement made by the Ethiopian government shows that even before Somalia's independence and federation with British Somaliland, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie was completely opposed to the idea of "Greater Somalia".

As the independence of Somalia and the unification with British Somaliland began to have its effect on the Somalis in the surrounding territories, Ethiopia began more activities to counter Somalia arguments. In 1961, Ethiopia said that the propaganda and incitements by Somalia did not seem to cease and that Somalia had intensified the campaign of unfriendliness towards Ethiopia, openly designed to satisfy Somalia's territorial expansionist ambitions at Ethiopia's expense. Haile Selassie, however, warned that:

These activities which the Government of the Republic of Somalia can scarcely deny constitute a great concern to Ethiopian government.... Such activities, if continued are likely not only to frustrate the Ethiopian government's persistent efforts to establish friendly and harmonious relations with Somalia and to lay the basis for the settlement of such problems as exist or may arise between them, to compel the Ethiopian government to reassess its policy towards Somalia with a view to taking those measures essential to the defence of its national unity and territorial integrity. Such measures would only be considered as last resort, after all else had failed, but for these measures Somalia alone would be responsible.... It should not be mistaken, the fact that

Ethiopia has the sovereign right and responsibility to protect her nationals and her territorial integrity. This concept has remained constant in the long history of international life. It could not be otherwise in this case. Since the closing of the nineteenth century Ethiopia was called to defend this integrity, she did so again with her blood in 1935 and 1941. It was her belief that the displacement of colonialism in the Horn of Africa, through the achievement of independence by the Republic of Somalia, this chapter was forever closed. Should Somalia leaders permit themselves to act in the role of those who had attempted to violate the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, the consequences would be most regrettable both in the interest of peace, of the region and of African unity.⁸⁴

The Emperor further said that, the unenviable background left by the consistent desire of Italy, during the period of her colonial hegemony on the Somali Coast, and insisted upon even during the period of her trusteeship tenure, seemed to be the policy of the Republic of Somalia towards Ethiopia. He, however, said that:

... the problems created and deliberately left unsolved by this period would yield to solution if, and only if, the Somalia leaders were willing to disabuse from their thinking any attempts to re-enact the episodes of the now discarded regimes.⁸⁵

Emperor Haile Selassie's statement showed further that Ethiopia opposes Somalia's claims on her territory, the Ogaden. Ethiopia will never allow Somalia to take an inch of her territory.

While reacting to the statement made by Somalia President, Aden Abdullah Osman, during the Organization of African Unity Inaugural Summit Conference which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Aklilou

Habte-Wolde condemned Somalia's territorial claims and warned that:

If the map of Africa were to be re-drawn on religious, racial and linguistic grounds, then the Somali Republic would not even exist because there is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali Nation.... It should therefore be the interest of all Africans now to respect the frontiers drawn on the maps by the former colonialists whether they are bad or good and Somalia should do the same. This is because, if countries moved into Somalia's direction, then even the Ethiopians would have claims to make on the same basis as Somalia, and for more on historical and geographical reasons.... The policy of Ethiopia, while never allowing an inch of her territory to be given up, had been: non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of every state, a peaceful settlement of all disputes on the established basis, co-operation between African brother states in all fields economic, cultural, and social, and to work actively for African unity.⁹⁶

The Ethiopian Prime Minister's statement in that conference confirmed further that Ethiopia was opposed to Somalia's territorial claims.

On November 14th of the same year, 1963, Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press report in which the Government condemned Somalia claims. The press said;

Somalia ... has followed a foreign policy of territorial aggrandizement directed to the annexation of the Ethiopian Province of Ogaden (E.P.O) and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.... At a time when the principle of respect for territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means are receiving increasing acceptance among nations, the Somalia government is pursuing a course which violates these principles at every step. The leaders of Somalia, despite all efforts to persuade them otherwise, continue to pursue the will-o-the-wisp of a "Greater Somalia" in public utterances, at international conferences, and in

inflammatory speeches at home. The usual argument adduced in support of the "Greater Somalia" concept is based on linguistic, religious and tribal affinity. However, were nations today to agree that these elements govern the existence of states in the modern world, it would be necessary to re-draw the political map of the world. Few nations today can lay claim to such homogeneity. Ethiopia will not part with one of her children because of any alleged linguistic, religious or tribal affinity, nor will Ethiopia permit the single inch of Ethiopian soil to be separated from the motherland on such specious grounds.⁸⁷

The Ethiopian press statement also confirmed that Ethiopia was opposed to Somalia's territorial claims. Ethiopia like Kenya would never part with an inch of her territory.

While explaining the reason why Ethiopia declared a state of emergency in 1964 to the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in February, 1964, Emperor Haile Selassie said that: Ethiopia had declared a state of emergency to exist in the region bordering the Republic of Somalia because of an armed attack carried out by Somalia military forces upon Ethiopian installations in Tug Wajale. The Emperor noted that, that act of aggression was the culmination of a series of incidents which had occurred with increasing frequency over the last several years in which Somali "bandits", organised and equipped by the Somalia government and led by Somalia officers, had crossed the frontier into Ethiopia to kill, pillage and destroy. He said that, that was one aspect of the policy of territorial aggrandizement being followed by the Republic of Somalia in pursuit of the achievement of a "Greater Somalia" at the expense of her neighbours, that policy he noted was blatant and blazen violation of the

enunciated in Article III of the OAU Charter."⁸

Speaking during the meeting, the Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Ato Ketema Yifru said:

...the policy being pursued by the Republic of Somalia is indirect violation of the fundamental principles governing relations between states embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. It is a direct and a clear violation of principles embodied in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity namely, the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the sovereign equality of all member states."⁹

The Foreign Affairs Minister's statement confirmed further Ethiopia's position. What needs to be emphasised here however is that, Ethiopia's position was maintained throughout Emperor Haile Selassie's rule and was continued by the administrations after him.

At his first news conference for the World press, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 18th September, 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam condemned Somalia's territorial claims on Ethiopia's land and the cause of the Ogaden war. He however predicted a long war to "throw out the invaders and promised that his government would do everything possible to protect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia."¹⁰

Mengistu's statement confirmed that his administration continued the policy of the previous administration.

Speaking at a dinner given in President Moi's honour in January, 1979, when Moi visited Ethiopia, Lt.Col. Mengistu condemned Somalia's territorial claims on Ethiopia's and Kenya's territories and said:

Our two countries should not hesitate from jointly confronting attempts made by the "expansionist government in Mogadishu towards realization of the futile dream of the so-called "Greater Somalia". Revolutionary Ethiopia shall not remain a silent spectator in the event of any threat against Kenya by the expansionist government of Somalia Peace and security can prevail in the Horn of Africa only when the Mogadishu government Publicly and unconditionally renounces the "expansionist designs" on Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti."¹

Mengistu's statement confirmed even further that his administration continued the previous administration's policy. Ethiopia, Mengistu said, would not remain silent in the event of any threat by Somalia.

The same position was stressed by Mengistu Haile Mariam when he visited Kenya in December, 1980. Speaking during a dinner hosted in his honour, Lt. Col. Mengistu condemned Somalia's territorial claims and said that:

... the arrogant government of Somalia has no desire to learn from history.... The country's policy of self-determination for Somalis living outside the Republic is a serious danger to Africa and to world peace We must therefore exert every effort to counter the sinister moves in our region as they constitute a direct threat to our existence and sovereignty.... In fact Somalia should renounce her territorial claims unconditionally."²

That position was continued by the new Ethiopian President Meles, Zenawi, who came to power after Col. Mengistu's

overthrow. Speaking during a dinner hosted in honour of President Moi, when Moi visited Ethiopia in November, 1991, President Zenawi said that his government was ready to protect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. In a joint communique signed at the end of President Moi's visit to Ethiopia, the two leaders declared their determination to protect their territories against any external power's claims. Zenawi's statement confirmed that his administration continued the policy of the previous government.⁹¹

The foregoing analysis shows that Ethiopia, like Kenya, opposes Somalia's territorial claims. That position was first taken by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and was continued by the governments that came after him.

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CHAPTER FIVE.

KENYA-ETHIOPIA-RELATIONS: THE SECURITY FACTOR5.0 INTRODUCTION

Every sovereign state, whether industrialised or non-industrialised has its own national interests which it is compelled to protect against the encroachment of other states. The exact nature of the national interests that must be preserved at all costs is open to various interpretations although it is a nation's territorial integrity and political independence that are paramount¹. To protect these interests, states need power which is seen as a means to an end. They therefore co-operate with each other so as to strengthen their power against other states. This fact is strongly advanced by the realist thinking¹.

This chapter seeks to examine and explain the extent to which the security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims contributed to their co-operative relations. The Somalia's territorial claims could be described as causing threat to both Kenya and Ethiopia, a threat that made the two countries to become allies so as to deter the Somalia moves.

5.1 THE CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

Somalia always aims at incorporating what was formerly the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The Somali nationalists wanted to unify somalis as early as 1920s. Sheikh Mohammed A. Hassan was for example determined to unify the Somalis under Islamic nation, while the S.Y.L. President, Haji Mohammed, wished their country to be amalgamated with the other somalilands to form one political, administrative and economic unit. He saw no future for Somalis except as part of a "Greater Somalia".³

The Osman-Shermerke administration (1960-1964) continued with the policy of self-determination for Somalis. Article 6 (4) of Somali Republic's Constitution for example stipulated that: "The Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories".

The same policy was continued by the Osman-Hussein administration. Prime Minister Hussein, stated that: "The right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule would continue to be the prime consideration of his government during its term of office"⁴.

Shermerke-Egal administration took over the same policy. After his nomination as Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal stated that, the Republic's foreign policy would not be separated

from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya, and France would not ignore the Somali lands they occupied³. He emphasized that, the unification of somali populated territories remained a "sacred aim of his government".

The same policy was continued by Siad Barre who came to power after toppling the Shermarke-Egal government. Barre for example made it clear that his administration was prepared to unite the five parts of Somaliland and to make sure that no Somalis lived under imperialism³. The five parts referred to by Barre include; the former British Somaliland; Italian Somaliland; French Somaliland, and portions of Ethiopia and Kenya occupied by the Somalis. His statement therefore showed that Somalia laid claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories during his administration.

Kenya and Ethiopia object strongly to Somalia's claims, they maintain that the realisation of self-determination would violate the territorial integrity of Kenya and Ethiopia. Their common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims was one of the factors that contributed to their co-operative relations during 1963-1991. Their official co-operative relations started in July, 1963 when the two countries signed the Ethiopia-Kenya Agreement of Co-operation and Mutual Defence Assistance. No text was published but in January, 1964 the Ethiopian government issued the following comment:

The agreement in the main deals with two aspects of assistance: economic and defence. Animated by the spirit of fostering African unity, the co-operation envisaged by the agreement is solidly based on the charters of the United Nations and that of the Organisation of African Unity. In addition the principles of territorial integrity and the right of political independence of nations are emphasized in no uncertain expression.... The defence arrangement envisaged in the agreement contains no other aim than to preserve peace and to maintain the territorial integrity of the two respective countries. No nation will remain silent while its borders are being tampered with or its territorial integrity challenged by an outsider. It is universally established that the one who seeks to seize the property of another or abrogate his right is the offender. Justice has always determined that the offender is responsible for his guilt. Had Somalia, applied her own resources as well as the foreign aid she receives, in co-operation with her brother neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia, for the economic development of the Somalia people rather than the territorial expansion and for the shedding of blood, the standard of living of the people of Somalia would have been alleviated'.

The words of the above quoted agreement shows that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. None of them would remain silent in case of Somalia attack. By signing the agreement, Kenya and Ethiopia showed that they were interdependent and that their national interests converged.

Somalia was opposed to the Ethiopia-Kenya agreement. Commenting on the agreement, the Somalia government said that:

We regret this agreement which breaks the Organisation of African Unity Charter to which Kenya and Ethiopia are parties..... The Somalia government has no alternative but to regard this agreement between the two neighbouring countries with whom it has a border dispute as intended to endanger, harm and threaten the peace of its territory'.

Replying to Somalia's comment, Kenya and Ethiopia governments said that:

The agreement is not directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state, African or non-African; is solely a defence treaty and would only become operative in the event when the territorial integrity and political independence of either contracting party is threatened by the external forces; is in conformity with both the United Nations Charter article 51 and the Organisation of African Unity Charter'.

When Emperor Haile Selassie visited Kenya in 1964, he and Kenyatta reaffirmed their countries' common aim to protect their territories. Speaking in the Kenya House of Representatives on June 9th, 1964 in the presence of Haile Selassie, the Prime Minister, Mr. Kenyatta, condemned Somalia's territorial claims and said:

Above all we must resist our common enemies not only those who war against us with guns and other weapons but, also the more insidious opponents of disease, ignorance, poverty and illiteracy¹⁰.

At the end of the Emperor's visit, the two countries agreed to take joint measures in accordance with the mutual defence treaty to defend their territories. Mr. Kenyatta's statement further confirmed that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations and that they were interdependent.

Their opposition to Somalia's claims was reaffirmed on July 15th, 1966 when the Consultative Committee formed by the two countries in 1964 met in Addis Ababa. The Kenyan Minister of Defence, Dr. Mungai, arrived in Addis Ababa on that date as the head of Kenyan delegation on consultations with the Ethiopian government. During the meeting, the two countries agreed to fight jointly against Somalia nationalists, "whom

they call shiftas". They said that their governments were not ready to give any part of their territories to Somalia.

Speaking on his return, Dr. Mungai said that the agreement had been reached with the Ethiopian government on "tougher measures" to eliminate shifta.¹² Dr. Mungai's statement again confirmed that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The same position was reaffirmed when President Kenyatta of Kenya visited Ethiopia in October 1967. Speaking at a State banquet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on October 31st, 1967, at the start of a seven day visit, President Kenyatta said that his government would never allow Somalia to take an inch of Kenya's territory¹³. He was however, grateful that the Prime Minister Egal had taken a positive step towards a peaceful solution of Kenya-Ethiopia disputes. A joint communique issued by Kenya and Ethiopia at the conclusion of President Kenyatta's visit stated that the two leaders: " ... reaffirmed their full support for the Organization of African Unity resolution on border disputes which pledged all member states to respect the borders existing on achievement of independence."¹⁴

The forgoing analysis shows that the 1960s was characterized by co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia for reasons related to Somalia's territorial claims on their territories. The security factor therefore made it imperative that Kenya and

Ethiopia co-operate. The findings also show that Kenya and Ethiopia were interdependent and that their national interests converged. They had a shared interest of protecting their territories against Somalia.

In the 1960s, Kenya and Ethiopia also condemned external powers' economic and military support to Somalia. The external powers that gave Somalia support then were the Soviet Union and the Middle East Arab countries. As early as 1963, Somalia received aid package of Ksh.33m to train and equip a force of 10,000 troops¹⁵. The Soviet Union on the other hand received communications and port facilities at Berbera. She was also given access to Somalia's air fields for the purpose of naval reconnaissance. By early 1970s therefore, Somalia had become the Soviet Union's loyal ally in Africa¹⁶.

The Soviet Union's support to Somalia continued until 1977 when Somalia changed allies. Between 1964 and 1976 Somalia received aid from the Soviet Union between Ksh.300m and 5 billion¹⁷. Within that period Somalia armed forces rose from 10,000 men in 1963 to 25,000 men in 1976.¹⁸ In the same period the Soviet military personnel based in Somalia were estimated at 1,000.¹⁹ By 1976 Somalia was also estimated to have had more than 250 tanks, more than 300 armed personnel carriers, and over 52 fighter planes²⁰. That military built up was however, undertaken in spite of the fact that Somalia had no internal security problems at the time. By 1976 Moscow had nearly 4,000 military and civilian advisers in Somalia²¹. That shows how

deeply the Soviet Union was involved in Somalia.

Kenya and Ethiopia did not however, view the Soviet Union's presence in Somalia favourably. Kenya blamed the continued conflict in the NFD between the shiftas and the Kenyan security forces on the external powers' support to Somalia. Both Kenya and Ethiopia felt that "so long as Somalia continued to get a lot of arms from the Soviet Union they were able to release some of the weapons to their brothers in the two countries who used them to attack Kenyan and Ethiopian territories". There was therefore, a strong anti-Soviet feeling in Kenya's and Ethiopia's circles before the fall of Haile Selassie.

In September 1974, change of leadership occurred in Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie's government was overthrown and replaced by a socialist - leaning, military junta - Dergue. Was Kenya's security co-operation with Ethiopia central to her stability and survival?. That was the question many observers of the region asked when Haile Selassie was overthrown. The immediate assumption was that Kenya was going to withdraw from her security co-operation with Ethiopia because the latter had become socialist and was strengthening her links with the Soviet Union while Kenya remained capitalist. Contrary to what had been predicted, Kenya did not disengage her security co-operation with Ethiopia, in fact, when the guidelines for Ethiopia's foreign policy were announced on September 12th, 1974 by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, the

Police and the Territorial Army that Ethiopia would maintain friendly ties with Kenya, Sudan and Somalia, the Kenya government said that they considered the undertaking as appropriate and hoped that the Emperor's exit would not affect the honouring of the existing Kenya-Ethiopia protocols¹¹.

According to Colin Legum, the two countries overlooked their divergent ideological stances and maintained their alliance. He aptly notes that because of its rooted suspicion of Somalia expansionism, Kenya maintained her close ties with Ethiopia's new regime despite the fundamental ideological differences. It was because of the shared Somali threat that the long-standing ties developed under Haile Selessie and Kenyatta survived the Ethiopian coup¹². Samuel M. Makinda also argues that, Kenya did not sever relations with Ethiopia after the Emperor's overthrow because she considered Somalia threat to be more serious and immediate than socialism or the Soviet Union's influence in Ethiopia¹³. Importantly then, it was the Somalia threat that made Kenya and Ethiopia to continue with their co-operative relations despite their ideological differences. The continuation of their co-operation was therefore geared towards the enhancing of their national interests.

Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories worsened in the mid-1970s particularly after Emperor Haile Selessie's overthrow. In those years, Somalia started to play down the unification goal and talked merely of striving for

self-determination of Somalis. It aroused hostility with all its neighbours, France over its activities in Djibouti, Ethiopia over its plans to detach the Ogaden region, and Kenya over its plans to detach the NFD. Due to Somalia's claims, Ethiopia and Somalia fought the Ogaden war of 1977 - 1978.

According to Samuel M. Makinda, Kenya sided with Ethiopia during the Ogaden war because it saw Somalia's readiness to send troops into the Ogaden as a rehearsal for what might take place in its NFD. According to Colin Legum on the other hand, because of its strong resistance to Somalia's claims to the NFD, as part of the "Greater Somali nation", Kenya in September, 1977 became the first black African state to ally itself openly with the Dergue²⁵. When I interviewed some government officials concerned with Kenya-Ethiopia relations, I confirmed that it was because of the close Kenya-Ethiopia co-operation and mutual fears of Somalia's intentions that Kenya vigorously opposed Somalia during the Ogaden war.

During the war, Kenya made the port of Mombasa available to Ethiopian imports traffic. Kenya also donated food supplies including 10,000 tones of maize to Ethiopia which was then confronted with famine caused by drought and wars²⁶. In early 1978, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Munyua Waiyaki, visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While in Addis Ababa he predicted victory for the Ethiopians in the Ogaden where they were fighting to repulse the invasion launched by Somalia. He said that:

Kenyans are over-joyed by your victory and just as your struggle was our struggle, so we now feel that your success is our success. Kenyans stand is not merely concerned with defending the principle of territorial integrity, but more so with defending the integrity of the Organization of African Unity Kenya is ready to jointly destroy anyone who wishes to annex territory".

Waiyaki's statement again proved the convergence of national interests of Kenya and Ethiopia. They were ready to jointly destroy anyone who wished to annex territory (Somalia). His statement further confirmed that the security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

In a joint communique signed at the end of Waiyaki's visit, Kenya and Ethiopia outlined conditions to be met by Somalia before peace in the region could be achieved. They called on Somalia to renounce all claims to the territories of Ethiopia and Kenya and to openly declare its acceptance of United Nations' and OAU's resolutions on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. On his return Minister Waiyaki warned that the events in the Ogaden be a lesson to Kenya of the Somalia danger. Confirming the report that Kenya had given material support to the Ethiopians during the Ogaden war, he promised to do all he could to help Ethiopians get more of the vehicles they urgently needed in the war with Somalia²³.

Kenya's and Ethiopia's calls on Somalia to renounce all territorial claims on their territories also confirmed that co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations was contributed to by the security factor.

During the Ogaden war, Kenyan official and unofficial attitudes were uniformly condemnatory of Somalia policies. There was wide spread fear that Mogadishu would next turn its guns on the one fifth of Kenya territory inhabited by ethnic Somali nomads. A typical criticism of Somalia actions was broadcast on radio Nairobi on 26th September, 1977. Kenya strongly sided with Ethiopia against Somalia. The conflict in the Horn of Africa was blamed entirely on Mogadishu. The radio Nairobi said that:

The Somalia's expansionism is unacceptable, Somalia is an aggressor both in words and deeds. She has invaded Ethiopia militarily and she lays claims on large chunks of Kenyan territory, her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they will set the continent and the world aflame²².

Kenya's newspaper, Daily Nation, on the other hand observed that, Somalia's attack on Ethiopia nullified the arguments which was often advanced by the Somalia regime that all it was interested in was helping Somali speaking people in the Ogaden and NFD of Kenya to pursue their rights to self-determination. The paper noted that it was clear that Somalia's intentions were simply to annex the two regions of Kenya and Ethiopia and as a result achieve its goals of creating a "Greater Somali nation". Kenya and Ethiopia, the paper noted, had both demonstrated that such a move would lead to strong resistance²³.

Kenya and Ethiopia also condemned the external powers' support to Somalia during the Ogaden war. The external powers that

gave support to Somalia that time included the United States and her allies and the Middle East Arab States.

The late 1970s witnessed change of alliances in the Horn of Africa. As 1975 passed and 1976 approached, it became apparent that the Dergue was serious in its determination to pursue a policy of socialist development, however not until 21st April, 1976 did the Dergue issue its detailed policy statement and political program. The document proclaimed the establishment of a Peoples Democratic Republic in Ethiopia with socialism as its philosophical underpinning. The document was suffused with Marxist terminology and popular democratic symbolism. It was unmistakable signal by the Dergue of its ideological preference. On December 29th, 1976, the Ethiopian news agency reported that the Dergue would be reorganized in accordance with Marxist - Leninist principles. In the same month, the Soviet Union agreed to supply the Dergue with \$ 100m in arms¹¹.

The ideological shift by Ethiopia's elite made possible a subsequent shift in international alliances. The Carter administration which was concerned about the Dergue's human rights violation and its tilt towards the USSR lost no time criticising the Ethiopian government. Within a month of being sworn in, the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, told a Senate hearing on 25th February, 1977 that he had removed Ethiopia, Argentina and Uruguay from the list of recipients of American aid because of their human rights violations. Vance's

decision came barely three weeks after Mengistu had taken power. The United States also informed Ethiopia in April, 1977 that it had planned to reduce personnel in the Military Assistance Advisory Group, MAAG, and that it would close down the Kagnev Station in September of that year.

The Dergue responded on 23rd April, 1977 by asking Washington to close down the Kagnev Station and the United States Information Service in Addis Ababa within four days and gave marching orders to the remaining MAAG personnel. Then on 27th April, 1977 the Pentagon suspended all United States arms supplies to Ethiopia, that made Ethiopia all the more to turn to the Soviet Union for weapons.

The United States overtures to Somalia suggesting the availability of military assistance took form in June, 1977. Carter was reported to have instructed his aides to "get Somalia to be their friend" and within two months, the United States had gone on to announce that it was willing in principle to supply defensive weapons to Somalia.¹¹

Washington did not want to go alone in that complex situation so it sought to co-ordinate its strategy with some Western allies and regional friends. Washington thought it was necessary to involve Britain, France, Italy and West Germany. It consulted also with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan which were inclined to support Somalia. On July 2nd, 1977, a Department of State spokesman said that the United States,

Britain, France and West Germany had agreed in principle to provide Somalia with arms. Two days later President Carter commented that while the United States did not want to begin a competition with the Soviet Union in arms supply, in the case of Somalia the United States was trying to work not on unilateral basis but in conjunction with other nations.³³

France proffered aid to Somalia in the event Ethiopia carried her counter offensive into Somalia. In addition 60 French built AMX 33 tanks began to arrive in Somalia via Saudi Arabia. The Federal Republic of Germany also supported Somalia. It gave about \$18m in economic assistance to Somalia.³⁴ British diplomacy followed the same pattern astuent of the United States. The United Kingdom like the United States made offers of military assistance to Somalia prior to the escalation of the Ogaden war after which it temporarily withdrew its offers only to be given again to Somalia after her withdrawal from the Ogaden .

At the same time, Arab countries gave support to Somalia. The war in the Ogaden and shift of Somalia away from the Soviet Union's influence provided the context for improved relations between Arab states and Somalia. A number of Arab states provided weapons, momentary assistance and tanks and promises of various kinds of military involvement in the event of Soviet Union and Cuban backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia were made. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan offered to come to the aid of Somalia in the event of the Ethiopian invasion of

Somalia.

The more conservative governments of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran began to move support for Somalia particularly after the latter gave the Soviet Union the boot in November, 1977. Egypt, Syria and Iraq also expressed solidarity with Somalia. Saudi Arabia provided Somalia with \$5m³⁵ in financial assistance most of which was used for buying arms. It also offered Somalia over \$ 400m³⁶ provided Somalia agreed to break away from the Soviet bloc and seek Western support. Egypt provided Somalia with military assistance and when the Cuban and Russian backed Ethiopian counter-offensive began, it decided to reinforce its token military presence in Somalia with about 2000 Egyptian personnel for non-combat duty³⁷. In addition, Sadat claimed that Egypt and Sudan promised a brigade troops to Somalia amounting to a total of 4,000 - 5,000 men financed by Saudi Arabia in the event of Ethiopian invasion³⁸. Egypt and Sudan also gave Somalia some of their old stocks of Soviet weapons paid for by Saudi Arabia³⁹.

Iran was the most active Muslim country that backed Somalia in the 1977-1978 Ogaden war. The Shah of Iran even announced that Iran would not remain idle if Ethiopia attacked Somalia, a statement which brought a sharp warning from the Organization of African Unity, about Iranians meddling in African affairs.⁴⁰ In January, 1978 the Shah went to the extent of declaring that he would commit his troops to the defence of Somalia if the Cuban and Ethiopian troops crossed the border.⁴¹ Pakistan,

Syria, Iraq, among others also gave support to Somalia of one kind or another.

Kenya and Ethiopia condemned the support given to Somalia during the Ogaden war by the external powers like Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, and by the Arab States like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Kenya for example made representations to Britain, United States, France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt with a view to persuade them to stop arming Somalia. Kenya sent a twelve man delegation to Washington and London in March, 1978 to state its view about the conflict in the Horn of Africa and to request greater arms support. The delegation led by Daniel T. Arap Moi, the then Kenya's Vice President included the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Finance Minister and the Attorney General. After their meeting with President Carter, Carter reaffirmed the United States' arms and finance support for Kenya and promised to maintain an arms embargo against Somalia so long as it had troops in the Ogaden.

On 14th August, 1978 the United States Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Moose, told Somalia Ambassador to the United States that although their agreement in Principle to provide defensive arms to Somalia still stood, Somalia's involvement in the Ogaden prevented the implementation. Two weeks later the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Philip Habib, told the Somalia Ambassador that Washington would not approve transfers to Somalia of United States manufactured arms in the

hands of third world countries while Somalia was involved in the Ogaden. The same stand was again emphasised by President Carter. Speaking in Washington, D.C., President Carter said that:

....before the United States would be ready to discuss providing economic aid or selling defensive weapons to Somalia, there would have to be a tangible withdrawal of Somalia forces from the Ogaden and the renewed commitment not to dishonour the boundaries of Ethiopia or Kenya."

By sending a delegation to the United States to ask the U.S to stop arming Somalia, Kenya proved that she was concerned about what was taking place in Ethiopia. Because of their interdependence therefore, Kenya called on those states to withdraw their support to Somalia.

Concern was also expressed over the Arab countries' support to Somalia. On 10th February, 1977, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister summoned Iranian Ambassador in Nairobi to complain about the Shah's call for military support for Somalia and suggested that the Shah was encouraging the aims of a "Greater Somalia." Kenya then cut diplomatic relations with Iran over her involvement in the war of the American friends in the region. Kenya also condemned Saudi Arabia's support to Somalia. In 1977 when Kenya learned that Saudi Arabia was providing arms to Somalia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Munyua Waiyaki, said that: "we do not want Saudi Arabia to pay for guns which in the present climate in the Horn of Africa could be turned against us".

Kenya also sought the good offices of Egypt to get Somalia

repudiate any territorial ambitions it had on Kenyan and Ethiopian territories. On 15th February, 1978, Egyptian's cargo plane carrying arms to Somalia was also intercepted on Kenya air space and were forced to land. Egypt retaliated by impounding two Kenyan passenger planes in Cairo until Kenya government allowed the Egyptian aircraft to fly back.¹⁴ The Kenya government however, condemned Egypt's support to Somalia and said that:

By supplying Somalia with arms, Egypt is encouraging continued conflict in the Horn of Africa.... One would expect Egypt to be interested in continued peace in the area for her own national interests. ...by continuing to support a poor nation whose leading quality is aggression, Egypt is not only failing in her duties as a leading African nation, but it is also undermining her own interests in the area.¹⁵

The preceding therefore shows that Kenya played a significant role in explaining to many countries why Somalia should not be provided with arms before it renounced claims on neighbouring states, namely: Kenya, Ehtiopia and Djibouti.

Ethiopia also expressed concern over those state's support to Somalia. Protest notes alleging Western diplomatic and military assistance for Somalia were delivered in February, 1977 to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia and Iranian Embassies in Addis Ababa. A rift developed between Ethiopia and Germany after Germany announced a D.M. 25m credit to Somalia. Convinced that Somalia would be free to use the money to purchase arms, Ethiopia retaliated by expelling the West German ambassador in Addis Ababa whose presence had been found

detrimental to traditional relations between the two countries. Ethiopia also condemned Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's support to Somalia. Both Cairo and Riyadh were described as agents of international imperialism.

By condemning those powers' support to Somalia, the two countries showed that their national interests converged and that they were interdependent. The two countries did not want Somalia to get any kind of support which would make it militarily strong because they feared that those arms would be used against them. The 1970s was therefore characterised by co-operation for reasons related to the two countries' common interest to protect their territories against Somalia's territorial claims.

Although Kenya under President Kenyatta's leadership supported Ethiopia in the Ogaden war, the year 1978 witnessed change of leadership in Kenya following Kenyatta's death in August of that year. The then Kenya's Vice-President, Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, was later sworn in as Kenya's second President. Change of leadership in Kenya did not however interfere with co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

When President Moi came to power, he pursued the policy of co-operation with Ethiopia previously initiated by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selessie. He for example made his first visit abroad since becoming President when he paid a State visit to Ethiopia from January 29th to 31st, 1979.

During his visit, President Moi was accompanied by a delegation which included the Attorney General; Ministers for Foreign Affairs; Power and Communication; Commerce and Industry; Works; Home Affairs and Co-operative Development.

Speaking at a dinner given in his honour by Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, President Moi condemned Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories and said that:

To sacrifice oneself in the defence of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is an extremely noble and honourable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep love for one's country and its future. As you all know, Kenya and Ethiopia are opposed to any territorial claims by Somalia. Our two countries are committed to uphold and respect the charters and decisions of the international organizations. We attach great significance to the sanctity of borders of African states as obtained at the time of their political independence.... None respect of this resolution would constitute a serious backward step for the entire continent, just at a time when unity, co-operation and positive neighbourliness are desperately needed for the development of every African country".

President Moi's statement even confirmed further that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

While in Ethiopia President Moi also reaffirmed his administration's commitment to co-operate with Ethiopia irrespective of the latter's political ideology. He further said that:

The excellent relations that exist between Kenya and Ethiopia started long ago.... Kenya and Ethiopia share a long, well recognised and peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and co-operation We are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims must be avoided at all costs and we call upon Somalia to lay down her territorial claims. Kenya will never part with an inch of her territory¹.

President Moi's statements confirmed even further that Somalia's territorial claims threatened Kenyan and Ethiopian governments. That threat resulted in their co-operative relations.

Speaking earlier, Lt.Col.Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia reviewed the friendly ties and long-standing relations between Kenya and Ethiopia and said that:

If Somalia attacks Kenya, Ethiopia will join the war. Our two countries will not hesitate from jointly confronting any and all attempts being made by the expansionist government in Mogadishu towards the realization of the futile dream of the so called "Greater Somalia". I would like to reaffirm that, for her part, Ethiopia will not remain a silent spectator in the event of any threat directed against Kenya by Somalia Peace and security can prevail in the Horn of Africa, only when Somalia publicly and unconditionally renounces its expansionist designs over Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti².

President Mengistu's statement also confirmed that security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. By saying that their two countries would not hesitate from jointly confronting any attempts being made by the expansionist government of Mogadishu, Mengistu confirmed that Kenya and Ethiopia were interdependent and that their national interests converged. He showed that Kenya-Ethiopia relations

were characterised by co-operation for reasons related to security reasons.

At the end of President Moi's visit, the two countries signed a treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The twelve-article treaty stressed the determination of the two countries to ensure their independence, territorial integrity, unity and the inviolability of their borders and, to that end, to continue to co-operate in the political, diplomatic and military fields⁴⁷. Article five of the treaty clearly stated that the contracting parties reaffirmed their unswerving opposition to expansionist policies pursued by any country. That was believed by the observers to refer directly to Somalia who lays claims on the territories of both nations as well as its allies.

Article two of the same treaty stated that, the two countries strive for the strengthening of peace and friendship on the basis of equality, mutual interests and co-operation in keeping with the principle of the inviolability of territorial integrity, and the sacredness of borders, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Article six of the treaty on the other hand stated that, in order to safeguard their independence, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of their borders, the two contracting parties would continue their co-operation in the political, diplomatic and military fields. Ethiopia and Kenya also

reaffirmed that for durable peace to prevail in the Horn of Africa, Somalia was to fulfil four minimum conditions.

1. That Somalia must unconditionally renounce claims on the territories of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and declare null and void all instruments asserting such claims.
2. That Somalia must openly and solemnly declare its acceptance of the principles and decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, governing inter-state relations including the principles of the inviolability of state frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.
3. That Somalia should declare that it would scrupulously respect international agreements as well as the principles of non-use of force in the settlement of disputes.
4. That Somalia should pay prompt and adequate reparations for the war damages inflicted on Ethiopia during the Ogaden war of 1977 -78¹⁵.

The conditions given to Somalia by Kenya and Ethiopia proved even further that Somalia's territorial claims made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate. According to Korwa G. Adar, it was because of Kenya's and Ethiopia's security concerns that the two countries signed the Ethiopia-Kenya treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, when Moi visited Ethiopia in 1979.

Kenya and Ethiopia also reaffirmed their opposition to Somalia's territorial claims on March 24th, 1980, during the Kenya-Ethiopia Consultative Committee meeting which took place at Mombasa. During the meeting, the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister, Col. Feleke Giorgis, condemned Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories. He said that:

Kenya and Ethiopia will never allow Somalia to take an inch of their territories.

We are resolute in our determination to protect our territories against Somalia and we stand firm to the principle of the Organization of African unity which sees boundaries as uti possidetis. Somalia should therefore renounce unconditionally her territorial claims¹¹.

What needs to be emphasised here is that, the Consultative Committee meeting took place at a time when shifita activities re-emerged in Kenya's North-Eastern Province and at a time when Somalia renewed claims on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

During the meeting, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Robert Cuko, also condemned Somalia's intentions in Kenya and Ethiopia. He said:

Kenya believes in practice and sincerely promotes the spirit of good neighbourliness. But Kenya has made it clear that we will not tolerate any interference in our internal affairs and in particular, the sanctity of our internal borders Kenya will not give an inch of her territory to Somalia¹².

The statements of Kenya's and Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs Ministers also proved that co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations was contributed to by Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims. A fact of shared interest therefore made it imperative that the two countries co-operate.

President Moi's visit to Ethiopia in 1979 was reciprocated in December, 1980 when Mengistu Haile Mariam visited Kenya. President Mengistu's visit also came at a time when shifita activities re-emerged in Kenya's North-Eastern Province and

when Somalia renewed her claims on the Ogaden. In that year, shooting and reorganised assassinations were reported in Kenya's North-Eastern Province. The matter came to a head with the killing of the District Officer near Somalia border, followed by a raid by well trained gangs on the outskirts of Garissa-the Provincial headquarters in which another five people were murdered.

In the same period, Ethiopia-Somalia relations continued to deteriorate due to continued shifta attacks in the Ogaden. In spite of Revolutionary Ethiopia's continued efforts towards normalising relations and firm stand for peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the expansionist nature of the reactionary leaders of Somalia kept on growing every day.

The Ethiopian Head of State, Col.Mengistu Haile Mariam, was greeted by President Moi when he arrived in Nairobi on December 1st, 1980 at the start of a four day official visit to Kenya. While in Kenya, Mengistu hailed the excellent relations between Kenya and Ethiopia and thanked the government of Kenya for the warm and brotherly welcome and generous hospitality extended to him and his colleagues. Touching on Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories, Lt.Col.Mengistu said that:

... the arrogant government of Somalia has no desire to learn from history. The country's policy is a serious danger to Africa and to World peace. Somalia has opted to be an agent of imperialism. We must therefore exert every effort to counter such sinister moves in our region as they constitute a direct threat to our existence and sovereignty Somalia should

renounce her claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories unconditionally⁵¹.

While speaking at the dinner hosted in honour of President Mengistu, President Moi also attacked the expansionist policies and military adventurism of Somalia which he described as: "a thorn in the flesh of both Kenya and Ethiopia". He said:

Mogadishu should renounce all territorial claims on Kenya and Ethiopia This should be done in a public and convincing manner to facilitate meaningful expansion of our present nucleus of regional solidarity Whether openly or in terms of fomented guerrilla warfare, Kenya and Ethiopia have been subjected to barbaric forms of aggression for over two decades or longer, and lives continue to be lost or sacrificed today It is tragic, that our efforts to create an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence and regional solidarity have constantly been negated or undermined by Somalia. And it is barely incredible that the Organization of African Unity has itself had no greater success. ... The government of Kenya is left with no alternative, but to make military provisions, supported by administrative measures, designed to defend our territorial integrity against any kind of threat by Somalia. The sovereignty of the Republic of Kenya is beyond question, and will be fully protected against any form of aggression and intrigue⁵².

The statements made by President Moi of Kenya and President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia confirmed even further that Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's territorial claims contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The two leaders also reiterated conditions which Somalia was to meet for a durable peace to be achieved in the Horn of

Africa. The conditions were:

- (a) Renunciation of all claims to the territories of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti;
- (b) Respect for frontiers;
- (c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and non-use of force in international relations⁵³.

Kenya and Ethiopia also continued to condemn external powers' support to Somalia in the 1980s. After the Ogaden war, Somalia continued to get support from the United States and her allies and from the Middle East Arab states. After the announcement of the complete withdrawal from the Ogaden in mid-March, 1978 Western overtures to Somalia were resumed. A high level delegation of the United States Department of State, led by the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Moose, arrived in Mogadishu on March 8th, 1978. Discussions concerned the conditions for United States provision of defensive weapons and economic assistance to Somalia. The United States for example, agreed to provide Kenya and Somalia with \$53m and 40m respectively⁵⁴. Those figures were increased to \$57m (Kenya) and \$95.5m (Somalia), during the 1982 and 1983 fiscal years⁵⁵. That was an indication of Reagan's administration determination to strengthen United States' presence in the two countries.

In the period between 1989-1991 Somalia received more than \$500m in military and economic assistance from United States⁵⁶. It also got aid from Italy and other Western powers. Between 1979 - 1983 for example, Italy assisted Somalia with military aid totalling to \$410m and signed \$200m economic aid with

Somalia⁵⁷. Britain also promised Somalia military aid. In the same period, France provided Somalia with aid amounting to \$5m⁵⁸. That was an indication that the Western industrialised countries resumed the responsibility of supplying Somalia with economic and military aid.

Kenya and Ethiopia however, condemned those powers' support to Somalia. In March, 1983 for example, Presidents Daniel Arap Moi and Mengistu Haile Mariam called on states providing military assistance to Somalia including the supply of weapons on whatever scale to stop doing so, noting that such assistance would provide a recipe for continued protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa⁵⁹.

The same call was made in October, 1987 by the Kenya-Ethiopia Consultative Committee. The Committee was meeting in Addis Ababa. During the meeting, Kenya and Ethiopia condemned Somalia regime for its expansionist activities and reaffirmed their governments' commitment to preserving their territorial integrity and security of boundaries as enshrined in the OAU and U.N. charters. They also called on all countries to desist from arming the Somalia expansionist regime under any pretext whatsoever⁶⁰.

Kenya's and Ethiopia's statements further confirmed that, the security factor contributed to their co-operation. The 1980s, like the 1970s and 1960s, was therefore, characterised by co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia for reasons related to

security factor. The 1990s also opened with the same objectives.

Although Mengistu and Moi condemned Somalia's territorial claims, the year 1991 witnessed again change of leadership in Ethiopia. In that year Mengistu was overthrown. His overthrow did not however affect the co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The continuity of the two countries' co-operative relations was proved when President Moi visited Ethiopia on 19th November, 1991. During his talks with the new Ethiopian President, Meles Zenawi, President Moi said that his visit would strengthen the long standing relations between Kenya and Ethiopia⁶². Zenawi said that the visit would open new opportunities of co-operation and confirmed that Ethiopia attached great value to her relations with Kenya⁶².

In a joint communique signed at the end of Moi's visit, the two leaders declared their determination to protect their territories against any external powers' claims⁶². President Moi also confirmed his government's support noting that Kenyans regarded Ethiopians as their brothers and sisters. The President further said that his commitment to peace, security and regional co-operation was the basis of his visit to Ethiopia.

The forgoing analysis has shown that, The security factor made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate .

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CHAPTER SIXGEOPOLITICS AND THE CO-OPERATIVE KENYA - ETHIOPIA RELATIONS6.0 INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics refers to the effects of a country's position on its politics. It was a term coined by Friedrich Ratzel who lived in the period between 1844 and 1904 in Germany.

Geopolitists like Karl Haushofer, Mahan, Mackinder and Margaret Sprout looked at the question of man's relationship to nature. They believed that geographical position of a state; means of communication, that is, roads, rail roads, highways and access to important waterways; determined a state's relationship to other states. For Karl Haushofer, geopolitics represented the relationship of political phenomena to geography. The purpose of geopolitics in Haushofer's conception was to place the systematic study of geography at the disposal of a militarised reich by relating national power to geography.¹ Margaret Sprout also believed in the importance of geography in explaining political behaviour. She believed that geography affected all human and non-human, tangible and intangible phenomena. She held that geographical position of a state conditioned her relations with the other states.²

Mahan on the other hand believed that access to important waterways influenced a nation's policy behaviour. Mahan concentrated on the impact of naval power upon political

potential. He wrote about the sea and national power and said that control of the seas and especially of strategic important waterways was crucial to great power status. He argued that states with ready access to the oceans had greater potential for major power status than states which were landlocked. The landlocked states always strived to co-operate with those states so as to get access to those important waterways.³

Mackinder on the other hand considered technological development of land transport as crucial to a state's development and her relations with the other states. According to Mackinder, the rail roads and subsequently the international combustion engines and the construction of modern highways and road networks, made rapid transportation within much of the land of Eurasia possible. He continued to argue that with the advent of the rail roads, the Middle East was becoming as accessible to Germany by land in the 20th century as it had been to Britain by sea.⁴ One would aptly say that, Mackinder meant that rail roads, roads, highways and important waterways helped to facilitate inter-state relations.

This chapter investigates the extent to which geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations with an aim of proving or disapproving our third hypothesis which states that geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

6.1 GEOPOLITICS: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO CO-OPERATIVE
KENYA - ETHIOPIA RELATIONS.

Available evidence show that geopolitics was one of the factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963 - 1991. Geographically, Kenya and Ethiopia are near each other. When I interviewed some Kenya government officials concerned with Kenya - Ethiopia relations, I confirmed that, that nearness made co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations possible.

Kenya and Ethiopia are found in Eastern Africa. Ethiopia for example, in the Northeast touches the Red Sea for nearly 500 miles along the Eritrean - Dankil Coast with ports of Massawa and Assab; in the East it's bordered by Djibouti; while in the Southeast, Ethiopia is separated from the Indian Ocean by Somalia; in the South, it's neighbour is Kenya and in the West and North, it's neighbour is Sudan⁵. The Republic of Kenya on the other hand is located on the Indian Ocean Sea board. It's bordered by Tanzania in the South; Uganda in the West; Sudan and Ethiopia in the North; and Somalia in the East.⁶

From the above analysis, it is clear that Kenya and Ethiopia are near each other and that they are neighbours. As a result of their nearness, for example, Kenya and Ethiopia depend on each other for trade (for details see chapter 3,). That interdependence made it imperative that they co-operate .

Kenya and Ethiopia also shared peaceful borders. The sharing of peaceful borders made it imperative that they co-operate. Kenya and Ethiopia boundary was marked by the Ethiopia - British Agreement signed by Ethiopian and British governments in 1907. Since the time of Kenya's independence, Kenya and Ethiopia shared peaceful borders. None of them ever laid claims on the other's territory or boundary. The only problem that faced the two countries as far as their borders were concerned were border raids.

When Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia visited Kenya in 1964, he confirmed among other things that Kenya and Ethiopia shared peaceful borders. He noted that sharing of peaceful borders brought Kenya and Ethiopia together.⁸ The Emperor's statement confirmed that peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia contributed to their co-operative relations. Due to peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia for example, the two countries in May, 1966 signed an agreement of Visa abolition.⁹

What needs to be emphasised here is that although Kenya and Ethiopia shared peaceful borders in those years, border raids were reported to cause problems for Kenya and Ethiopia. The border raids did not however, affect the co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. In April, 1964, for example, it was reported that, seven people were killed and 9,000 head of livestock stolen in an attack on the Turkana by the mixed Ethiopian and Sudanese raiding parties.¹⁰ It was also reported in August of the same year that about 200 Meville and Dongiro

tribesmen on the Ethiopian border with Kenya raided Kenya-Turkana tribesmen killing about one hundred and twenty one people, sixty three of whom were children.¹¹

On October 25th, 1965, it was again reported that a party of about one hundred raiders from Ethiopia killed fourteen Gabbra tribesmen and wounded many others when they attacked a village in the Marsabit Police Division of Kenya.¹²

The border raids problem did not, however, interfere with cooperative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. In fact the two countries solved the border raid problem peacefully. It was reported in Kenya House of Representatives on September 15th, 1964 that steps would be taken to disarm Ethiopian tribesmen who had carried out raids into Kenya territory.¹³ The Parliamentary Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office, Mr. J. Nyamweya, for example, said that those raids in no way reflected the policies of the two countries or governments, between whom relations were very good. The raids, he said, were inspired by the traditional hostilities of the tribes, and the Ethiopian government was as much concerned about them as was the Kenya government.¹⁴

More attempts to try and solve the border raid problem came in November, 1964. At its third meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, on November 13th 1964, the Kenya - Ethiopia Consultative Committee discussed the problem of border raids from Ethiopia. The Kenya government was very glad to receive assurance that

the Ethiopian government was taking vigorous measures to arrest the persons involved in the Turkana border incidents.¹⁵

As a result of border raids, one Kenyan Member of Parliament, Mr. Godana, called for diplomatic break with Ethiopia.¹⁶ Moving a motion calling on the Kenya government to break diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, Mr. E.D. Godana said in Parliament on February 13th, 1966 that between October 22nd, and November 20th, 1965, about 90 people were killed in the Marsabit district by Shiftas from both Ethiopia and Somalia. He said that most of the raiders came from Ethiopia. Ethiopia he said, was one of the "most dangerous" elements against Kenya in Africa, and he demanded the appointment of a commission to find out how many people had been killed in Kenya and how many heads of cattle had been stolen by Ethiopians since independence.¹⁷

Replying to the motion, however, the then Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi (now Kenya's President), said that Ethiopia and Kenya would continue to be friendly countries and that the Government of Kenya would not accept breaking off of diplomatic relations. Moi reminded the Members of Parliament that a committee was already considering the border raids question and that the government continued to review conditions there. But, he said, "raids across the border, were a traditional activity and took place in both directions. He noted that the people of Marsabit area were also to accept some responsibility for those raids and that

the Ethiopians were not therefore alone to blame."¹⁰

Peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia continued to contribute to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations in the 1970's. In the year 1970, for example, when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia visited Kenya from June 10th - 13th, him and President Kenyatta signed an agreement demarcating the border between the two countries. A joint communique issued at the end of the Emperor's visit said that the signature of the treaty: "represented a triumph for the cause of good neighbourliness, harmony and understanding between neighbouring states." They were confident that: "secure and recognised borders helped to foster friendship and co-operation between sovereign states with common borders"¹¹. The words of the communique proved that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The agreement, the communique said, was regarded as:

concrete fulfilment of the principles of friendly relations and co-operation enshrined in the Organization of African Unity Charter. The agreement in demarcating the border also regularises the position with regard to watering, grazing and access rights, preservation of law and order and joint inspection of the boundary and its maintenance.

Speaking after his return to addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie said that the treaty marked: "a new milestone" in the relations between the two peoples. He added that the treaty would: "no doubt help in strengthening their fraternal relations and the area of co-operation between their two

countries both in the great interest of African unity and in the universal peace."²⁰. President Kenyatta had said earlier that:

This treaty is an event of great historical significance not only to our two countries but to the whole of Africa. Our continent has experienced more than its share of sufferings out of border problems. We believe that we have taken a step in the right direction, a step that will serve as an example to other African countries. This agreement is indeed a monument to the ideals of good neighbourliness and mutual understanding between sovereign states which are the cornerstone of African unity. It represents a victory for the whole of Africa.²¹

President Kenyatta's statement confirmed even further that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

During his visit to Ethiopia in January 1979, President Moi of Kenya also stressed the common commitment of the two countries to uphold and respect the charters and decisions of the international organizations and emphasised the great significance the two countries attached to the sanctity of borders of African states as obtained at the time of their political independence. He said that non-respect of those resolutions would constitute a serious backward step for the entire continent, just at a time when unity, co-operation and positive neighbourliness were desperately needed for the development of every African country. A treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia was signed shortly before the end of President Moi's visit. The twelve-article treaty stressed the determination of the two countries to

ensure their independence, territorial integrity, unity and the inviolability of their boundaries and, to that end, to continue to co-operate in the political, diplomatic and military fields. President Moi's statement also confirmed that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations²².

When I interviewed some Kenya government officials concerned with Kenya-Ethiopia relations, I confirmed that Kenya and Ethiopia continued to share peaceful borders by 1991. I also confirmed that the sharing of peaceful borders continued to contribute to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

Although Kenya and Ethiopia continued to share peaceful borders, border raids continued between the two countries. Kenya and Ethiopia however, did their best to solve the problems peacefully. At a meeting of Ethiopia-Kenya Consultative Committee which took place in the Ethiopian Southern town of Awasa in January, 1981, the delegations of Kenya and Ethiopia emphasised that apart from the reported border raids in that year, their countries continued to share peaceful boundaries. They agreed among other things to maintain peace on the border and curb the activities of infiltrators²³.

The question of cattle rustling along Kenya's northern border, especially with that part adjoining Ethiopia continued to cause problems to the security authorities of both Kenya and

Ethiopia in 1983²⁴. Kenya and Ethiopia however, tried to solve the problem peacefully. Regular meetings of Ethiopian and Kenyan officials, for example, took place during 1983 to thrash out those problems²⁵. Relations between the two countries however, remained good despite Ethiopia's increasingly closer ties with the Soviet bloc.

Border raids problem continued to occupy most of the work of Ethiopia-Kenya Consultative Committee in the beginning of 1990s. The two countries, for example, discussed continuing depredation by Ethiopian cattle rustlers in 1990. An official Kenyan spokesman in December, 1990 said that 144 Kenyans had been killed over the last nine years, while the rustlers had made across the border with 19,000 head of cattle and 3,000 goats²⁶. Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia however, remained friendly and co-operative based on the convergence of their national interests in the beginning of 1990s, despite the fundamentally different policies of the regimes of President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and President Daniel T. Arap Moi of Kenya.

The means of communication shared by Kenya and Ethiopia also helped to strengthen co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Communication between Kenya and Ethiopia was made possible by the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway which was completed in 1977 and by the port of Mombasa. According to Mahan, access to important waterways influenced a nation's foreign policy behaviour towards other nations. Mackinder on the other hand

maintained that, technology of land transport was crucial to a state's development. According to Mackinder, the rail roads and subsequent international combustion engines and the construction of modern highways and road network made rapid transportation possible.

As early as 1963 when Kenya got her independence, Kenya and Ethiopia emphasised the need to improve their communication. When Emperor Haile Salessie of Ethiopia visited Kenya in 1964, President Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie again emphasised the need to improve communication between Kenya and Ethiopia²⁷. The same emphases were made by Kenya and Ethiopia in March, 1967 when an Ethiopian delegation, led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ato Ketema Yifru, arrived in Nairobi. He said that the basic aim of the talks was to explore all avenues which would strengthen Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Matters discussed included, defence, international affairs, economics and communication²⁸.

The same emphases were again made when President Kenyatta visited Ethiopia in October, 1967. In a joint communique issued at the end of the President's visit, the two leaders stressed among other things the importance of increased contacts between their countries and towards that end decided to speed up the completion of the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway which was then under construction²⁹. The highway was completed in 1977. Kenya's side was completed in 1974, while Ethiopia's side was completed in 1977.

Since its completion, the highway has made communication between Kenya and Ethiopia possible. The two countries use the highway among other things to transport their exports to and imports from each other. Kenya's important waterway, the port of Mombasa, was also used by Kenya and Ethiopia to export and import their goods. During the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, Kenya donated food supplies including 10,000 tones of maize to Ethiopia which was then confronted with famine caused by drought and wars³⁰. The food supplies were transported to Ethiopia through the port of Mombasa. Kenya also gave 50 road tankers and 20 heavy lorries worth Ksh. 7.2m for use on the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway³¹. In the same year, Ethiopia used the port of Mombasa to transport her import goods. According to Colin Legum, Ethiopia used the port of Mombasa as a port of entry for some of its supplies, including oil when Djibouti, Assab and Massawa ports were either too congested or closed to the Ethiopians³².

From the above analysis, it is evident that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. A fact of shared means of communication made it imperative that the two countries co-operate. The analysis further confirmed that Kenya and Ethiopia were interdependent.

The position of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa also played an important role in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The Horn of Africa is a region

inhabited mainly by Somalis. More specifically the Horn of Africa covers an area of about 374,200 square miles, covering the whole of the Somali Republic, about one third of French Somaliland (now Djibouti), about one fifth of Ethiopia, and about one fifth of Kenya³³.

The Horn of Africa has been a microcosm of the tensions that beset the World. One of the causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa is Somali irredentism. The Somali irredentism has largely been responsible for the conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, on the one hand, and between Kenya and Somalia, on the other hand. Somalia's goal since 1960 when she got independence has been the desire to 'liberate' and unite in a "Greater Somali nation" the other Somali-inhabited territories of Djibouti, Ethiopia's Ogaden region and Kenya's North - Eastern Province (formerly known as the Northern Frontier District or the NFD). For details refer chapter 4. PP.95-102.

What should be mentioned here is that, Somalia's claims on the two countries' territories, was brought about by the partition of the Horn of Africa. European contacts with the Horn of Africa were limited until 1869, when the opening of the Suez Canal focused attention upon the areas strategic importance³⁴. The heightened interest in the area and the wave of European imperialist expansion in Africa led to the establishment of the European colonies and protectorates in the 1880s. That coincided with the consolidation of power in Ethiopia under

Menelik II, and the extension of Ethiopian authority into areas which were previously under only nominal Ethiopian sovereignty³⁵. By the end of the century, the Horn of Africa had been partitioned among Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia. The Somalis were divided into British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland and portions of Kenya and Ethiopia³⁶.

The Somali nationalists objected to the division of Somali people into five parts. They aimed at uniting all the Somalis divided by the colonial powers into a "Greater Somali nation". Part of their aim was achieved in 1960 when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were amalgamated to form Somalia. The Democratic Republic of Somali (Somalia) got her independence in 1960. After Somalia's independence, one of the country's objective was to liberate and unite in a "Greater Somali nation" all the Somalis living in the other three Somali-inhabited territories of Djibouti, Ethiopia's Ogaden and Kenya's Northern Frontier District now known as the North - Eastern Province of Kenya.

Kenya and Ethiopia as was found out in chapters four and five objects very strongly to Somalia's territorial claim. The two countries would never allow Somalia to take an inch of their territories. Kenya's and Ethiopia's policy was therefore motivated by the need to protect their border and prevent any attempts to undermine their territorial integrity. The threat of Somali irredentism therefore brought Kenya and Ethiopia

politically close, culminating in the signing in 1963 of a mutual defence pact.

According to Samuel M. Makinda, by signing the mutual defence pact with Ethiopia in 1963, Kenya hoped that the two partners would jointly contain what they saw as Somalia's expansionist goals³⁷. Makinda's argument confirmed that the position of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa was important to Kenya in as far as Somalia continued to lay claims on her territory. Kenya's position in the Horn of Africa was also important to Ethiopia for the same reasons.

According to Makinda, there were a number of reasons why Kenya did not end her co-operative relations with Ethiopia when Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown. He said that, as long as Somali threat to both Kenya and Ethiopia remained, Kenya did not see any compelling reasons for withdrawing from security co-operation with Ethiopia. Kenya, he said, also appeared to consider Somali threat to be more serious and immediate than socialism or Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Finally, Makinda noted that, until late in 1977, there was still a Soviet military presence in Somalia. The Kenya government feared that its abandonment of Ethiopia could lead to a rapprochement between Ethiopia, which was politically close to the USSR, and the Soviet-backed Somalia, resulting in an isolated Kenya being more vulnerable to Somalia attacks³⁸. Makinda's argument proved further that Ethiopia's position in the Horn of Africa was important to Kenya in as long as

Somalia continued to lay claims on her territory. It also confirmed that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. Kenya and Ethiopia continues to co-operate to-date for the same reasons.

In 1981, Kenya started to improve relations with Somalia. After the Organization of African Unity Good Offices Committee meeting which took place in Nairobi in 1981, Kenya's President Daniel T. Arap Moi and Somalia's President Siad Barre held talks in Nairobi and issued a joint communique reaffirming Kenya's and Somalia's commitment to continue to promote better understanding and collaboration in the interests and welfare of the peoples of the two countries. According to Samuel M. Makinda, the explanation for Kenya - Somalia rapprochement was that the two countries which allowed the United States' forces access to their military facilities in return for economic and military assistance in 1980, were under American pressure to ease the tension between them³⁹. Somalia did not however renounce her claims on Kenya's territory.

When Kenya's relations with Somalia started thawing in 1981, there was speculation that the pro-American Kenya and Somalia might be looking for a way of isolating the pro-Soviet Union Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia, however, continued to co-operate as though there was nothing going on between Kenya and Somalia. In fact, the Kenya - Ethiopia Consultative Committee met in Mombasa, Kenya, in January, 1983 to discuss the border problems.⁴⁰

In July 1984, President Daniel T. Arap Moi of Kenya paid a State visit to Somalia, the first ever by a Kenyan Head of State, and called for the lessening of tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. President Moi also asked Kenya and Somalia to forget their past differences and search for peace as: "... the only logical and positive way towards economic and social, development in the Horn of Africa".⁴¹ His trip to Somalia made many people to speculate that Kenya - Ethiopia co-operative relations would end. However, Kenya and Ethiopia continued to co-operate. Two months after President Moi's visit to Somalia, for example, he went to Ethiopia to attend the tenth anniversary of the Ethiopia Revolution and conferred with Mengistu Haile Mariam.⁴²

According to Samuel M. Makinda, by seeking a rapprochement with Somalia, Kenya wanted to influence Somalia relations with Ethiopia. But while Kenya's intentions was to draw somalia closer to Ethiopia, Somalia's intention was to draw Kenya away from Ethiopia. Kenya's aim according to Makinda was to bring Somalia to regional co-operation network which it had been trying to establish with Ethiopia and Sudan.⁴³

Ethiopia and Somalia also started to improve their relations in 1986. By early 1986, relations between Somalia and Ethiopia appeared to be thawing. Somalia's President Siad Barre and the Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti on 16th January, 1986, during the inaugural conference of the six nation Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

(IGADD). IGADD members are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Two days later, Barre and Mengistu announced that they were setting up an ad hoc committee to discuss their differences ⁴³. That was a sign that Somali and Ethiopian leaders were willing to start a dialogue, and officials of the two countries held talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1986. But there has been no indication as to how far they are prepared to go to resolve their differences.

When we carried out the interviews, we asked the Kenya government officials concerned with Kenya-Ethiopia relations whether they thought that the position of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa had ceased to be of importance to Kenya with the improvement of Kenya-Somalia relations and Ethiopia-Somalia relations. Those interviewed, however, said that as long as Somalia had not renounced officially her claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories, the position of Kenya and Ethiopia continued to be of great importance to the two countries. The statements made by those Kenya officials proved that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The preceding therefore shows that geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. Nearness of Kenya and Ethiopia to each other; the peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia; improved means of communication between the two countries and the position of the two countries in the Horn of Africa, made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate.

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CHAPTER SEVEN**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION****7.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter gives chapter by chapter summary of the thesis. It also attempts to demonstrate our findings in relation to our objectives and hypotheses. The general conclusions from each chapter will contribute towards either proving or disapproving our hypotheses.

7.1 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS.

This thesis analyses and explains the nature of inter-state relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. Chapter one deals with introduction. The background of the problem, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, hypotheses, literature review, justification of the study, theoretical framework and methodology are given in this chapter.

Chapter two looks at the background situations of Kenya and Ethiopia with an aim of showing that the two countries had different colonial backgrounds, and different ideologies. There was also change of leadership in both countries. Ethiopia's historical background, leadership and ideology in Ethiopia, Kenya's historical background and leadership and ideology in Kenya are all discussed in this chapter. It was deduced that, Kenya and Ethiopia had different colonial backgrounds and

different ideologies. There was also change of leadership in both countries. Change of leadership in Kenya and Ethiopia and the two countries' colonial and ideological differences did not however affect their co-operative relations.

Chapter three addresses Kenya - Ethiopia trade interactions. Specifically the chapter seeks to establish the extent to which bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations with an aim of proving or disproving our first hypothesis which states that trade was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

Chapter four discusses Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories. The aim is to show that Somalia lays claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories and that Kenya and Ethiopia objects very strongly to those claims. The historical background of Somalia's claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories, Somalia's claims on Kenya's territory, Kenya's position on Somalia's claims, Somalia's claims on Ethiopia's territory and Ethiopia's position on Somalia's claims are all discussed in this chapter. It was deduced that Somalia lays claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories namely the NFD and the Ogaden respectively. Kenya and Ethiopia however objects very strongly to those claims.

Chapter five looks at the extent to which the security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims contributed to co-operative Kenya -

Ethiopia relations with an aim of proving or disapproving our second hypothesis which states that the security factor was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

Chapter six looks at the extent to which geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations with an aim of proving or disapproving our third hypothesis which states that geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations.

7.2 OBJECTIVES AND MEANS OF ANALYSIS

As noted in the forgoing, it is meaningful to first examine our objectives and show how we analyzed the data. This will logically lead us into analysing our findings visa-a-vis the hypotheses.

Our general objective was to analyze and explain the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991. More specifically, our first objective aimed at showing the extent to which bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. In this case, we analyzed Kenya's trade with Ethiopia in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and beginning of 1990s.

We found out that, Kenya's trade with Ethiopia in the 1960s was little. The trade between the two countries however, increased

tremendously in the 1970s, 1980s and beginning of 1990s. By analysing the two countries' trade in those years, we were trying to establish whether change of leadership, different ideologies and different colonial backgrounds of Kenya and Ethiopia had a negative impact on Kenya-Ethiopia trade relations. Available evidence, however, shows that the above mentioned factors did not interfere with co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

Our second objective aimed at showing the extent to which security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. In this case we analyzed our data by dividing the work into six sections.

First, we looked at the general historical background of Somalia's territorial claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories; second, we looked at Somalia's claims on Kenya's territory (The N.F.D); third, we looked at Kenya's position on Somalia's claims; fourth, we looked at Somalia's claims on Ethiopia's territory (the Ogaden); fifth, we looked at Ethiopia's position on Somalia's claims; and sixth, we looked at the convergence of national interests of Kenya and Ethiopia, i.e, the joint interests of Kenya and Ethiopia to protect their territories against Somalia's territorial claims.

It was deduced that Somalia's territorial claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories goes back to the time before Somalia's independence. Kenya and Ethiopia, however, object very strongly

to Somalia's claims on their territories. They would never allow Somalia to take an inch of their territories.

Our third objective aimed at showing the extent to which geopolitics contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. We analyzed our data by first, looking at the extent to which Kenya's and Ethiopia's nearness to each other contributed to their co-operative relations; secondly, we looked at the extent to which peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia contributed to their co-operative relations; thirdly, we looked at the extent to which means of communication shared by Kenya and Ethiopia contributed to their co-operative relations; fourth, we looked at the extent to which Kenya's and Ethiopia's positions in the Horn of Africa contributed to their co-operative relations.

It was deduced that: Kenya's and Ethiopia's nearness to each other; the fact of shared peaceful borders by Kenya and Ethiopia; the shared means of communication by Kenya and Ethiopia; and the positions of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa all played an important role in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

7.3 HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

Our first hypothesis was that bilateral trade was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The findings show that despite change of leadership in both Kenya and Ethiopia and despite the fact that the two countries had different ideologies and different colonial backgrounds, they traded with each other during 1963-1991. It was noted that interdependence of the two countries and the convergence of their national interests made it imperative that they trade with each other.

The emphases to improve trade between Kenya and Ethiopia were made by the two countries as early as 1960s. Those emphases continued to be made in the 1970s, 1980s and beginning of 1990s. According to Kenya and Ethiopia, fraternal relations and mutually beneficial economic co-operation could not be achieved without promotion of trade between the two countries¹. The emphases made by Kenya and Ethiopia to improve trade between themselves confirmed that trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The available trade figures between the two countries and the findings of the interviews carried out also confirmed that fact.

Further findings especially those of trade figures in tables four and five, i.e., Kenya's trade with Tanzania and Kenya's trade with Uganda respectively and those of the interviews carried out, however shows that Kenya traded more with her two East African neighbours than it did with Ethiopia. Basing our argument on those findings, therefore, we conclude that bilateral trade contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations only to a small extent.

Our second hypothesis was that security factor or Kenya's and Ethiopia's common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's claims was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

The findings show that Somalia lays claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories. They base their case primarily on cultural considerations. There is no territorial ambitions but government of a free Somali state has special duty towards its kinsmen across the borders who have a common cultural heritage and origin and who live against their will under a system of government which is not of their choosing². Since Somalis form a majority in Somalia, the argument arises that Somali minorities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti should for linguistic and religious reasons be united to form a "Greater Somalia"³.

Further findings shows that Kenya and Ethiopia object very strongly to the idea of a "Greater Somalia". They would not consider any proposition which cause them to surrender any part of their territories. Despite change of leadership in both countries and despite the fact that Kenya and Ethiopia had different colonial backgrounds and different ideologies, they both feel that the realisation of self-determination would violate their territorial integrity. Emperor Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile Mariam and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia; and Presidents Kenyatta and Moi of Kenya maintained the same position.

When we carried out the interviews, we noted that the interdependence of the two countries and their common aim to protect their territories against Somalia's territorial claims, made it imperative that they co-operate. Those interviewed emphasised that compared to bilateral trade, and geopolitics, security factor contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations to a greater extent. Basing our argument on the findings of the interviews carried out and on the findings of the available written data, therefore, we conclude that the security factor was the major factor that contributed to co-operative Kenya - Ethiopia relations. A fact of shared interest therefore made it imperative that the two countries co-operate.

Our third hypothesis was that geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The findings show that geopolitics played an important role in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. The nearness of Kenya and Ethiopia to one another, for example, made it imperative that the two countries co-operate. Sharing of peaceful borders by Kenya and Ethiopia also made it imperative that the two countries co-operate. It was noted that Kenya and Ethiopia shared peaceful borders during 1963-1991, none of them laid claims on the other's territory. Cattle rustling problems across Kenyan and Ethiopian borders were, for example, solved peacefully. During the interviews, it was confirmed that the peaceful borders shared by Kenya and Ethiopia brought them closer.

Further findings show that the means of communication shared by Kenya and Ethiopia also made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate. The transportation of Kenya's and Ethiopia's exports and imports was, for example, made possible by those means of communication. Finally, the findings show that the position of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa made it imperative that Kenya and Ethiopia co-operate. The Kenyan government officials concerned with Kenya-Ethiopia relations interviewed during the study emphasised that Ethiopia's and Kenya's positions in the Horn of Africa was of great importance to the two countries for security reasons. As long as Somalia continued to lay claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories, they said, Kenya's and Ethiopia's positions in the Horn of Africa would continue to be of great importance to the two countries.

When we interviewed some Kenya government officials concerned with Kenya-Ethiopia relations on whether they thought that geopolitics was significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations, they said that, comparatively, geopolitics contributed to the two countries' relations only to a small extent. Of the three hypotheses therefore, hypotheses two came out as significant in contributing to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations.

7.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

This study provides some modest contribution to the field of international relations in general and the study of African

International Relations in particular. Those interested in knowing about the significance of economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations during 1963-1991 are now provided with some data. They should, however, know that there were also other factors apart from economic and political factors that contributed to co-operative Kenya-Ethiopia relations. Those factors were, however, not part of our study, since they included cultural and religious factors.

7.5 RESEARCH PROBLEMS

We encountered certain problems in the course of gathering our data which should be indicated in order to enlighten the reader of the nature of this study.

First, we discovered that despite the twenty-eight years of Kenya - Ethiopia interactions, not sufficient literature has been generated dealing with their relations. Many scholars have mainly been writing on either the determinants of Kenya's or Ethiopia's foreign policies in general.

We sought to overcome that problem by reading different journals especially, the African based journals like the African Research Bulletin, Africa Diary, Africa Contemporary Records and others.

Secondly, we found it problematic to acquire data on Kenya-Ethiopia security matters. This problem was considered to have been accentuated by the sensitivity of the topic. Documents like

the signed treaties and communiques could not be reached even after a long trial as the officers concerned considered them confidential.

We again overcame this problem by reading journals like the African Research Bulletin; Africa Contemporary Record; Africa Diary; Keesings Contemporary Archives and Newspapers where we could either find the whole treaty and the whole communique' or part of the treaty and communique' quoted.

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